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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the pervading sense of crisis among Gibraltar’s eighteenth-
century British governors, caused by the large-scale geopolitical conflicts of the period and the 
multiethnic inhabitants of the territory, and the commanders’ attempts to manage that crisis by 
embracing technologies of governmentality. Captured by Anglo-Dutch forces in 1704, Britain 
formally acquired this Mediterranean possession in 1713. Shortly after its acquisition, Britons 
embraced the territory as their own, proclaiming it to be a “bulwark” of Great Britain and 
“bastion” of Britishness. However, the reality on the ground belied such rhetoric. British 
Gibraltar was in actuality a Mediterranean meeting ground, bringing together peoples, ideas, and 
goods from across the region. The vast majority of the town’s population was comprised of 
foreign migrants who settled in Gibraltar seeking the many opportunities that the British garrison 
offered. These individuals brought with them a variety of cultural, religious, and political 
identities that impacted the growth and development of the territory, creating a multi-cultural 
space that was both produced by and participated in the Mediterranean world.  
These foreign bodies and their foreign mores also impacted the governance of the 
territory. As experienced British military men, Gibraltar’s governors desired a British Gibraltar 
like they had imagined, one with British laws, institutions, and peoples to serve as a British 
Protestant stronghold in a hostile (non-Protestant) sea. Yet this was not possible with the current 
composition of the town’s population. As they understood it, the foreign inhabitants posed a 
threat to their efforts to secure Gibraltar for Britain. Concerned by these individuals and driven 
by the need to manage this population, Gibraltar’s governors employed techniques of 
governmentality in order to better “see” any threats and “know” the population. In their minds, 
practices like surveillance, census taking, quarantine, and the use of documentary regimes were 
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necessary for them to grasp Gibraltar’s peoples and take control of the territory. The 
commanders consolidated this knowledge into an imperial archive, which they believed provided 
an orderly and rational picture of the territory. I argue that the governors embraced such tactics 
because they believed this would enable them to solve the population problem in Gibraltar and 
secure Britain’s hold on the garrison. However, the commanders’ “necessary” technologies were 
largely driven by their exaggerated fear of the foreign and their unsuccessful desire to create an 
ideally British Protestant territory. The governors’ tactics suggests a larger trend of population 
management that developed across the empire, but Gibraltar offers a key promontory of this 
phenomenon on a local level. 
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Introduction 
Upon the formal acquisition of Gibraltar in 1713, Queen Anne expressed her excitement 
about Britain’s new Mediterranean territories to Parliament: “Our Mediterranean-Trade, and the 
British-Interest and Influence in those Parts, will be secured by the Possession of Gibraltar and 
Port-Mahon, with the whole Island of Minorca, which are offered to remain in my hands.”1 
Captured by Anglo-Dutch forces in 1704 during the War of the Spanish Succession, the British 
government was eager to retain Gibraltar, which they believed offered a prime position for the 
state to involve itself in Mediterranean politics and trade, enabling the expansion of Britain’s 
influence in the region.  As Thomas Gordon, a prominent British author, proclaimed, “Gibraltar 
was “the most important Place in the world to the trade and Naval Empire of England, the Key 
of the Mediterranean, the Terror of our Enemies, and the best Pledge of our new Friendships.”2 
In the minds of Gordon and many other Britons in the metropole, Gibraltar was a miniature 
British island, a “Bulwark of their Country” that promoted British ideals, culture, and trade in a 
hostile and pagan sea.3 
Yet Gibraltar’s British governors living in the territory found a very different reality: 
instead of a bastion of Britishness, Gibraltar was a Mediterranean meeting ground of peoples, 
ideas, and goods from across the region with few British peoples or practices present. As one 
governor commented, Gibraltar was “Chiefly Inhabited by Jews, Moors & Papists of Different 
                                                          
1 “Third Parliament of Great Britain: Second session - Begins 21/3/1712,” The History and Proceedings of the 
House of Commons: volume 4: 1706-1713 (London, 1742), pp. 294-334. 
2 Thomas Gordon, Considerations Offered Upon the Approaching Peace; And Upon the Importance of Gibraltar to 
the British Empire (London, 1720), pp. 27-28. 
3 John Trenchard, Cato’s Letters, Vol. I: Saturday, November 5, 1720, “Reasons to Prove that We Are in No Danger 
of Losing Gibraltar” (no. 1), p. 2. 
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Nations, who may prove of Dangerous Consequence to the Town.”4 Under British rule, Gibraltar 
became a transnational and transimperial space, despite British administrators’ efforts, as 
migrants flocked to the garrison from homes across the shores of the Mediterranean. These 
Mediterranean bodies, and the cultural and religious identities they brought with them, were a 
cause for alarm for the British governors. Despite being residents of a British territory, the 
inhabitants’ status as “trans-imperial subjects” made them suspect to the military governors; as 
both foreign and familiar, they appeared to be an inherent threat to the security of the territory 
and its continued possession by Britain.5 Their ties to foreign (Catholic) states, many of which 
were at odds with Britain throughout the century, coupled with their intimate knowledge of the 
garrison, its strengths and its weaknesses, discomfited the governors. In the minds of the 
commanders, the best way to protect the territory, beyond that of military armament, was to 
create a truly British territory, supported by British subjects, laws, customs, and religion. Fixated 
on the territory’s lack of British bodies and beliefs, the governors deemed Gibraltar’s 
Mediterranean population to be a “crisis” that required constant management. 
 My dissertation examines this idea of crisis in eighteenth-century Gibraltar and its 
British governors’ attempts to manage that crisis by embracing technologies of governmentality. 
Such a view of Gibraltar, especially during that period, is contrary to most portrayals of the 
British Rock, which depict Gibraltar as an unconquerable British stronghold rather than an 
embattled territory plagued by the threat of invasion, rebellion, and war. The large-scale, 
geopolitical conflicts of the eighteenth century, many of which involved Gibraltar or were 
geographically near the territory, were a serious and valid concern for the military governors, 
                                                          
4 GGA, Crown Land Series A, Bland’s Court of Enquiry, fo. 1-2. 
5 E. Natalie Rothman, Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2011). 
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who were single-handedly responsible for maintaining the garrison and protecting the territory. 
Yet, the governors’ greatest concern, which I argue was largely unfounded, was the governance 
of Gibraltar’s multiethnic population. Such fears, in conjunction with the surrounding 
international threats, drove the governors to adopt what Foucault describes as techniques of 
population management or governmentality.6  
As this dissertation shows, technologies of governmentality were consciously deployed in 
eighteenth-century Gibraltar in an effort to closely manage and control its Mediterranean 
inhabitants. Governors employed various means of surveillance to “see” the structure of the 
society and the landscape of the population. Through these surveys, they believed that they could 
“know” the entire picture of the territory and its people, enabling them to suss out potential 
threats. These individuals were divided into “schematic categories,” based on ethnicity or 
religion, granting the governors a sense of control and order over possible troublemakers. The 
governors reproduced this vision of the territory and their knowledge of the inhabitants through 
the conscious creation of an archive, which they used to facilitate their own as well as their 
successors’ administration of Gibraltar.7 While this gathering of knowledge comprised the 
“official” vision of Gibraltar, it was by no means coherent and comprehensive but rather 
contingent and ever-changing based on the governors’ particular needs and desires related to 
                                                          
6 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, 
Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 87-104. 
7 For more work on archives as a form of governmentality, see Antoinette Burton, Dwelling in the Archive: Women 
Writing House, Home, and History in Late Colonial India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Betty Joseph, 
Reading the East India Company, 1720-1840: Colonial Currencies of Gender (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2004); Lisa Lowe, “The Intimacies of Four Continents,” in Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in 
North American History ed. Ann Laura Stoler. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), pp. 191-212; Tony 
Ballantyne and Brian Moloughney, “Asia in Murihiku: Towards a Transnational History of Colonial Culture,” in 
Brian Moloughney and Tony Ballantyne (eds), Disputed Histories: Imagining New Zealand’s Pasts (Dunedin: 
University of Otago Press, 2006), pp. 65-92; Ben Kafka, The Demon of Writing: Powers and Failures of Paperwork 
(Cambridge: Zone Books, 2012). 
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each individual situation. Each of these technologies came about as reactionary responses to 
what the commanders believed was necessary to better secure the territory and solve the vexing 
problem of population. In their minds, Gibraltar’s security could only be guaranteed through 
constant population management and the development and use of such technologies.  
Despite the governors’ arguments that these practices were “necessary” to properly 
govern and secure the territory, I contend that they were primarily driven by their (exaggerated) 
fear of the foreign and the desire to create a hegemonic British Protestant identity. In 
commanders’ minds, their solution to the problem of Gibraltar was to encourage and grow a 
homogenous population that fulfilled their ideas of what a British subject and British colony 
should look and be like. Because this imagined vision could not and did not come to be, the 
governors embraced these technologies as a means of flexing the arm of the state against those 
who sought, consciously or unconsciously, to undermine this goal. Yet their efforts to create a 
miniature Britain, or even to demonize non-Britons, were largely unsuccessful. Instead these 
practices served to limit the power of productive inhabitants and antagonize the populace, in 
particular the British residents. The governors’ adoption of these technologies in an attempt to 
control foreign bodies suggest a larger trend of population management that eventually 
developed in sites across the British empire.8 These practices were not limited to the small 
                                                          
8 For later use of censuses and other administrative technologies, see Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of 
Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Kathrin Levitan, A Cultural History 
of the British Census: Envisioning the Multitude in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); 
Norbert Peabody, “Cents, Sense, Census: Human Inventories in Late Precolonial and Early Colonial India,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 43, no. 4 (2001): 819-850; Matthew Edney, Mapping an Empire: The 
Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997); Renisa 
Mawani, Colonial Proximities: Crossracial Encounters and Juridical Truths in British Columbia, 1871-1921 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009); Sudipta Sen, Distant Sovereignty: National Imperialism 
and the Origins of British India (New York: Routledge, 2002); Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge 
and the Fantasy of Empire (New York: Verso, 1993); James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to 
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). For nineteenth-century 
quarantine practices in the empire, see Alison Bashford, “Epidemic and Governmentality: Smallpox in Sydney, 
1881,” Critical Public Health 9, no. 4 (1999): 301-316; Alison Bashford, “Quarantine and the Imagining of the 
Australian Nation,” Health 2, no. 4 (1998): 387-402; Krista Maglen, The English System: Quarantine, Immigration 
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Mediterranean territory, yet the site of Gibraltar offers a prime vantage point to explore such 
politics on a local level in order to better understand the larger imperial and national impact.9 As 
Michael McDonnell argues, “if we really want to think global, we need to watch the local.”10 
 
Countering the “Gibraltar Tradition” 
 The common narrative of eighteenth-century Gibraltar is one of a strong, unconquerable 
British rock that has withstood all foreign attacks. Writers begin with its capture during the War 
of Spanish Succession in 1704 and the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 when Britain formally acquired 
the territory. The narrative continues through the wars of the eighteenth-century, focusing in 
                                                          
and the Making of a Port Sanitary Zone (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); John Booker, Maritime 
Quarantine: The British Experience, c. 1650-1900 (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007). For the use of passes to control 
mobility, see Margaret Allen, “‘Innocents Abroad’ and Prohibited Immigrants’: Australians in India and Indians in 
Australia 1890-1910” in Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective, ed. Ann Curthoys and Marilyn 
Lake (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2005); Radhika Viyas Mongia, “Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the 
Passport” in After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation, ed. Antoinette Burton (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003); Mark B. Salter, Rights of Passage: The Passport in International Relations (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); Radhika Singha, “Passport, Ticket, and India-rubber Stamp: ‘The Problem of the 
Pauper Pilgrim’ in Colonial India, c. 1882-1925” in The Limits of British Colonial Control in South Asia: Spaces of 
Disorder in the Indian Ocean Region, ed. Ashwini Tambe and Harald Fischer-Tine (New York: Routledge, 2009); 
John Torpey, "Passports and the Development of Immigration Controls in the North Atlantic World During the 
Long Nineteenth Century" in Migration Control in the North Atlantic World: The Evolution of State Practices in 
Europe and the United States from the French Revolution to the Inter-War Period, ed. Andreas Fahrmeir, Olivier 
Faron, and Patrick Weil (New York: Berghahn Books, 2005); John Torpey, “Coming and Going: On the State 
Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’” Sociological Theory 16, no. 3 (1998): 239-259. 
9 For example, see Kathleen Wilson, “Rethinking the Colonial State: Family, Gender, and Governmentality in 
Eighteenth-Century British Frontiers,” American Historical Review 116, no. 5 (2011): 1294-1322; C. A. Bayly, 
Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, eds., The Age of Revolutions in 
Global Context, c. 1760-1840 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Katherine Arner, “Making Global 
Commerce into International Health Diplomacy: Consuls and Disease Control in the Age of Revolutions” Journal of 
World History 24, no. 4 (December 2013): 781-782; J. C. D. Clark, The Language of Liberty, 1660-1832: Political 
Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); 
James Epstein, Scandal of Colonial Rule: Power and Subversion in the British Atlantic during the Age of Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Tamar Herzog, Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in 
Early Modern Spain and America (Yale University Press, 2003); Robert Travers, “Contested Despotism: Problems 
of Liberty in British India” in Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas 1600-1900, ed. Jack P. Greene 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
10 Michael A. McDonnell, “Paths Not Yet Taken, Voices Not Yet Heard: Rethinking Atlantic History,” in 
Connected World: History in Transnational Perspective, ed. Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake (Canberra: ANU E 
Press, 2005), pp. 45-62. 
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particular on the 1727 Siege, in which the garrison was attacked by Spanish forces, and the Great 
Siege of 1779-1783, in which the British defeated a combined Franco-Spanish foe and held the 
territory despite losing the American colonies. At the end of the eighteenth-century timeline are 
the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars with a special emphasis on the Battle of 
Trafalgar in 1805. The story is one of British military victory, imbued with triumphalism and 
pride in the power of Britain to conquer all who dared challenge their hold in Gibraltar. In this 
telling Gibraltar serves as a symbol of Britishness and a metaphor for British strength. Gibraltar, 
in many ways, acts as a miniature Britain, an “island” that embodies British values and furthers 
British causes. 
This narrative tradition, aptly named the “Gibraltar tradition,” began in the early 
eighteenth century, not long after Britain’s acquisition of the territory in 1713. With the Rock 
threatened by the Spanish powers during the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1721), 
Britons at home in the metropole quickly became attached to the idea of Gibraltar. Although 
British ministers were not as dedicated to the idea of keeping Gibraltar, hoping that its return to 
Spain would bring peace between the two states, many Britons were loath to give up the symbol 
of their victory in the war. As contemporary writers argued, Gibraltar was “a just concern for the 
Honour and Welfare of the British Nation” and as much a part of Britain as a city like 
Portsmouth.11 This attachment grew stronger with the 1727-1729 Anglo-Spanish war as Gibraltar 
symbolized the honor and might of the British state as the prize that Spain could not recapture, 
despite its best efforts. By the end of the eighteenth century, in particular after the Great Siege 
                                                          
11 A Letter to the Lord Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, p. 4; Gordon, Considerations Offered upon the 
Approaching Peace (London, 1720), pp. 17, 27-28; Britannus, Letter to an Independent Whig (London, 1720), pp. 
17-19; see also Cato’s Letters, Vol. I: Saturday, November 5, 1720, Reasons to Prove that We Are in No Danger of 
Losing Gibraltar (no. 1), pp. 2, 5. 
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and Britain’s unlikely victory against Spanish and French forces, the “impregnable Fortress” of 
Gibraltar was “the brightest [jewel] in the British Diadem” and “Their Kingdom’s Bulwark.”12 
The Gibraltar tradition, which is carried on today, has created a “mythic” Gibraltar in 
which the Rock serves as a “stable, iconic landmark.”13 As scholars have shown, the creation of 
colonial landmarks constructs a “metonymic replacement” for the site itself, essentially ridding 
the territory of any hindrances, strife, or disorder.14 Instead of reflecting the constant fears of the 
British government surrounding the loss of the territory, this narrative establishes Gibraltar as a 
constant victor against all foes and a bastion of Britishness, from the Union Jack flying at the top 
of the Rock to the people on the ground. This narrative form also provides a sense of social, 
political, and even geographic stability that does not exist in reality by creating boundaries and 
categories that were indistinguishable on the ground. The Gibraltar tradition has performed 
accordingly, providing a sanitized view of life in the territory that appears stable and without 
international contestation, free from internal dissonance and non-British influences. Unlike the 
historical reality, in which the territory’s borders were a subject of debate and its people were not 
easily categorized – despite the governors’ efforts to do so anyway – the classic narrative of 
Gibraltar obscures those past conflicts to focus on the military victories and chronicle of British 
strength. The landmark narrative also enabled colonial governments to feel as if they had a sense 
of control, stabilizing the territory enough to “capture” it, and offering a “promontory” from 
                                                          
12 Officer, An Impartial Account of the Late Famous Siege of Gibraltar (1728), p. 35; [Daniel Defoe], An Enquiry 
into the Pretensions of Spain to Gibraltar (London, 1729), p. 3; John Breval, Calpe, or Gibraltar a Poem (London, 
1727), p. 13. See also Letter to the Independent Whig, pp. 14-15. See also Gibraltar a Bulwark, pp. 55-56. 
13 David Lambert, “’As Solid as the Rock’? Place, Belonging and the Local Appropriation of Imperial Discourse in 
Gibraltar,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 30, no. 2 (June 2005), p. 211; D. Graham Burnett, 
Masters of All They Surveyed: Exploration, Geography, and a British El Dorado (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2000), p. 12. Lambert argues that the Gibraltarians have “co-opted” the tradition by “emplacing themselves 
firmly on the Rock,” demonstrating that “British imperial history is actually local history too” (pp. 215-216). 
14 Burnett, Masters of All They Surveyed, p. 12. 
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which administrative eyes could survey all and any developments.15 Through the Gibraltar 
tradition, Britons at home, including the British government, felt that they had a clear 
understanding of the territory; both a mythical and geographical landmark, the Rock also served 
as a historical and imperial one, standing tall as a staunchly British Mediterranean outpost 
representing the resilient and unyielding British empire.16   
While I recognize the power and persuasiveness of the Gibraltar tradition, I seek to 
examine Gibraltar not from the (Union Jack-flying) promontory but from a more ground-level 
perspective. In particular, I am interested in exploring the relationships, and the conflicts, 
between the people of Gibraltar and the resident British administration. This approach will 
examine two viewpoints: what life was actually like in Gibraltar and how the governors managed 
these circumstances. As historian Geoffrey Plank noted in a recent article, “scholars have not 
paid sufficient attention to… the ways in which Protestant Britons, North African Jews, 
Muslims, Italians, and Spanish interacted there.”17 It is my goal to examine these interactions, 
focusing specifically on those between the British governors of Gibraltar and their multiethnic 
subjects. Recognizing that many of Gibraltar’s governors hoped for a territory like that espoused 
in the Gibraltar tradition, I want to examine how these commanders grappled with the reality of 
the Mediterranean Rock that they encountered on a daily basis, driving them to imagine and 
devise strategies to overcome these challenges. Rather than a miniature Britain, the arriving 
governors found a Mediterranean meeting ground comprised of peoples from across the region.  
 
                                                          
15 Burnett, Masters of All They Surveyed, pp. 129-130. 
16 Burnett, Masters of All They Surveyed, p. 15; Gordon, Considerations, p. 29; Joseph Davies, Humble Proposal for 
the Increase of Our Home Trade, and a Defence to Gibraltar (London, 1731), p. 9. 
17 Geoffrey Plank, “Making Gibraltar British in the Eighteenth Century,” History 98 (2013), p. 350. 
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The “Trans-imperial Subjects” of Gibraltar 
As will be discussed in chapter one, migrants arrived from a variety of Mediterranean 
states, in particular Spain, Genoa, and North Africa. With these foreign bodies came foreign 
ideas, cultures, religions, languages, goods, and even loyalties. They were, as Natalie Rothman 
describes, “trans-imperial subjects,” serving as “intermediaries who articulated difference” by 
straddling Gibraltar and the Mediterranean world.18 Their non-British origins, by definition, 
made them foreigners, yet their residence in Gibraltar made them members of a British territory 
and community. As “strangers” to the garrison, the residents were both of the territory yet 
outside of it.19 This dual status of foreign resident positioned them within multiple societies; for 
some this included just their homeland and Gibraltar, whereas others may have identified with 
several homes or states due to the diasporic nature of their birth communities. Rothman’s 
conception of the trans-imperial subject emphasizes that these people brought with them diverse 
political attachments, confessional affiliations, kin and patronage ties, skills and knowledge, and 
general life experiences that subsequently affected the development of Gibraltar and the lives of 
the community there.20 This is true not only of Gibraltar’s “foreign” population, but all those 
who came to the territory, including British settlers and governors, who in turn had their own 
histories that influenced their experiences there.21 
                                                          
18 Rothman, Brokering Empire, p. 4. 
19 See Rothman, Brokering Empire, pp. 6-7 for her discussion and use of Georg Simmel’s “stranger.” 
20 Rothman, Brokering Empire, pp. 11-14. 
21 David Lambert and Alan Lester, eds. Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long 
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 15-16. See chapter 1 for more on this in 
relation to the garrison’s governors. 
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While I appreciate the importance of these trans-imperial subjects’ individual stories, this 
is not my primary focus for this dissertation.22 Instead I aim to explore how the “foreignness” of 
Gibraltar’s residents influenced the development and administration of the territory. Bringing 
with them foreign ways of living, cultures, ideas, and religions, these inhabitants challenged the 
conception, and the reality, of a bounded, British Gibraltar. As these actors suggest, Gibraltar’s 
borders were porous; the surrounding seas, rather than being a barrier, served as a site of 
connection, bringing together the various landmasses on its shores.23 As peoples from 
communities, states, and empires across the Mediterranean traveled to and settled in Gibraltar, 
they demonstrated that the British territory was not simply comprised of or influenced by Britons 
                                                          
22 Great work has been done on the people of Gibraltar, especially by a number of Gibraltarian authors. For that, see 
H. W. Howes, The Gibraltarian: The Origin and Development of the Population of Gibraltar from 1704 (Colombo: 
City Press, 1951); Mesod Benady, “The Settlement of Jews in Gibraltar, 1704-1783,” Transactions & Miscellanies, 
Jewish Historical Society of England 26 (1974-1978): 87-110; Edward G. Archer, Gibraltar, Identity and Empire 
(New York: Routledge, 2006); Charles Caruana, The Rock Under a Cloud (Cambridge: Silent Books, 1989); 
Jennifer Ballantine Perera, “El Desarrollo de la Población de Gibraltar Durante los Siglos XVIII y XIX Dentro del 
Sistema Dual Fortaleza-Colonia Que Regía en el Peñón” in Gibraltar y Los Gibraltareños: Los Orígenes y la 
Situación de Un Enclave Estratégico en las Puertas del Mediterráneo,” ed. by Enrique Ojeda Vila and Rafael 
Sánchez Mantero (Sevilla: Tres Culturas del Mediterráneo, 2008); Sam G. Benady, General Sir George Don and the 
Dawn of Gibraltarian Identity: A Biography (Gibraltar: Gibraltar Books, 2006); T. J. Finlayson, The Fortress Came 
First: The Story of the Civilian Population of Gibraltar during the Second World War (Grendon: Gibraltar Books 
Ltd, 1991); Joseph Garcia, Gibraltar: The Making of a People (Gibraltar: MedSun, 1994); Tito M. Benady, “The 
Jewish Community of Gibraltar” in The Sephardi Heritage, Vol. 2, The Western Sephardim, ed. by R. D. Barnett & 
W. M. Schwab (Grendon: Gibraltar Books, 1989); Joshua Marrache, The Flemish Synagogue of Gibraltar: Kahal 
Kadosh Nefuso Yehudah (Grendon: Gibraltar Books, 2000); the many works by Larry Sawchuk; and the collection 
of the Gibraltar Heritage Journals 1-20 (1993-2013). 
23 For an in-depth discussion of porousness, particularly related to smuggling, see Eric Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, 
Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865-1915 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2005), pp. 4-5. For the sea as a site of exchange and an interstate arena in its own right, see David Abulafia, 
“Mediterraneans,” in Rethinking the Mediterranean, ed. W. V. Harris (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); 
Karen Wigen, “AHR Forum Oceans of History: Introduction,” American Historical Review 111, no. 4 (2006): 717-
721; Elizabeth Mancke, “European Expansion, Oceanic Space, and the Creation of a Global International System” 
in Maritime History as World History, ed. Daniel Finamore (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004); Jerry 
H. Bentley, “Sea and Ocean Basins as Frameworks for Historical Analysis,” Geographical Review 89, no. 2 (1999): 
215-224; Ashwini Tambe and Harald Fischer-Tine, eds. The Limits of British Colonial Control in South Asia: 
Spaces of Disorder in the Indian Ocean Region (New York: Routledge, 2009); David Armitage, “Three Concepts of 
Atlantic History,” in The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, ed. David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Michael Pearson, “Studying the Indian Ocean World: Problems and 
Opportunities” in Cross Currents and Community Networks: Encapsulating the History of the Indian Ocean World, 
ed. H. P. Ray and Edward Alper (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Ian Coller, “Arab France: Mobility and 
Community in Early-Nineteenth-Century Paris and Marseille,” French Historical Studies 29, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 
433-456. 
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but rather was an intimate part of the Mediterranean world in which it existed. Although I focus 
my attention on the particular geographic space of Gibraltar, I follow David Hancock’s argument 
that historical subjects and empires were not sealed or bounded entities but rather were 
intertwined and contingent on the histories of their residents, neighbors, and the wider world.24   
Situated within the Mediterranean itself, linked to other Mediterranean states, housing 
Mediterranean peoples, and trading Mediterranean goods, Gibraltar was largely defined by the 
Mediterranean. In this sense, this dissertation serves not just as history of British Gibraltar, but 
rather one that is firmly grounded in the Mediterranean.25 While I discuss the Mediterranean as 
an overarching geographic space, I do not believe that there was a singular Mediterranean culture 
among the region’s many peoples. Instead, I recognize that there were multiple, separate 
geographical spaces within the sea that need to be recognized and respected. As Ian Morris 
argues, the interconnection of the Mediterranean did not mean that the other existing institutions, 
states, and empires in that region ceased to matter.26 While my focus is not on detailing these 
various players or spaces, they do play an implicit role in the discussion of Gibraltar’s 
inhabitants and the governors’ responses to various international and internal developments. 
Despite metropolitan British conceptions of the territory, which proclaimed it as a key part of the 
British empire and the embodiment of all it stood for, this dissertation argues that Gibraltar was 
grounded in its Mediterranean roots. 
 
                                                          
24 See David Hancock, Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2009). 
25 This follows Horden and Purcell’s claims that their history is one that is “in” the Mediterranean not of it. See 
Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2000), pp. 2-4. 
26 See Ian Morris, “Mediterraneanization,” Mediterranean Historical Review 18, no. 2 (2003), p. 51. 
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The Governors & the (Foreign) Population Problem 
Sent to Gibraltar with a commission from the British Crown to administer and manage 
the town and garrison, Gibraltar’s governors were the primary, and occasionally, only British 
authority in the territory. These men served as “the executive officers responsible for ensuring 
that a territory accepted imperial authority, was adequately defended, and was generally 
profitable.” They were also responsible for “ensur[ing] that territories were sufficiently 
populated with those loyal to the imperial center.”27 Charged with such tasks Gibraltar’s many 
foreign Mediterranean residents were a great concern for these British governors’ successful 
administration of the territory. While many of these individuals brought a number of talents that 
proved useful for the development of the town and the British empire, Gibraltar’s governors did 
not see these migrants as advantageous. I argue that Gibraltar’s “trans-imperial subjects,” whom 
in many settings were beneficial, posed a direct threat to the governors’ imagined dreams for 
Gibraltar and their efforts to create a British territory. The inhabitants’ foreign cultural identities 
and mores did not align with the commanders’ visions of loyalty to the British sovereign and the 
empire.  
Fixated on the notion of “foreignness,” these individuals were deemed to be aliens or 
“not of one’s own” by Gibraltar’s governors, who were preoccupied by the fact that the majority 
of inhabitants were born in different (non-British, non-Protestant) states or kingdoms.28 As I 
argue, these subject foreigners blurred the lines between Briton and non-Briton, complicating the 
governors’ binary understanding of the population, which they tried desperately to maintain 
despite its heterogeneity. The commanders’ efforts to keep clear-cut categories between 
                                                          
27 Andrew Mackillop and Steve Murdoch, eds. Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers c. 1600-1800: A Study of 
Scotland and Empires (Boston: Brill, 2003), pp. xxvii-xxviii. 
28 “Alien, n." OED Online, June 2014, Oxford University Press. 
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inhabitants who could be trusted and those who were suspect relied on place of birth and 
religion. Those who were born abroad were assumed to be untrustworthy; their allegiance, the 
governors assumed, would always be to a foreign state and its interests. In addition, as people of 
a different faith, these inhabitants’ religion was also foreign to the commanders, suggesting 
further loyalties to other religious leaders or states who espoused similar beliefs. Such 
misgivings also included true British subjects who were native to the town but had foreign 
parents – the vast majority of Gibraltar’s natural-born British subjects. Their families’ foreign 
connections and loyalties, be it political, cultural, or religious, marked them as subject aliens and 
thus potential (imagined) threats to the British crown. For many governors, any resident who was 
not a true-born Briton from the British Isles was deemed an “other,” someone whose loyalty 
could never be truly proven. The commanders feared that these foreign inhabitants were merely 
trying to “pass” as faithful subjects to the Crown, but were in actuality turncoats in disguise.29 
In part the governors’ fear of their peoples, I argue, was driven by Gibraltar’s situation. 
These commanders, who spent their lives promoting and protecting the British state across the 
empire, had been placed during the last years of their careers alone on a small Rock in the middle 
of a hostile sea, far from Britain.30 Located only yards from the Spanish armaments and troops, 
                                                          
29 The literature on “passing” is largely applicable to this discussion of true or false subjecthood. For a greater 
discussion of passing, see Sharra L. Vostral, Under Wraps: A History of Menstrual Hygiene Technology (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2008); Linda Schlossberg, “Introduction: Rites of Passing” in Passing: Identity and 
Interpretation in Sexuality, Race, and Religion, ed. Maria C. Sanchez and Linda Schlossberg (New York: NYU 
Press, 2001); Brad Epps, “Passing Lines: Immigration and the Performance of American Identity” in Passing: 
Identity and Interpretation in Sexuality, Race, and Religion, ed. Maria C. Sanchez and Linda Schlossberg (New 
York: NYU Press, 2001); Amy Robinson, “It Takes One to Know One: Passing and Communities of Common 
Interest,” Critical Inquiry 20, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 715-736; Elaine K. Ginsberg, ed., Passing and the Fictions of 
Identity (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996); Shompa Lahiri, “Performing Identity: Colonial Migrants, Passing 
and Mimicry Between the Wars,” Cultural Geographies 10 (2003): 408-423; Thomas Kidd, “Passing as a Pastor: 
Clerical Imposture in the Colonial Atlantic World,” Religion & American Culture 14, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 149-
174. 
30 For similar works that focus on British administrators’ experiences across the empire, see Lambert and Lester, 
Colonial Lives; Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Colony and Metropole in the English Imagination, 1830-1867 
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and often in the midst of heated European and North African conflicts, these men were 
perpetually reminded that Gibraltar was a contested territory and that an attack could occur 
almost at any moment. Nor were their troops the most satisfied or well-trained. As 
contemporaries reported, soldiers dreaded being posted in Gibraltar as there was little 
amusement or opportunities to travel outside the small garrison. Those that were stationed there 
often remained for a lengthy period of time with little hope of transfer or escape.31 As a result, 
some of the soldiers coped by deserting while others imbibed in any available liquor and 
spirits.32 The garrison also often did not have a full complement of soldiers with only a few 
regiments stationed in the territory at a time. During the eighteenth century, when war loomed 
frequently, the lack of troops made many of Gibraltar’s governors nervous as they recognized the 
unlikelihood of timely reinforcements.  
In addition, Britain was almost 1,100 miles away, a journey that took at best a few 
months so long as the winds and the weather were favorable. Even if London ministers chose to 
send additional troops, or if they had important news or advice for the governor, he often would 
not receive such letters or men for an extended period of time. One can imagine that many of 
these men also felt alone and embittered during such postings.33 In this setting, as the only 
British authority in a largely foreign territory with few British institutions or peoples and Spanish 
                                                          
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age 
of Expansion, 1560-1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
31 Robert Poole, The beneficent bee: or, Traveller's Companion (London, 1753), pp. 73, 126; J. A. Houlding, Fit for 
Service, p. 16. 
32 This was one of Governor Bland’s many complaints about the soldiers in his Account. See TNA, C) 91/62, “An 
Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, Article 2. 
33 Some of Gibraltar’s governors did issue complaints to the government in London about their postings. Governor 
Bland even asked to be recalled back to England or to Scotland after a year in the garrison because of the poor 
weather and its influence on his health. He could no longer stand the humidity, the rocks, and the sun of Gibraltar, 
he claimed, and he requested to be removed immediately. This process took at least an additional year before he was 
allowed to leave the territory. 
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forces at the doorstep, Gibraltar’s governors were constantly concerned about just how they 
could manage to keep Gibraltar in British hands. At a time when the larger geopolitical situation 
was volatile and Britain found itself frequently involved in conflicts with its European 
competitors, most of whom were Gibraltar’s close neighbors, the commanders were justified in 
their concerns about Gibraltar’s safety.  
However, the governors’ fears were also largely driven by their desire to make Gibraltar 
a truly British territory and propagate what they defined as a British Protestant identity. As 
mentioned previously, I argue that the vast majority of Gibraltar’s inhabitants could not be bound 
by specific categories of identification. While their birthplaces and (current) religion may have 
been distinguishable, these were not altogether defining of who these individuals were or where 
their loyalties lay. This inherent messiness of the population challenged the governors’ abilities 
to understand their residents and the territory, impelling them to impose a simplified, binary 
vision of the territory (us versus them) and embrace practices that they believed could increase 
their control over this complicated and problematic heterogeneous population. 
 
Governmentality in Gibraltar 
As Michel Foucault has argued, population became the primary target of governance in 
the eighteenth century.34 This was especially true in Gibraltar where the inhabitants were a 
primary focus of the governors’ energy and administrative efforts. Rather than simply 
administering territories or fostering family values and loyalty to the sovereign, government at 
this time was similar to that of running a ship: “It means clearly to take charge of the sailors, but 
also of the boat and its cargo; to take care of a ship means also to reckon with winds, rocks and 
                                                          
34 Foucault, “Governmentality.” 
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storms; and it consists in that activity of establishing a relation between the sailors who are to be 
taken care of and the ship which is to be taken care of, and the cargo which is to be brought 
safely to port, and all those eventualities like winds, rocks, storms and so on.”35 This new style of 
governance, as Foucault explains, necessitated the close management of all aspects of the 
heterogeneous population. As a result, governments embraced the need for “savoir,” placing an 
emphasis on knowing the population in order to engender a rational and effective governance.36 
This process and the institution of techniques of population management Foucault termed 
“governmentality” or the art of government.37 
My dissertation seeks to explore the techniques of governance and the practices of 
governmentality employed by Gibraltar’s governors in the eighteenth century. Like Foucault 
mentions, the governors were plagued by the problem of population and its effects on life in 
Gibraltar. As discussed above, the governors saw the townspeople as a threat and problem that 
needed to be solved. I place a particular emphasis here on the word “see” – surveillance was a 
key component of governmentality both in Gibraltar and elsewhere. As Jeffrey Monaghan 
argues, surveillance was the first weapon available to and employed by colonial officials.38 
Through these surveillance practices, governors felt that they could see the “structure” of society 
and the landscape of the population.39 This technology enabled them to produce an overarching 
image of the population, or so they believed, and discover the places and ways in which they 
                                                          
35 Foucault, “Governmentality,” pp. 93-94. 
36 Foucault, “Governmentality,” p. 99. 
37 Kirstie M. McClure, “Taking Liberties in Foucault’s Triangle: Sovereignty, Discipline, Governmentality, and the 
Subject of Rights,” in Identities, Politics, and Rights, ed. Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1995), p. 170. 
38 Jeffrey Monaghan, “Settler Governmentality and Racializing Surveillance in Canada’s North-West.” Canadian 
Journal of Sociology 38, no. 4 (2013), p. 496. 
39 Allen Chun, “Colonial ‘Govern-mentality’ in Transition: Hong Kong as Imperial Object and Subject.” Cultural 
Studies 14, no. 3/4 (2000), p. 437. 
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needed to intervene. As we see in each chapter of this dissertation, surveillance is at the heart of 
each of the tactics governors employed to facilitate their governance. In chapter 2, Lieutenant 
Governor Richard Kane’s (1720-1721, 1725-1727) surveillance encouraged and facilitated his 
use of the census, the alien act, and property grants; in chapter 3, surveillance was fundamental 
to Governor Humphrey Bland’s (1749-1752) introduction and employment of the institution of 
quarantine and the policing of bodies; in chapter 4, surveillance enabled Governors Robert Boyd 
(1768-1777, 1790-1794) and George Augustus Eliott (1777-1787) to mark individuals as 
foreigners or subjects based on their actions and supposed loyalties; and in chapter 5, 
surveillance of developments abroad and within the territory drove Governor Boyd to introduce a 
series of regulations that eventually propelled residents to critique his methods of governance. 
In this practice of surveillance, James Scott argues, the colonial official only “sees” such 
activities, peoples, and practices that are of interest to him. This selective vantage point and its 
“simplified approximations” reduce the “complex reality” to “schematic categories.”40 In the 
case of Gibraltar, the governors did not often view their inhabitants as individual threats but 
rather created distinct larger groups which were easier for them to manage and control. These 
groups, or categories, hinged around divisions of ethnicity or religion. By focusing on these 
particular categories – Spaniard, North African, Genoese, or Briton; Catholic, Jew, Muslim, or 
Protestant – governors were able to create a sense of order to the territory. As Kathleen Wilson 
has shown in her work, the concept of population was directly tied to the notion of order from its 
very beginnings in the seventeenth century.41 This idea of easily divisible and definable groups 
                                                          
40 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 76-77. 
41 Kathleen Wilson, “Rethinking the Colonial State: Family, Gender, and Governmentality in Eighteenth-Century 
British Frontiers,” American Historical Review 116, no. 5 (2011), p. 1298. 
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and the practice of categorizing and subdividing the territory enabled governors to feel as if they 
could better grasp the nature of the situation. Following these categories, chapters two through 
five each implicitly highlight one particular subject group. In chapter 2, the Spaniards were the 
primary concern for Governor Kane; in chapter 3, the Jews, or more broadly anyone from North 
Africa, functioned as the potential threat to Bland and the health of the garrison; in chapter 4, the 
Genoese and their shifting loyalties were Boyd and Eliott’s greatest concern when trying to 
regulate Mediterranean passes; and in chapter 5, Gibraltar’s British commercial settlers, 
surprisingly enough for both myself and the governor, were the troublemakers who challenged 
Boyd’s authority and encouraged the rest of the population to rebel against him. 
These practices of surveillance and categorizing enabled the governors to produce a large 
body of knowledge about the territory. Knowledge, as Nicholas Dirks argues and Bernard Cohn 
demonstrates, was “what colonialism was all about.”42 The governors’ knowledge, gathered 
through a variety of methods, facilitated their “techniques of rule” and management of the 
population and the many facets of their lives.43 The archive itself, as Lisa Lowe contends, was a 
“site of knowledge production” that can be “read” as “a technology for administering and 
knowing the colonized population.”44 For many administrators the archive was the totality of 
everything that was surveyed and cataloged, providing an overarching and “complete” picture of 
the territory. Yet as Thomas Richards argues, the archival vision, despite being often piecemeal 
                                                          
42 Nicholas B. Dirks, “Foreword,” in Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India by Bernard S. 
Cohn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: 
The British in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. See also C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: 
Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000). 
43 Wilson, “Rethinking the Colonial State,” p. 1299. 
44 Lowe, “The Intimacies of Four Continents,” p. 196. 
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and contingent, was much more coherent and unified than a territory could possibly be.45 In this 
dissertation I demonstrate how the governors consolidated this knowledge in the form of an 
archive, which sought to provide an orderly and rational understanding of the territory. This 
archive was not in actually a static totality, but rather was a compilation of fragmented pieces 
that the governors gathered through their efforts to respond to various “crises;” the archive was 
constantly growing, changing, and developing as each individual commander required. The 
governors’ archive not only serves as the primary source for piecing together Gibraltar’s 
eighteenth-century past today, but it also functioned as the primary source for any decisions 
surrounding its inhabitants. This archive and the paperwork it necessitated makes an appearance 
in each of the four thematic chapters.46 In chapter 2, Kane began the physical recording of the 
population’s numbers through the census and was responsible for issuing some of the town’s first 
property grants, offering a record of who qualified for the privilege as a British subject; in 
chapter 3, this archive appeared in the form of bills of health and quarantine notices which 
served to mark certain individuals as clean, foul, or suspect and facilitated Bland’s classification 
of them accordingly; in chapter 4, Eliott created an entire documentary regime to determine the 
subjecthood of Mediterranean pass applicants – this record was used later by himself and other 
governors for other legal decisions, such as property grants and civil suits; in chapter 5, Boyd 
and the British petitioners both participated in the creation of archive in an effort to convince the 
each other and later British ministers in London of the validity of their arguments and 
approaches to governance. 
                                                          
45 Thomas Richards, The Imperial Archive: Knowledge and the Fantasy of Empire (1993), p. 4. 
46 For more on paperwork, see Ben Kafka, The Demon of Writing.: Powers and Failures of Paperwork (Cambridge: 
Zone Books, 2012). As he argues, “paperwork syncopates the state’s rhythms, destabilizes its structures” (p. 10). 
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Through these tactics and technologies of population management – surveillance, the 
creation of categories, and the production of an archive – Gibraltar’s governors sought to solve 
the problem of population. The majority of their focus, I argue, was on Gibraltar’s foreign, 
Mediterranean bodies. This is not to say, however, that such attention to these individuals was 
necessary. As I illustrate in chapter 1, the foreign migrants were of great use to the garrison and 
the development of the town. In his work Bakhle argues that colonial authorities were often 
fixated on groups whose threat is “far more rhetorical and symbolic than physical” because these 
figures “questioned the fundamental legitimacy of colonial rule.”47 As my work seeks to show, 
the governors believed that the foreign population was the greatest possible threat to the garrison 
whereas a strengthened British presence would help support it. Instead, as chapters two through 
four show, such fears were often unfounded as Gibraltar’s governors established series of 
management policies and practices often to no real end. While there may have been a few 
offenders and potential threats, no real foreign challenges to their authority ever materialized. 
However, as chapter five reveals, the greatest actual population problem that the governors 
experienced was caused by Britons. The events of chapter five, which details British merchants’ 
challenges of the governor’s authority, were the only ones that truly resulted in an actual crisis. 
This chapter is, in essence, the exception that proves the rule. Not only did Governor Boyd have 
to manage the rhetorical assault as well as physical revolts, but he also had to justify his actions 
to his superiors in London and hope that his approaches to governance would be deemed 
appropriate by British ministers. Such occurrences did not come about with the foreign 
population; rather, they were demonized solely because of the governors’ fears. Like Foucault’s 
                                                          
47 Quoted in Monaghan, “Settler Governmentality,” p. 496. 
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ship captains, Gibraltar’s governors were more concerned with the possible seamonsters of the 
deep than the rocks, icebergs, and storms brewing ahead. 
 
Chapter Summaries 
Chapter one sets the stage for the story, explaining the relationships of Gibraltar. It begins 
by placing Gibraltar within its Mediterranean environs and describing its relations with its 
neighbors, especially Spain and Morocco. These two states played a significant role in the 
development of Gibraltar and are key to many of the events described in the following chapters. 
Next, we learn about the people of Gibraltar, its inhabitants and its governors. Gibraltar’s 
residents came from across the Mediterranean, and from places further afield like Britain, to 
meet the garrison’s many needs and embrace available opportunities. Gibraltar’s governors, on 
the other hand, were all British military men, schooled in the struggles of the state and its empire 
in their postings across the globe. The governors were the British authority in the garrison and in 
the town, due to the territory’s lack of independent civil management. The chapter also 
introduces the relationship between the governor and his peoples as well as that between the 
military and the civil sphere in Gibraltar. As this chapter demonstrates, the military power in 
Gibraltar dictated all aspects of life in the town as the governors sought to impose strict 
regulations on all their peoples in order to secure the territory from any possible threats, 
including those from within. 
Chapter two examines the development of different tools of population management in 
Gibraltar as they arose in response to the foreign (Catholic) body. When Governor Kane arrived 
in the garrison in 1725, the British Protestant territory seemed to be under attack from Catholic 
and foreign (Spanish) threats nearby and abroad. Not surprisingly then, he was equally 
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concerned that an attack could arise from within – in a town with a vast majority Catholic 
population, half of which were Spaniards, it seemed like a Catholic uprising was possible, 
especially with the right encouragement. Fearful that a strike was imminent, Kane sought to 
shore up the territory’s defenses, not only militarily but civilly. This included increasing his 
knowledge of the current population through the use of a census, reproducing the society in data 
form and detailing just how many Catholic men of fighting age and Catholic arms were in the 
garrison. He also employed more explicit techniques of population management by placing 
restrictions on all foreign visitors and requiring their registration through the renewal of his 1720 
Alien Act. Finally, Kane worked to promote the British Protestant growth of the territory, 
encouraging the outmigration of foreign property owners, creating new spaces for British settlers 
to reside and privileging their ownership of property. These mechanisms of governance, Kane 
suggested, were necessary in order for him to know and control the territory, monitor for any 
possible threats, and respond accordingly. The best security, he opined, was to strengthen the 
British Protestant contingent which could help overcome any foreign influences. 
Chapter three explores the governors’ efforts at managing the health of Gibraltar and the 
diseased body, and in turn, also managing its reputation as a Christian and European territory. As 
scholars have shown, notions of health in the eighteenth century were bound to religious, 
cultural, and political beliefs and institutions, and many Christian Europeans (incorrectly) saw a 
great divide between themselves and their Muslim neighbors to the south and east. Torn between 
its need for Moroccan supplies and diplomacy and the desire to court Spain and its European 
neighbors, Gibraltar’s governors had to find a solution that appeased, or avoided upsetting, both 
parties. This chapter examines Governor Bland’s efforts to negotiate Gibraltar’s place within 
Christian Europe through the introduction of management tools such as town sanitation projects 
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as well as quarantine while simultaneously maintaining communication with North Africa. I 
explore the problem that disease posed to the garrison, physically and ideologically, as well as 
Bland’s attempts to manage such threats by policing and segregating the diseased from the 
healthy. Such practices became even more important with the outbreak of the plague in Morocco 
in 1750. This case study demonstrates Bland’s efforts to control Gibraltar’s health and use such 
mechanisms to also manage the territory’s reputation and standing within the Mediterranean 
world. 
Chapter four examines Mediterranean pass protection and its ties to subjecthood in the 
British empire. Granted to British subjects in order to protect them against Moroccan corsairs, 
these passes signified the privileges of subjecthood – the freedom of mobility under the 
protection of the British Crown. In 1722 an Order in Council made these privileges available to 
all residents of Gibraltar. While this legislation offered significant opportunities to expand the 
territory’s commerce and its involvement in Mediterranean trade networks, it also invited 
opportunities for abuse by mobile bodies. Gibraltar’s governors feared the outcomes that could 
result from this expanded pass protection to foreigners, believing it could have detrimental 
financial, military, and commercial consequences, as well as denigrating the status of British 
subjects and the name of Britain. In an effort to control access to passes and British subjecthood, 
Governors Boyd and Eliot introduced a number of tactics to survey passholders and determine if 
they were worthy of pass protection. By the end of the 1780s, Eliott initiated a pass regime that 
required proofs of loyalty, deliberations by other (British) garrison merchants, and the governor’s 
approval. This institution, he and Boyd believed, would grant them greater control over the 
difficult to manage maritime population. 
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Chapter five focuses on a particular conflict between Gibraltar’s British merchants and 
the governor in the prelude to the French Revolutionary Wars. Like the other chapters, in this 
situation Governor Boyd was concerned by the internal and external threats to the garrison 
caused by the surrounding revolutionary fervor and unrest. He sought to clamp down on any 
possible challenges to the garrison’s security by radical bodies, instituting a number of 
regulations. These restrictions, however, were met with a great deal of resistance by the 
commercial British settlers in Gibraltar. They petitioned the governor, adding their voices to the 
territory’s archive, complaining of his militaristic governance of the territory. Appealing to 
British law and liberties, the merchants protested his efforts to control all aspects of their lives, 
and when the governor refused to relent, they encouraged other inhabitants to revolt. After a 
month of unrest, both parties appealed to British ministers seeking redress and approval of their 
actions. These petitions to the London government employed similar republican revolutionary 
rhetoric as used by other British observers of the events in France. The merchants sought to 
present Boyd as a tyrant while he turn represented them as “outrageous Peyneists” who 
challenged his authority as granted by the Crown. In the end, as events in France and Britain 
became more volatile, the British government supported Boyd’s approach to governance, 
enabling him and future governors to continue with these technologies of rule. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Most eighteenth-century Britons imagined a Gibraltar as an undefeatable British bastion, 
replete with British peoples, goods, beliefs, and customs, in the midst of a distinctly non-British 
(non-Protestant) sea. Yet, as Gibraltar’s governors found, this vision of the territory was merely a 
dream – one that they hoped with their encouragement could become a reality someday. In the 
meantime, however, the commanders needed to manage the situation on the ground, which 
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included hostile neighbors, the ever-present threat of invasion and/or warfare, and a multiethnic 
migrant population with ties to foreign states and religions. For the governors, the lack of British 
influence in the territory was the most pressing threat to their administration and the security of 
Gibraltar as a whole; not only did these non-British subjects pose a risk for rebellion within but 
they also jeopardized the governors’ dreams of a British Rock. In order to manage these 
residents, the commanders embraced various technologies of rule, in particular surveillance, the 
gathering and production of knowledge, and the creation of an archive. These tactics, the 
governors’ believed, would support their administrative efforts to control the population and 
perhaps facilitate the growth of a truly British Gibraltar. Yet, Gibraltar remained – and continues 
today to be – a Mediterranean meeting ground, despite the overarching grand narrative of the 
British, Union-Jack-flying Rock.
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Chapter 1 
“Some Short Reflections on the Situation of Gibraltar”: An Introduction to the Place and 
Peoples of Eighteenth-Century Gibraltar 
 
“Sometimes the [Mediterranean] stage is a theatre of war; more often it is the 
setting for peace, trade, and creative human movement. The actors on this stage 
speak many tongues and do not always understand each other; nor do we, the 
audience, always realise what is really going on, for the plots and story-lines are 
complex and not always what they seem.”1 
 
 This chapter seeks to provide a brief introduction into the “geographical stage” of 
Gibraltar in the eighteenth-century. Situated at the crossroads of the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Atlantic Ocean, with Europe to the north and Africa to the south, Gibraltar was located at the 
heart of many routes of exchange. As a site of encounter, Gibraltar brought together the various 
peoples, cultures, and goods of the region. Scholars of the Mediterranean have emphasized that 
the Mediterranean was (and is) a contact zone, a term introduced by Mary Louise Pratt to 
describe “social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often 
in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination.”2 This idea of Gibraltar as a 
                                                          
1 Russell King, “Introduction: An Essay on Mediterraneanism,” in The Mediterranean: Environment and Society, 
edited by Russell King, Lindsay Proudfoot, and Bernard Smith (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 10. 
2 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: Rutledge, 1992), p. 4. See 
Miriam Cook, Erdag Göknar, and Grant Parker, eds., Mediterranean Passages: Readings from Dido to Derrida 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008). For authors who also discuss the ocean as a contact zone, 
see also Bernhard Klein and Gesa Mackenthun, Sea Changes: Historicizing the Ocean (New York: Routledge, 
2004); Laura Tabili, Global Migrations, Local Culture: Natives and Newcomers in Provincial England, 1841-1939 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
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meeting point and grappling place between various cultures and communities is a fitting one, and 
one that this chapter and this dissertation seeks to explore.  
On a larger scale, Gibraltar was a space that influenced and was influenced by the 
surrounding Mediterranean territories. As the first section of this chapter explores, Gibraltar’s 
neighbors, Spain and Morocco, played a significant role in the development and governance of 
the territory. The historical relations between these three sites as well as their geographic 
proximity meant that they were intimately bound to each other. Rarely were all three players at 
peace; for most of the century, this triangle of relations was defined by alliances and friendships, 
confrontations and struggles, and rifts and divisions. The balance of power was constantly 
shifting, and the plot was constantly changing, but at the center was Gibraltar and its 
relationships with both states. As a result, Gibraltar’s history itself was changeable, influenced 
by the developments of its closely-linked neighbors. 
On a smaller scale, Gibraltar was a site of constant negotiation by the peoples in the 
territory. It is this story that dissertation and this chapter is primarily focused on – although this 
was influenced profoundly by the larger interstate relations described above. The second section 
of this chapter explores the residents of Gibraltar, people who were drawn to the territory from 
across the Mediterranean. The inhabitants, as mentioned in the introduction, were “trans-imperial 
subjects,” bringing with them connections, ideas, goods, cultures, and religions that shaped the 
territory in several ways.3 This section examines the motivations of these individuals in coming 
to Gibraltar, their roles within the community there, and their histories during the eighteenth 
century. The third section of this chapter focuses on Gibraltar’s governors, who in many ways 
                                                          
3 See Natalie Rothman, Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2011). 
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situated themselves as the counterpoint to the inhabitants. As British military men in charge of a 
British territory, these men brought with them decades of experience serving the British state and 
empire across the globe. Dedicated to preserving and protecting British interests, Gibraltar’s 
governors were faced with a conundrum upon their arrival in the garrison. For many of these 
commanders, they desired to help build a British Gibraltar, one that embodied and promoted 
British Protestant ideals and institutions. Yet, they found an established Mediterranean territory, 
one with many foreign residents, goods, practices, and cultures.  
It is this conflict between the British military sphere of the garrison and the 
Mediterranean space of the town that is the focus of the fourth and final section of this chapter. 
This last piece seeks to examine how the governors, in charge of both the military and civil 
spheres of the territory, sought to manage this great responsibility. As military men, they were 
significantly influenced by their past training and largely structured their civil duties accordingly. 
Life in Gibraltar ran under military time and on a military schedule and according to the rules 
instituted by the military authority. While there were attempts to change this arrangement, none 
were successful, leaving the garrison commanders as the sole British authority in the territory. 
This was troublesome for many of the inhabitants, who struggled against the imposition of 
military institutions. However, the governors argued that such practices were necessary both for 
the good of the inhabitants and, more importantly, the security of Gibraltar. Suspicious of the 
foreign population and fearful of the threat such outside influences might pose to the territory, 
Gibraltar’s governors sought to assert strict control over Gibraltar by managing all aspects of 
life. They believed that the foreign population of Gibraltar required an administrative approach 
that could recognize and respond to any potential threats to the garrison’s security. While this is 
29 
 
the focus of chapters two through five, this chapter offers the necessary background to 
understand those developments, providing “some short reflections on the situation of Gibraltar.”4 
 
Gibraltar and its Neighbors: Spain & Morocco 
Much of Gibraltar’s history was shaped by its geography within the Mediterranean 
(Figure 1.1). As scholars have noted, the Mediterranean has traditionally been a close-linked, 
interconnected space; sharing cultures, institutions, goods, and peoples, the Mediterranean was a 
site of exchange and interdependence.5 “Bordering upon the confluence of the Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean Seas, [and] enjoying a… centrical and convenient situation for Traffic with 
Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and the Barbary States,” Gibraltar was perfectly located in the 
midst of all the hubbub.6 As another author remarked, “Nature, by this Situation, seems to have 
annex’d to this Place the Sovereignty of the Mediterranean Seas.”7 As part of the Mediterranean 
world, Gibraltar participated in and was shaped by the influences of its Mediterranean neighbors 
and peoples. The story of Gibraltar, I suggest, would not be complete without taking into 
consideration its situation within this world and its relations with its Mediterranean neighbors. 
                                                          
4 Some Short Reflections on the Situation of Gibraltar, and Its Importance to the Trade and Maritime Force of this 
Kingdom (London, 1731). 
5 The notion of common Mediterranean characteristics has been deemed “Mediterraneanism” by W. V. Harris, and 
he argues that this is often used wrongfully to apply observations about one particular culture to many others. The 
interconnection of the Mediterranean, as Ian Morris argues, did not make the institutions, states, empires present in 
that sea cease to matter. W. V. Harris, “The Mediterranean and Ancient History,” in Rethinking the Mediterranean, 
ed. W. V. Harris (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 38; Ian Morris, “Mediterraneanization,” 
Mediterranean Historical Review 18, no. 2 (2003), p. 51. See also Cooke, Goknar & Parker, Mediterranean 
Passages, p. 1. 
6 GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 4, 1779-1786, “1784 Considerations on the Trade of Gibraltar,” fo. 526. 
7 A Letter to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations (London, 1720), pp. 4-5. 
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Although each state had its own unique institutions, beliefs, and cultures, they all influenced one 
another, both directly and indirectly, resulting in many intertwined histories.8 
“Near the Southernmost Point of Spain… [and] opposite to Ape’s Hill near Ceuta in 
Barbary,” Gibraltar’s relationship with its closest neighbors, Spain and Morocco, played the 
most significant role in the development of the territory. In the past, Gibraltar had been 
integrated into each of these states; the territory became part of the Islamic empire with the 
conquest of Iberia in 711 CE but was recaptured by Spanish forces in 1462 CE.9 Named “Djabal 
Tarik,” or the Mount of Tarik, in honor of the commanding Arab general, Tarik ibn Ziyad, 
Gibraltar served as entrance point for the Arab invasion and conquest of the Iberian peninsula in 
the eighth century. It appears that the site was in little use until the twelfth century, during which 
the work of planning Medinat-al-Fath (the City of Victory) began. Islamic influences from this 
period dotted the landscape of Gibraltar, some of which remain today. Parts of the old Moorish 
walls and towers can be found throughout the town, including the Tower of Homage which was 
part of the original Moorish Castle.10 These architectural pieces originated during the 300 years 
of struggle over the territory between North African Islamic forces and Spanish Christian 
armies.11  
                                                          
8 See David Hancock, Oceans of Wine: Madeira and the Emergence of American Trade and Taste (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2009), p. xvi. 
9 Although conquered by Islamic forces in 711 CE, a permanent settlement was not build until 1160 CE. This 
included the Moorish Castle, of which the Tower of Homage is still standing today. The town was fought over and 
captured several times in the next three hundred years by many different forces, including the Nasrids of Granada, 
the Marinids of Morocco, and the kings of Castile. The 1462 capture by the 1st Duke of Medina Sidonia established 
Gibraltar as part of the Campo Llano de Gibraltar for a short period of time under King Henry IV of Castile until it 
was returned to the duke, who then sold it to a group of conversos from Cordova. After two years they were expelled 
and the territory was returned to the Spanish crown in 1501. 
10 TNA, CO 91/40, 17 January 1799, William Fyers to Charles O’Hara. 
11 The town was fought over and captured several times in the next three hundred years by many different forces, 
including the Nasrids of Granada, the Marinids of Morocco, and the kings of Castile. 
31 
 
In 1462, Gibraltar was taken by the Spanish Christians under the command of the first 
Duke of Medina Sidonia and eventually entered the hands of the Spanish monarchy in 1501. 
Once under Spanish rule, Gibraltar was eventually refortified with Spanish walls and towers, 
although the garrison was not well supported. The territory primarily served as part of the 
southern Spanish hinterland as a marketspace and administrative center, a Franciscan church and 
friary (now the governor’s mansion, known as the Convent), and an occasional naval port, which 
was often used by admirals from other states, including England in the late seventeenth 
century.12 These states’ long history in and with Gibraltar would have an influence on the 
development of the territory once it was acquired by the British crown.13 
On August 1, 1704 an Anglo-Dutch fleet attacked Gibraltar during the War of the 
Spanish Succession in the name of Charles III of Spain, and three days later the Spanish 
governor, fighting on behalf of Philip V, agreed to surrender. After several attacks by Philip’s 
forces, by 1705 Gibraltar remained securely in Charles’ hands with English military commanders 
at the helm. Initially the governors were appointed in the name of Charles, but by 1711 the 
British government made no such claims, appointing commanders of their choosing. The 
government also ordered the governor to expel all foreign (Dutch) troops in hopes of claiming it 
as a solely British possession. When the War of the Spanish Succession concluded with the 
signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, Philip V was declared King of Spain but in return he 
ceded several Spanish territories to Britain and its allies, including Gibraltar. As Article X of the 
                                                          
12 George Hills, Rock of Contention: A History of Gibraltar (London: Robert Hale & Company, 1974), pp. 25, 48, 
53, 97, 99, 114; William G. F. Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians: A History of Gibraltar (Cranbury, NJ: 
Associated University Press, 1987), pp. 64-65; Charles Caruna, The Rock Under a Cloud (Cambridge: Silent Books, 
1989), p. 8; Stephen Constantine, Community and Identity: The Making of Modern Gibraltar since 1704 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), p. 37. 
13 See Hills, Rock of Contention; Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians; Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 
37. 
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treaty declared: “The Catholic King does hereby, for himself, his heirs and successors, yield to 
the Crown of Great Britain the full and entire propriety of the town and castle of Gibraltar, 
together with the port, fortifications, and forts thereunto belonging; and he gives up the said 
propriety to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right for ever, without any 
exception or impediment whatsoever.” If Britain were ever to “grant, sell or by any means to 
alienate therefrom the propriety of the said town of Gibraltar,” “the preference of having the sale 
shall always be given to the Crown of Spain before any others.”14 With the signing of this treaty, 
Britain gained two new Mediterranean possessions as well as a Spanish adversary constantly 
looking to regain its lost “jewel.”15 
The rest of the eighteenth century was marked by moments of conflict between British 
Gibraltar and its Spanish neighbors. In 1720 during the War of the Quadruple Alliance, Spanish 
forces threatened to attack the garrison. While this assault never materialized, hostilities 
continued between the Spanish monarch, Philip V, and the British state in Gibraltar. In 1726 the 
Spanish government accused Britain of breaching the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht and in early 
1727 war broke out between the two states. In February 1727 Spanish forces besieged the 
territory of Gibraltar, making several attempts on the garrison. The British soldiers held strong, 
however, and the Spaniards lifted the siege four months later in June 1727.16 A truce was 
declared in 1728 and the peace agreement was finally concluded in 1729. This treaty, however, 
                                                          
14 Chris Grocott and Gareth Stockey, Gibraltar: A Modern History (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2012), 
Appendix, pp. 165-166. 
15 Philalethes, Gibraltar a Bulwark of Great Britain. In a Letter to a Member of Parliament (London, 1725), pp. 30, 
55-56; [Britannus]. Letter to the Independent Whig, Occasioned by his Considerations of the Importance of 
Gibraltar to the British Empire. London, 1720), pp. 14-15. 
16 For firsthand accounts of the 1727 siege, see Colonel Guise, “Journal of the Siege of Gibraltar 1727” (Typescript, 
Gibraltar Garrison Library); A Particular Account of a Sharp and Bloody Attack (Cork, 1727); An Express Account 
of the Siege of Gibraltar (London, 1727); John Mawer, Liberty Asserted: Or, the Siege of Gibraltar (London, 1727); 
S. H. Journal of the Siege of Gibraltar (1727); W. Smith, The Late Siege of Gibraltar (London, 1728). 
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did not mark the end of Spanish schemes to regain Gibraltar. Throughout the 1730s and much of 
the 1740s, the garrison was under alert of possible Spanish threats; however, none of these came 
to pass. There were still moments of aggression throughout the following three decades, but the 
next direct assault on Gibraltar did not come about until the War of American Independence. In 
1779 Spanish and French forces besieged the garrison, embarking on the “Great Siege” that 
lasted for four years.17 There were numerous attacks by both sides, but British forces finally took 
the upper-hand during the “Great Assault” by shooting “red-hot shot” which destroyed their 
enemies’ floating batteries. Following the conclusion of the siege in 1783, Gibraltar was again at 
peace until the start of Britain’s involvement in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
in 1793. 
As this brief history shows, Gibraltar’s primary adversary was its (very) close neighbor, 
Spain. Spanish hostility over the loss of their territory has permeated Gibraltar’s history under 
British rule and significantly affected its development. Tied directly to the Spanish mainland by 
a narrow, three-quarters of a mile spit of land, those in Gibraltar could not escape the Spanish 
presence on their doorsteps. Gibraltar’s small size, only 2.6 squares miles, which compared to 
Spain’s almost 195,000 square miles felt excessively small for those under Spain’s enemy gaze. 
The nearby Spanish threat concerned many of Gibraltar’s governors throughout the century as 
they surveyed the construction of fortifications, the movements of troops, the gathering of arms, 
and the meeting of naval vessels. Because the eighteenth century was ripe with conflict between 
                                                          
17 An Accurate Description of Gibraltar Interspersed with a Pathetic Account of the Progress of the Siege (London, 
1782); S. Ancell, A Journal of the Blockade and Siege of Gibraltar (Dublin, 1802); Samuel Ancell, Cock of the Rock 
(London, 1784); Arx Herculea Servata (London, 1783); John Drinkwater, A History of the Siege of Gibraltar 1779-
1783 (London, 1785); Miriam Green, “A Lady’s Experiences in the Great Siege of Gibraltar (1779-83),” The Royal 
Engineer’s Journal (1912); “Some Account of the Assault of Gibraltar in 1782. In a Letter to the Earl of Balcarres” 
in Extracts from Colonel Tempelhoffe’s History of the Seven Years War, authored by Colin Lindsay. Vol. 2, Part III 
(London: T. Cadell, 1793); Captain John Spilsbury, A Journal of the Siege of Gibraltar 1779-1783 (London, 1785); 
Catherine Upton, The Siege of Gibraltar, From the Twelfth of April to the Twenty-seventh of May, 1781. To which is 
Prefixed, Some Account of the Blockade (London: J. Fielding, 1781). 
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England and Spain, Gibraltar was often a focal point in diplomatic and military battles. During 
these periods, Gibraltar’s commanders focused their attention on shoring up the territory’s works 
and fortifications, strengthening the garrison, and encouraging Parliament to send additional 
troops to support the few existing regiments stationed there. Perpetually concerned by the 
potential Spanish threat, the fear of attack and the possibility (and reality) of siege shaped life in 
the embattled territory. 
Not surprisingly relations between Gibraltar and Spain in the eighteenth century were 
typically cool at best. For most of this period, the Spanish-Gibraltarian border was closed. While 
Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht decreed that the land borders between the two were to remain 
shut, it did allow “communication by sea with the coast of Spain.” Spanish ships were also 
allowed to enter Gibraltar’s harbor to trade “provisions, and other things necessary for the use of 
the garrison.” Yet for most of the century, all borders remained closed between the two. As the 
treaty noted, the land closure was part of an effort to “hinder” the “fraudulent importations of 
goods” from Gibraltar to Spain.18 Smuggling was a significant problem during this period, 
plaguing many of Gibraltar’s governors who were held accountable by the Spanish government 
for its peoples’ illegal sale of alcohol and tobacco.19 Tired of constantly fighting with the Spanish 
commandants across the border about the smuggling issue, some of Gibraltar’s commanders 
welcomed the closed land borders, preferring the limited communication and complaints.20 Yet 
                                                          
18 Appendix B: “Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht,” in Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians, p. 333. 
19 Tobacco and alcohol were only to be distributed by the Spanish government so that they could collect the 
resulting tariffs, which provided significant revenue for the state. However, smugglers from Gibraltar circumvented 
these rules, resulting in significant losses of profit for the Spanish exchequer and angering the Spanish monarchy. 
This has been a problem throughout Gibraltar’s history since the eighteenth century and is still a concern today. 
20 Governor Bland, for instance, remarked several times, including in his treatise to his successors, of the importance 
of keeping land borders with Spain closed. This was necessary, along with enacting extremely punitive measures, he 
argued to help prevent the pervasive problem of smuggling. See TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s 
Conduct,” 1751, fo. 34-43. 
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the sea borders were another matter altogether as their closure served as an ever-present reminder 
of Spanish enmity. 
This complete break in communication between Spain and Gibraltar was a Spanish effort 
to undermine British rule by forbidding goods to cross into the territory. Because Gibraltar had 
little arable land and lacked the capacity to provide sufficient provisions for itself, its 
commanders had to seek supplies elsewhere. Britain was too far away to rely on; ships from the 
metropole often took a few months, if not longer depending on weather, to transport goods to 
Gibraltar.21 Thus by cutting off the territory’s communication with Spanish traders, the Spanish 
government sought to frustrate commanders’ efforts to supply the garrison. Blaming Gibraltar’s 
“disregard” for Anglo-Spanish treaties, the pervasive smuggling problems, and the territory’s 
penchant for disease, the Spanish government dismissed any claims that they were being 
purposefully prejudicial merely because they could.22 As relations between Spain and Gibraltar 
remained largely contentious, such excuses as to why the borders had to remain closed became 
ever-more prevalent. 
During times of peace, however, there were moments of amity between the two territories 
and their respective governors.23 In these moments the commanders in the Campo would allow 
communication by sea, and even sometimes by land, and offer Gibraltar supplies and 
                                                          
21 Winds in the Channel often deterred ships from making the passage to Gibraltar; in 1794 these winds lasted for 
more than 3 months, which limited access to British provisions and communications. See GGA, Diary 1792-1794, 
30 March 1794. The majority of supplies sent from Britain were military related, such as munition, but during 
emergencies, they also sent food supplies, including some livestock but primarily salt provisions. See Constantine, 
Community and Identity, p. 41. 
22 Some of the excuses the Spanish government employed, beyond those listed above, included Britain’s “wrongful” 
ideas of what constituted Gibraltar’s borders, its allowance of Jews in the territory, and its pervasive armaments and 
“unlawful” guard towers. See Hills, Rock of Contention, pp. 226-236; Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians, p. 
124. For more on Spain and quarantine in Gibraltar, see chapter 3. 
23 At times the governors (and their wives) even visited one another, spending time in the other’s garrison. See 
GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782; GGA, Diary 1778. 
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provisions.24 The commanders also helped facilitate the British mail service, which often went 
through Spain on its way to British administrators in Gibraltar and throughout the Mediterranean 
and North Africa.25 When the borders were open, people from both sides were occasionally 
allowed to cross. Spanish merchants would come into Gibraltar to sell their wares, as permitted 
by Article X, while British officers would pass into Spain for entertainment.26 There was little 
for members of the British army to enjoy on the Rock, beyond illicit drinking and gambling, so 
some of the garrison commanders supported the officers’ travels to nearby Spanish sites.27 
Occasionally other residents of Gibraltar were also allowed into Spain, especially for the annual 
bullfight in San Roque which drew large crowds of people from the surrounding towns.28 These 
times of peace and collaboration became more frequent in the last decades of the century, 
particularly once Britain joined Spain in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.29 Yet 
for most of the eighteenth century, relations were not so amicable; instead, Gibraltar and Spain 
were largely at odds and Gibraltar’s governors constantly faced the challenge of managing their 
Spanish neighbors. 
                                                          
24 This occurred during the 1750s under Governor Bland, in the 1770s under Governor Boyd, and a few other times 
during that century. See TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 41-42. 
25 See GGA, Governor’s Letter Book 1771, fo. 22; GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782, 20 March 1781; GGA, Diary 
1778, 30 May 1778; GGA, Diary 1792-1794, 7 March 1793, 6 May 1793, 21 July 1793; V. Denis Vendervelde and 
Richard J. M. Garcia, Gibraltar: Quarantine and Disinfection of Mail (Southampton: Malcolm Beresford 
Montgomery, 1994), pp. 8, 11. 
26 See especially GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782; GGA, Diary 1778; GGA, Diary 1777-1778; GGA, Diary 1792-
1794. 
27 Spanish entertainment was also occasionally allowed into the garrison during times of peace. See GGA, Diary 
1777 & 1778-1782, 9 December 1778; GGA, Diary 1778, 19 March 1778, 8 May 1778, 20 August 1778. 
28 GGA, Diary 1778, 15 August 1778. 
29 While this period is outside of the scope of the dissertation, there has been a good amount of work done on this 
era. See Hills, Rock of Contention; Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians; Constantine, Community and Identity; 
Archer, Gibraltar, Identity and Empire, pp. 52-54. See also Larry Sawchuk’s work on the early nineteenth century, 
including his discussion of the yellow fever epidemics; Jason R. Musteen, Nelson’s Refuge: Gibraltar in the Age of 
Napoleon (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011). 
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Across the Straits Gibraltar’s neighbors by sea were typically much more accommodating 
to the garrison’s needs. Britain and Morocco had a long history of alliances in the early modern 
period, beginning in the sixteenth century. With the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the 
king of Morocco, impressed by England’s military prowess, sought to form a union with Queen 
Elizabeth based on their mutual concern over Spanish expansion. The resulting series of treaties 
enabled greater access for English merchants in Moroccan ports, provided enhanced legal rights 
for Englishmen residing in Morocco, and solidified the two states as allies against Spanish 
attempts at invasion and piracy.30 This alliance lasted until the English took possession of 
Tangier in 1661; when English soldiers took the port, they displaced the local populations and 
heavily fortified the town, souring Anglo-Moroccan relations. With a Moroccan victory over the 
English forces in 1680 and England’s abandonment of the garrison in 1684, relations between 
the two states improved.31 England’s capture and eventual acquisition of Gibraltar thirty years 
later only further strengthened its relationship with Morocco. 
During the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714), Morocco proved to be an important 
ally, providing fresh foods and building supplies from its cities of Tangier and Tetuan. 
Negotiations regarding a formal compact between the two states were discussed earlier in the 
                                                          
30 P.G. Rogers, A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900 (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
1970), pp. 6-20; Nabil Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1569-1689 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005), pp. 
12-37. 
31 For more on Tangier, see A.J. Smithers, The Tangier Campaign: The Birth of the British Army (Stroud: Tempus, 
2003); Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600-1850 (New York: Anchor Books, 2002); 
George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, The works of His Grace, George Villiers, late Duke of Buckingham. In two 
volumes (London, 1715), p. 274; David Jones, The Secret History of White-Hall, from the Restoration of Charles II 
Down to the Abdication of the Late K. James (London, 1717), pp. 13-14; J. F. P. Hopkins, Letters from Barbary, 
1576-1774: Arabic Documents in the Public Record Office (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 30-31; J. 
A. O. C. Brown, “Anglo-Moroccan Relations and the Embassy of Ahmad Qardanash, 1706-1708,” The Historical 
Journal 51, no. 3 (September 2008), p. 602; Sari Hornstein, The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade 1674-
1688: A Study in the Peacetime Use of Sea Power (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1991), p. 156; Alison Games, Migration 
and the Origins of the English Atlantic World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 297; Nabil Matar, 
Britain and Barbary, 1589-1689 (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005), pp. 146-148 for a description of 
John Luke’s account of life in Tangier. 
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war but began formally in 1713.32 By 1721 the first treaty was signed, promising peace between 
the two kingdoms on both land and sea, permitting duty-free trade and anchorage at any port, and 
guaranteeing the protection of all law-abiding citizens while residing in the other’s territory.33 
For Gibraltar this newfound alliance meant increased supplies for the garrison, enhanced 
prosperity for local traders, and security for those traveling across the corsair-ridden seas.34 For 
the North Africans the treaty enabled non-resident traders to be regarded as English, allowing 
them to reside in Gibraltar for an extended period of time without additional cost or fear of harm. 
This compact brought a number of benefits to both parties, especially when the Spaniards closed 
their borders to British trade. During the 1727 siege, British officers applauded Moroccan 
suppliers for giving them the provisions they so desperately needed, such as mutton, pulses and 
other dried goods.35 When Spain refused to allow any trade with Gibraltar after the siege had 
ended, the two states formed another agreement in 1729, confirming many of the articles from 
the 1721 treaty and adding additional guarantees of supplies for the garrison.36 This series of 
treaties served to elevate British standing in the North African state, leading some Britons to 
exclaim, “I say, the Moors regard us more than they do any other Christian State on account of 
Gibraltar.”37 
                                                          
32 Brown, “Anglo-Moroccan Relations;” Nadia Erzini, Moroccan-British Diplomatic and Commercial Relations in 
the Early 18th Century: The Abortive Embassy to Meknes in 1718. 
33 See Hopkins, Letters from Barbary, p. 46-50 for a version of the treaty. 
34 By 1682 the corsairs were no longer individual entrepreneurs but instead were largely controlled by the king.  
Wanting a monopoly on violence on both sea and land, Ismail order the captains to hand over all of their captives for 
which he would then compensate them.  See C. R. Pennell, Morocco: From Empire to Independence (Oxford: 
Oneworld, 2003), pp. 102-105. For more on the corsairs, see chapter 4. 
35 Officer, An Impartial Account of the Late Famous Siege of Gibraltar (London, 1728), p. 22. Pulses are considered 
to include dried beans, peas, lentils, and chickpeas. 
36 Daily Courant (London, England), Friday, August 7, 1730; Issue 8996. 
37 [Philalethes], Gibraltar a Bulwark of Great Britain (London, 1725), p. 18. 
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Morocco continued in its role as Gibraltar’s provider throughout the eighteenth century, 
supplying the garrison with the vast majority of its provisions, including “Horned Cattle, Sheep 
& Fowls; Oranges, Lemmons & other Fruits in their Season, with many other articles for 
immediate consumption.”38 Yet these transactions were not always smooth ones. The Moroccan 
state was engaged in a series of civil wars and regional disputes during the eighteenth century 
that disrupted the regular trade with the garrison.39 The archival record is replete with news of 
developments across the Straits as Gibraltar’s governors tried to follow the many changes in 
leadership.40 There were also a number of diplomatic blunders between the two states as 
Gibraltar’s governors tried to impose their wishes upon unwilling Moroccan leaders and the 
North African alcaides circumvented the terms of the Anglo-Moroccan treaties. Despite the 
necessary trade relationship between the two parties, leaders from both states were often 
frustrated with each other.41 Gibraltar’s governors complained of Moroccan corsairs’ illegal 
capture of Gibraltar’s ships, the arbitrary raises in provisioning and commercial fees, and the 
alcaides’ occasional refusals to provide supplies.42 In return the Alcaides of Tetuan and Tangier 
felt ignored and disrespected by the governor on a number of occasions, employing tactics such 
as those described previously to show their displeasure.43 Consequently, some of the garrison’s 
governors saw the alliance with North Africa as a necessary evil. As one governor described it, 
although the Moors are “a Treacherous, Knavish People, little regarding the Faith of Treaties, 
                                                          
38 GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 4, 1779-1786, “1784 Considerations on the Trade of Gibraltar,” fo. 523. 
39 See GGA, Diary 1792-1794; TNA, CO 91/11. 
40 For some examples, see TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo.51. 
41 While Gibraltar physically required the goods Morocco provided, Tetuan and Tangier needed the garrison trade to 
help their revenue as provisioning Gibraltar provided much of the cities’ incomes. 
42 See chapters 3 and 4. 
43 See chapter 3 (and TNA, CO 91/11) for a brief discussion of this. 
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when they can gain by the Breach of them,” it was necessary to maintain their “friendship” “not 
only for the supplying of Gibraltar with Live Cattle, Sheep, Fouls &c. but likewise to prevent 
their Molesting the British Trading Ships.”44 
These relationships with Spain and Morocco set the backdrop for much of what 
developed in eighteenth-century Gibraltar as events in and with both of these states profoundly 
affected the people of Gibraltar and the functioning of the garrison. Gibraltar’s reliance on its 
neighbors for supplies played a significant role in the governor’s decision-making, as did its 
desire to keep the peace in an effort to preserve the territory. Its treaties with both states also had 
consequences for the management of the territory, as will be discussed below. For Gibraltar’s 
governors, it was a constant effort to negotiate with and between Spain and Morocco, and this 
posed a stumbling block for many.45 As Governor Bland noted, “To keep up a Friendship with 
them [Spain and Morocco] both at the same time, is a most Difficult Task; and yet it must be 
attempted, and accomplish’d if possible; as the Plenty of the Town, and Interest of Great Britain 
both require it.”46 The balance of power between the three states was constantly changing, and as 
it did, the governors in Gibraltar had to realign their interests and their diplomacy accordingly. In 
many ways, the Spain-Morocco-Gibraltar triangle is essential to understanding the Rock’s 
history and its administration while under British rule. 
 
 
                                                          
44 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 43-44. 
45 As long-time enemies, part of the trouble was balancing relations between the two states. According to Governor 
Bland, the Spaniards would not open their doors to Gibraltar unless “we renounce all our Alliances with the 
Mahometans, and make open War upon them,” whereas the Moors “are Jealous that we favor the Spaniards more 
than we do them, and would therefore have us always at Variance with them.” TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of 
General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 72. See also chapter 3 for a greater discussion of this. 
46 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 70. 
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The People of Gibraltar 
After English and Dutch forces captured Gibraltar in 1704, the majority of Spanish 
inhabitants, approximately 1,200 families, left the garrison, seeking safer Spanish climes in San 
Roque.47 According to Colonel Joseph Bennet, a British engineer sent to Gibraltar in 1712 to 
report on the state of the territory, thirty Spanish families and six clergymen remained after the 
initial capture of the territory.48 These Spaniards, likely supporters of Charles III, were 
guaranteed protection by the Anglo-Dutch forces and granted an allowance of provisions for 
their subsistence. Once the battles over Gibraltar ended in late 1705, more immigrants flocked to 
the territory. In 1706 Queen Anne declared Gibraltar a free port, opening it to all traders free of 
customs duties.49 This was done not just in an effort to promote commerce in the town but also to 
“Incorrage Merchants and others to Inhabit there.”50 After this proclamation was made, “many 
boats & Embarkations came from Portugal, Barbary, & even from the Enemy’s Towns of 
                                                          
47 Colonel Joseph Bennet provides the number of families in his “Some Remarks concerning Gibraltar.” H. W. 
Howes and Tito Benady have estimated that there were between 5,000-6,000 individuals living in Gibraltar prior to 
the British occupation. Those that remained, some scholars contend, were primarily of Genoese background or 
single Spanish women. Many of the original civilians chose to leave with the Spanish soldiers, although they were 
given the right of residence to those who chose stay so long as they swore allegiance to Charles III. Some historians 
have argued that these Spaniards believed it would be a temporary exile, which is why they established residence in 
nearby San Roque, but once they realized that Gibraltar was to remain in British hands, they realized this was not 
the case. See H. W. Howes, The Gibraltarian: The Origin and Development of the Population of Gibraltar from 
1704 (Colombo: City Press, 1951); Tito Benady, “Spaniards in Gibraltar after the Treaty of Utrecht,” Gibraltar 
Heritage Journal 7 (2000), pp. 125-126; David Levey, Language Change and Variation in Gibraltar (Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008), p. 17. 
48 BL, Add MS 10034, “Some Remarks concerning Gibraltar, humbly offer’d by Colonel Joseph Bennet, to the 
Honourable the Comissiners appointed to Examine the publick Accompts of Spain and Portugal in 1712,” fo. 136, 
“Names of Old Inhabitants who Remained in the Towne,” fo. 141-142; TNA, CO 91/1, fo. 17-19. 
49 “Fourth Parliament of Great Britain: First session (3 of 3) - Begins 17/4/1714,” The History and Proceedings of 
the House of Commons: Volume 5: 1713-1714 (London, 1742), 106-154; TNA, PC 1/3170, “Gibraltar: Papers 
Relating to the Establishment of Civil Government and Civil and Criminal Courts;” TNA, PC 1/16/13, “Fifteen 
Papers Concerning Complaints from Inhabitants of Gibraltar, and London Merchants Trading There, About its 
Status as a Free Port.” 
50 BL, Add MS 61544, Samuel Pitt (merchant at Gibraltar) to Sir C. Peers, 6 July 1708, fo. 69. 
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Malaga, Marvela, Estepona, Tarriffa, & other adjacent Places.”51 The encouragement given to 
foreign merchants as well as the relative stability of the garrison and its need for civilian support 
and laborers made Gibraltar especially attractive to many foreigners. By the time of its formal 
acquisition by the British in 1713, a significant number of Spaniards, Genoese, and Jews had 
immigrated to the garrison. 
By 1725, when the first town census was performed, there were 113 civilian Britons 
(10%), 400 Spaniards (37%), 414 Genoese (38%), 23 French (2%), 21 Dutch (with Spanish 
wives) (2%), 5 Moors (0.5%), and 111 Jews living in Gibraltar (10%).52 This ratio of ethnic 
groups in the territory remained largely for the same for the rest of the eighteenth century, with 
the Spanish population decreasing some after the 1727 siege and the Genoese and Jewish 
populations increasing respectively. In 1753 the population had reached 1,816 individuals: 351 
Britons (19%), 83 (British) navy and victualling offices (5%), 597 Genoese (33%), 575 Jews 
(32%), 185 Spaniards (10%), and 25 Portuguese (1%).53 By 1767, the census no longer divided 
the population into specific ethnic groups, but rather based on religious confession. At that time 
there were 467 British Protestants, 1,460 Roman Catholics, and 783 Jews in the town.54 These 
numbers increased fairly proportionately for the 1777 census, which calculated 519 British 
Protestants (16%), 1,819 Roman Catholics (57%), and 863 Jews (27%). This census was also the 
first to subdivide each group into “native” and “non-native,” finding that approximately half of 
                                                          
51 BL, Add MS 38329, Colonel Joseph Bennett, “Some Remarks Concerning Gibraltar,” 22 November 1712. See 
also BL, Add MS 10034, fo. 136-140 and TNA, CO 91/1, fo. 17-19 for a similar report. 
52 TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 
Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588. See chapter 2 for more on this particular census. 
53 Howes, The Gibraltarian, p. 3; Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 24. The 1754 census counted 1,810 
civilians (414 Britons, 604 Jews, and 792 Roman Catholics) and a military population of 4,515, which included 
1,426 women and children. 
54 Howes, The Gibraltarian, p. 12; Constantine, Community and Identity, pp. 24-25. See also GGA, Alien Question, 
Flood, “History,” Appendix A, No. 4, 17 January 1767. 
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the inhabitants in each group were native-born.55 The 1791 census listed inhabitants similarly, 
finding a total of 403 British Protestants (14%), 1,852 Roman Catholics (63%), and 693 (23%) 
Jews, of which approximately half were native-born.56 By the end of the eighteenth century, 
Britons remained a minority within the garrison, comprising a mere 13% of the population – a 
slight increase from the 10% total in 1725. Roman Catholics, on the other hand, which included 
Spanish, Portuguese, Genoese, French, and Minorcan immigrants and their children, were almost 
63% of the town’s population and Jews composed almost 24%, with the majority being native-
born to Gibraltar.  
With this overwhelming foreign population, and very few “conquered” peoples, Gibraltar 
experienced the coming together of a wide variety of cultures, ideas, religions, and associations 
all within its small civil sphere. Bringing with them their own individual histories, these peoples 
created the space of Gibraltar as one of encounter and fusion. This is evident in all aspects of 
Gibraltar’s culture: its local dialect (Llanito), its cuisine, its religious practices, and its 
lifestyles.57 All of these peoples brought significant benefits to the territory, some because of 
their continuing connections with their home states. While the population was often divided into 
ethnic and religious groups, these were not the only defining characteristics of individuals. 
                                                          
55 In actuality, there were about twice as more native Jews than “strangers” (the only group which non-natives were 
titled as such), whereas the British and Roman Catholic inhabitants were more evenly split. GGA, Demography, 
“List of Inhabitants 1777.” See also Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 26; Howes, The Gibraltarian, pp. 12-
13. 
56 Again, more than half of the Jewish population was native-born unlike the others. See GGA, Demography, “List 
of Inhabitants 1791.” See also Constantine, Community and Identity, pp. 27-28; Howes, The Gibraltarian, p. 27. 
According to Howes and Constantine, there was also a 1787 census; however, the original data has not survived. As 
Constantine argues, the numbers reported for this census look a bit high for the time period, especially considering 
the loss of inhabitants with the Great Siege (1779-1783) and the slow process of rebuilding the town. According to 
these authors, in 1787 there were 512 British Protestants, 2,098 Roman Catholics, and 776 Jews, totaling 3,386 
inhabitants. See Howes, The Gibraltarian, p. 12; Constantine, Community and Identity, pp. 26-27. 
57 See Jennifer Ballantine Perera, “Are We What We Eat?,” The Calentita Press 3 (2011), p. 4; Constantine, 
Community and Identity, p. 426; David Levey, Language Change and Variation in Gibraltar (Philadelphia: Johns 
Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008). Llanito is an interesting mix of several different languages, including 
English, Spanish, Portuguese, Hebrew, Italian, Arabic, and recently even Hindi. 
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However, it is probable that individuals from certain states likely formed ethnically-based groups 
because of similar beliefs, religions, professions, and languages. Together this combination of 
peoples created a small-scale Mediterranean world in the tiny town of Gibraltar. 
 
Spaniards 
 Some of the earliest immigrants to English-held Gibraltar were Spaniards. Although the 
majority of Gibraltar’s citizens left when the garrison fell in 1704, it appears that a number of 
Spaniards came back across the border by the end of 1705 once the fighting in Gibraltar 
ceased.58 Colonel Bennet argued that these individuals and families “got into the Town… [so 
they could] also receive, the same Allowance of Provisions” as the Spaniards who remained 
post-capture.59 It is more likely that they were supporters of the defeated Charles III or Catalan 
soldiers who came in 1704 with Prince George’s troops and decided to stay.60 Regardless of their 
motivations, the new Spanish population proved to be a significant help to the English garrison. 
They served as many of the town’s laborers and shopkeepers by day, working to support the 
garrison community, and as watchmen by night, forming the Spanish guard which was 
responsible for manning the Devil’s Tower post on Gibraltar’s eastern rock face.61 When the 
                                                          
58 Caruana argues that the majority of the inhabitants left post-capture because they were concerned the British 
soldiers would act similarly as they did in Cadiz, where the invading forces ransacked churches, convents, and 
homes and raped many of the female residents. Also many of the Spanish residents owned large pieces of land and 
industries in the Campo region, which had remained a part of Spain, and they chose to return to those holdings 
rather than staying on the insecure Rock. See Charles Caruana, The Rock Under a Cloud (Cambridge: Silent Books, 
1989), p. 8. 
59 BL, Add MS 10034, “Some Remarks concerning Gibraltar, humbly offer’d by Colonel Joseph Bennet, to the 
Honourable the Comissiners appointed to Examine the publick Accompts of Spain and Portugal in 1712,” fo. 136 
60 See Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 22; Tito Benady, “The Depositions of the Spanish Inhabitants of 
Gibraltar to the Inspectors of the Army in 1712,” Gibraltar Heritage Journal 6 (1999): 99-113. 
61 The guard was led by a Spanish Sergeant, who also performed some policing duties for the town and liasoned 
between the civil and military sphere. See GGA, Diary 1778, 16 September 1778; Benady, “Spaniards in Gibraltar 
after the Treaty of Utrecht,” pp. 125-126; Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 22. 
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fortifications required improvements, the Spaniards, along with Gibraltar’s other foreign 
residents, worked to repair them, dedicating twelve hour shifts to the task. Per the Treaty of 
Utrecht, Roman Catholics were promised that “the free exercise of their religion” would be 
protected while under British rule.62 Although this was not always honored, in general Spanish 
Catholics were permitted to practice their religion and a Catholic church was established in the 
town.63 Despite these opportunities and allowances, when war seemed apparent between 
Gibraltar and Spain in 1727, many of the Spanish residents left the garrison for their home 
state.64 Some remained, and many of those who did helped to fight alongside British soldiers and 
man the works. This period marked a turning point for the Spanish population of the garrison. 
After 1727, the number of Spaniards fell significantly, not to rise again until the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century when the borders with Spain opened and the two territories were 
joined against a common French enemy. 
 
Genoese 
 Gibraltar’s Genoese population also arrived soon after British occupation of the territory, 
quickly establishing itself on the east side of the Rock in Catalan Bay.65 Some Genoese were 
                                                          
62 Appendix B: “Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht,” in Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians, p. 334. 
63 For some complaints by Spaniards against Gibraltar’s governors response to Roman Catholics, see Benady, “The 
Depositions of the Spanish Inhabitants.” Also, technically Gibraltar was within the Bishop of Cadiz’s jurisdiction, 
but he was refused entrance to the territory several times, and in 1773 the governor insisted (with London’s 
approval) that the governors had the power to appoint the parish priests. GGA, Governor’s Letter Book 1771, fo. 
177-181; GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1787-1789, fo. 374-376; GGA, Letters to Consuls, Lisbon & Cadiz, 1769-
1797, fo. 11-13; GGA, Diary 1777-1778, 10 June 1777. See also Constantine, Community and Identity, pp. 73-74; 
Caruana, The Rock Under a Cloud, chapter 3. Caruana provides a very thorough overview of Roman Catholicism in 
Gibraltar, including the ecclesiastical disputes between priests and the governors. 
64 The Spanish priests did remain in the garrison, both during the 1727 Siege and the Great Siege. See Father 
Francisco Messa O. F. M., “Appendix One: A Diary of Events of the Great Siege 1779-81,” in Caruana, The Rock 
Under a Cloud. 
65 Caruana has found a source that suggests this settlement was a result of a group of Genoese ship-workers who 
followed Rooke and the British fleet and performed most of their repairs. These men initially set up shop on one of 
the western beaches (Sandy Bay), but when the Spaniards attacked the eastern side, a permanent guardroom was 
46 
 
recorded among town’s earliest inhabitants, having been residents under Spanish occupation and 
remaining after its capture in 1704. During the early modern period, Genoese merchants and 
mariners had settled across the Spanish coastline, having expanded their trade networks 
throughout the Mediterranean.66 As Braudel noted in his works, “Genuensis ero mercator, a 
Genoese, therefore a trader.”67 Known for their commercial and maritime prowess, this 
community was drawn to British Gibraltar and its need for merchants to help support the 
garrison. Queen Anne’s declaration of Gibraltar as a free port also encouraged Genoese 
settlement as it reduced the costs associated with their trade and facilitated the use of its port as 
“an Emporium for Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Ocean.”68 The Genoese recognized the 
value of Gibraltar as a re-export site, seeing as the territory produced few goods of its own, and 
sought to use this to their advantage by integrating it into their pre-existing networks. They 
served as the primary merchants and mariners in the town, but they also performed a number of 
other duties; Genoese inhabitants served as retailers of wine and spirits, licensed porters, cooks, 
gardeners, and general laborers.69 They were also well-known fishermen, and the sea off of 
                                                          
established there at Catalan Bay. The guardroom had a regular supply of provisions, so the Genoese workers 
relocated there and remained there even after the war. See Caruana’s quotation from Cecilia Hanky in Caruana, The 
Rock Under a Cloud, p. 190, fn. 13. 
66 Mesod Benady, “The Settlement of Jews in Gibraltar, 1704-1783,” Transactions & Miscellanies, Jewish 
Historical Society of England 26 (1974-1978), 88; Howes, The Gibraltarian, pp. 9-10; Fernand Braudel, The 
Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 2 vol. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995), pp. 342-344, 501-506. 
67 Braudel, The Mediterranean, p. 319. 
68 Ignacio Lopez de Ayala, Historía de Gibraltar (Madrid, 1782), p. 176. 
69 The position of porter became a licensed job under General Bland, who sought to regulate who was responsible 
for carrying goods and spirits in the garrison as an attempt to “prevent Wine or Spirits being Convey’d to the Sutlers 
of Soldiers Cladestinely.” Licenses were also required to retail snuff and tobacco as well as for bakers. See TNA, 
CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, Articles 3, 4, and 6. For examples, see GGA, Civil 
Secretary’s Register No. 3, 1774-1778, fo. 1-6; GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1776, fo. 42, 45, 78, 110; 
GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782, 1 January 1779. 
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Gibraltar offered prime opportunities for such work.70 Not only did the Genoese fulfill many of 
the garrison’s occupational needs, but after 1727 they formed their own guard who worked to 
police the town during times of peace.71 They also helped served and protect the territory when it 
was under attack, as many Genoese inhabitants supported British forces during times of war. 
They served as privateers, they risked capture to retrieve supplies for the garrison, they helped 
man the works and rebuild fortifications, and they remained in the territory even when it was 
under attack to help support the troops however possible.72 While the garrison’s many needs 
offered significant opportunities for these mobile, maritime people who flocked to the territory 
throughout the eighteenth century, they in turn proved to be invaluable resources for protecting 
and improving Gibraltar.73 
 
Jews 
 Jewish migrants, especially Sephardic Jews from Morocco, also came to Gibraltar not 
long after its capture by Anglo-Dutch forces. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries many Jews 
settled in Gibraltar, but they were expelled after the Spanish conquest in 1492. With the English 
occupation of the territory, the Jewish community, which had settled in Morocco after the 
expulsion, returned to Gibraltar. As Colonel Bennet grumbled in 1712, “The Jews come daily in 
                                                          
70 Tito Benady, “Genoese in Gibraltar,” Gibraltar Heritage Journal 8 (2001): 85-106; Howes, pp. 31-36; 
Constantine, pp. 56-57. Fishermen also had to get passes from the governor. See GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register 
No. 3, 1774-1778, fo. 3. 
71 During peacetime, many Genoese inhabitants also helped to resupply the garrison’s stores and clear the garrison 
walls of “rubbish and other incumbrances” for the safety of the garrison. See GGA, Governor’s Letter Book 1749-
1766, 29 April 1756, fo. 152, 13 November 1756, fo. 175, 14 December 1756, fo. 180; W. Smith, Account of the 
Siege of Gibraltar 1727, fo. 7R. (NB: Most of these references also apply for Jewish inhabitants who also served 
during the garrison during times of war and peace) 
72 See GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782, 3-4 July 1779.  
73 The Genoese population increased significantly during the War of Austrian Succession due to the disasters 
happening in Genoa. See Hills, Rock of Contention, p. 294. 
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great numbers from Barbary, Leghorn and Portugal.”74 This migration was evident not only by 
the engineer’s complaints, but also by the 1712 list of rents, which included several Jewish 
names.75 However, according to the Treaty of Utrecht, Jews and Moors were forbidden from 
living in Gibraltar. As Article X stated, “Her Britannic Majesty, at the request of the Catholic 
King, does consent and agree, that no leave shall be given under any pretence whatsoever, either 
to Jews or Moors, to reside or have their dwellings in the said town of Gibraltar.”76 Despite the 
ban on Jewish and Moorish residents, Jews comprised a significant component of Gibraltar’s 
population.77 By 1721, members of the Jewish community were formally given land grants by 
the governor to hold their own properties, including one grant for a piece of waste ground on 
which they could build their own synagogue, later known as the Great Synagogue.78 A second 
synagogue (the Little Synagogue) was constructed in 1759 on the site of one of Gibraltar’s meat 
                                                          
74 BL, Add MS 10034, Reports Relating to Gibraltar 1704-1770, “Some Remarks Concerning Gibraltar, Humbly 
Offer’d by Colonel Joseph Bennet,” fo. 136-140; TNA, CO 91/1, fo. 17-19. 
75 TNA, CO 91/1, fo. 104. See also several letters in TNA, CO 91/1; Benady, “Depositions,” p. 88. 
76 The treaty also forbade “refuge or shelter… to any Moorish ships of war in the harbor of the said town, whereby 
the communication between Spain and Ceuta may be obstructed, or the coasts of Spain be infested by the excursions 
of the Moors.” See Appendix B: “Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht,” in Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians, p. 
334. 
77 Few Moors ever settled in the territory during the eighteenth century, making that particular group less of a 
concern for the British and the Spaniards. 
78 The grant was made to Isaac Netto, a Jew from Leghorn and London who had been trained by his father to be a 
rabbi. Netto had been a merchant in Gibraltar for many years, and with this grant became the leader of the Jewish 
community. This synagogue was fondly known as “The Dutch Synagogue” and was a single-story building located 
at the back of Engineer’s Lane. The synagogue was destroyed in 1766 during a terrible rainstorm, but it was rebuilt 
in 1768 on a larger piece of land. It was destroyed again in 1781 during the Great Siege but was once again rebuilt 
and then later reconstructed after a fire in 1812. See GGA, Crown Land Series A, Bland’s Court of Enquiry, fo. 163; 
Dieter Haller, “Transcending Locality, Creating Identity – A Diasporic Perspective on the Mediterranean: the Jews 
of Gibraltar” in The Mediterraneans: Transborder Movements and Diasporas, ed. Ina-Maria Greverus, Regina 
Romhild & Gisela Welz (Munster: Transaction Publishers, 2000), pp. 18-19; Synagogues,” Jewish Gibraltar at 
http://www.jewishgibraltar.com/synagogues.php.  
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markets and nearby one of the few Yeshivas in the town, and a third, known as the Flemish 
Synagogue, opened for worship in 1799.79 
 Although the Jewish inhabitants of the town created a number of problems for Britain 
with the Spanish government, these residents remained, keeping a strong presence in the 
territory.80 British ministers throughout the 1710s-1720s commanded Gibraltar’s governors to 
expel the Jews in accordance with the treaty; however, many of these governors refused to do so. 
The Jewish population had proved essential to the maintenance of the garrison, bringing supplies 
from Morocco and serving as the town’s primary merchants.81 Without the Jews, the governors 
realized, Gibraltar would not be able to support its current population. Also, the Jewish 
inhabitants were known for being very successful financially, and many of the garrison’s early 
governors were eager to line their own pockets.82 By keeping the Jews in exchange for increased 
taxes and fees, Gibraltar’s commanders realized that they could make a personal profit from this 
community. As a result, the governors insisted in their communications with inquiring British 
ministers that these inhabitants could not leave until all debts and other commercial negotiations 
                                                          
79 A fourth synagogue (the Abudarham Synagogue) was constructed in 1820. See “Synagogues,” Jewish Gibraltar at 
http://www.jewishgibraltar.com/synagogues.php; Joshua Marrache, The Flemish Synagogue of Gibraltar: Kahal 
Kadosh Nefuso Yehudah (Grendon: Gibraltar Books, 2000). 
80 For a sampling of Spanish complaints against the Jews, see TNA, SP 78/154, Prior to Dartmouth, 16/27 
September 1712, fo. 64; TNA, SP 36/6, Whitehall to Colonel Clayton, 16 April 1728, fo. 46-47. For a few British 
responses, see TNA, CO 91/8, “The Humble Petition of Diverse Merchants;” Gibraltar a Bulwark, p. 18, 22; The 
Report of the Commissioners Sent Into Spain: Pursuant to an Address of the House of Commons to Her Late 
Majesty Queen Anne, Relating to Gibralter (London, 1728), p. i; Letter to the Lord Commissioners, p. 12; BL, Add 
MS 10034, Reports Relating to Gibraltar 1704-1770, “Some Remarks Concerning Gibraltar, Humbly Offer’d by 
Colonel Joseph Bennet,”, fo. 136-140; BL, Add MS 38329, Bennet Remarks, fo. 157; TNA, CO 91/5, Portmore to 
London, 21 March 1713/14, fo. 13; TNA, CO 91/4, Kane to Townshend,15 August 1728, Kane to Delafaye, 13 
October 1725, fo. 151-152; TNA, CO 91/9, Sabine to London, 15 June 1730; TNA, CO 91/4, Russell to Stanyan, 30 
April 1727; various documents in TNA, CO 91/1 and TNA, CO 91/6. 
81 Geoffrey Plank has even argued that by 1713 Moroccan currency had become the main currency in Gibraltar. 
Plank, “Making Gibraltar British in the Eighteenth Century,” History 98 (2013), p. 351. 
82 See BL, Add MS 10034, Reports Relating to Gibraltar 1704-1770, “Some Remarks Concerning Gibraltar, 
Humbly Offer’d by Colonel Joseph Bennet,” fo. 137. 
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were settled. Otherwise, they argued, the territory could lose money and it might drive away 
profitable merchants. Once the business transactions were completed, the commanders promised 
to force the Jews out of the garrison.  
In 1717 a number of Jews were expelled, but several remained in order to supply the 
territory and supposedly finish their business in the garrison. By 1718 Britain and Spain went to 
war and Gibraltar was in need of supplies and support. As a result, the governor recalled a 
number of the former Jewish inhabitants, who returned to the territory and resumed their 
positions as garrison suppliers. By the time the war ended, Britain and Morocco were in the 
midst of completing negotiations of the 1721 Anglo-Moroccan treaty, which granted permission 
for Moroccan Jews and Arabs to settle in Gibraltar.83 Problems between Spain and Britain 
remained and the Spanish monarchs continued to cite the presence of Jews in Gibraltar as an 
aggravating factor; however, the British government was no longer willing to rid itself of 
Gibraltar’s Jewish community.84 War erupted again in 1727 and Spanish forces besieged the 
territory, during which time the Jews proved themselves as serviceable members of the garrison. 
Their participation during the siege, both manning the works and transporting supplies, solidified 
their standing in Gibraltar. Afterward there were no more attempts to rid Gibraltar of its Jews.85 
                                                          
83 Ramsey Cook, “Governing a Colony Pas Commes Les Autres: The Dilemmas of Unplanned Conquest,” in 
Realities of Representation: State Building in Early Modern Europe and European America, ed. Maija Jansson 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 188. 
84 Some British ministers and authors continued to blame the harboring of Jews in Gibratlar as the primary reason 
why Spain treated the territory with such hostility. See Gibraltar a Bulwark, 20; Report of the Commissioners, i; A 
Letter to the Lord Commissioners, 12; BL, Add MS 10034, Reports Relating to Gibraltar 1704-1770, “Some 
Remarks Concerning Gibraltar, Humbly Offer’d by Colonel Joseph Bennet,” fo. 136-140. Several governors also 
agreed that Spain could easily use the presence of Jews against them: see TNA, CO 91/5, Portmore to London, 21 
March 1713/14, fo. 13; TNA, CO 91/4, Kane to Townshend, 15 August 1728, Kane to Delafaye, 13 October 1725, 
fo. 151-152; TNA, CO 91/9, Sabine to London, 15 June 1730. One minister recommended that when peace was 
renewed with Spain after the 1727 Anglo-Spanish war that the article surrounding these residents be excluded: see 
TNA, CO 91/4, Russell to Stanyan, 30 April 1727. 
85 For a more thorough overview see Benady, “The Settlement of Jews in Gibraltar,” pp. 87-110; Joshua Hassan and 
Jewish Historical Society of England. The Treaty of Utrecht, 1713, and the Jews of Gibraltar: Lecture (London: 
Jewish Historical Society of England, 1970). 
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For the rest of the eighteenth century, the Jewish community continued to grow. By the 
mid-eighteenth century, the population was large enough that they too had their own police 
system led by the “Jew Sergeant” who was responsible for managing the “lower classes” of 
Jewish inhabitants.86 While some of the town’s Jews worked as shopkeepers, bakers, butchers, 
tailors, shoemakers, and licensed porters, the majority served as merchants, participating in the 
supplying of the garrison. The commercial opportunities available in the town made many of 
Gibraltar’s Jewish merchants very successful. The Jewish diasporic community was spread 
throughout the Mediterranean and beyond, and much like for the Genoese, Gibraltar served as an 
important hub for re-exporting goods and advancing their trade in the region.87 Also like the 
Genoese, the Jewish community offered a great deal of support for the garrison during times of 
need, especially during the Great Siege.88 Providing supplies, manning the works, rebuilding 
fortifications, among other tasks, the Jewish community served Gibraltar well when the Rock 
was under attack.89  They benefited greatly from the opportunities in Gibraltar, and in return 
many members of the Jewish community supported their newly adopted home unstintingly both 
in times of peace and in times of war. 
 
 
                                                          
86 For examples, see GGA, Diary 1792-1794, 6 December 1792. 
87 As described by Aslanian, Jewish commercial networks were polycentric, that is not depending on one nodal 
center but operating from many. Because this system required more sedentary nodes or settlements to act as “routing 
stations,” Gibraltar served as a useful hub in that regard. See Sebouh David Aslanian, From the Indian Ocean to the 
Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011), pp. 14-15. 
88 Like the Genoese, they also helped with peacetime garrison tasks, such as moving artillery, clearing walls, and 
restocking the stores. See GGA, Governor’s Letter Book 1749-1766, 13 November 1756, fo. 175, 14 December 
1756, fo. 180. 
89 See fn. 69. 
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Britons 
 In the early years of its rule, the British government sought to attract a large British 
population to the Mediterranean territory. With the declaration of Gibraltar as a free port, the 
governor tried to court British merchants settled in Cadiz and Malaga; however, few relocated to 
the garrison. As he informed the merchants, “any English protestant that were inclined to settle 
here, should meet with all the encouragement I cou’d possible show them… [and] that they 
shou’d on all occasions find me ready to joyne with them in all things for the vantage of 
Trade.”90 Spanish trade, at that time, was flourishing, whereas Gibraltar’s commercial 
opportunities seemed limited, especially considering that migrants from other states had fulfilled 
many of the garrison’s trading needs. As Admiral Cornwall complained in 1717, “there is no 
encouragement for any English Merchants to come and reside here, since all Trade will pass 
thro’ ye Jews Hands.”91 Other efforts, such as encouraging Protestant property ownership, 
granting exclusive trading rights, and privileging their standing within the community, also failed 
to attract significant numbers of settlers. For many Britons, the territory was simply too 
politically unstable, especially in the early decades of British possession, and there were few 
advantages to relocating there. There were not significant plots of land or houses, the civil courts 
had yet to be established, the port was not thriving or even all that profitable, and residents were 
stuck on a very small rocky outcrop in a foreign sea surrounded by largely hostile neighbors. For 
Britons who had opportunities to settle elsewhere, Gibraltar and its lack of land and trade was 
not all that appealing. 
                                                          
90 TNA, CO 91/1, Colonel Cotton, 1717. 
91 TNA, CO 91/1, Cornwall to Cotton, 7 September 1717. 
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 The majority of Britons who did reside in the town were primarily soldiers, either those 
who were still on duty or time-expired (discharged) who chose to settle there. While some 
governors discouraged ex-servicemen and their families from remaining in the town, others 
courted them, seeking simply to improve the number of Protestant inhabitants.92 Civilian Britons 
were typically the leaders of the business community in Gibraltar, serving as traders and 
innkeepers with some filling other less prominent roles.93 Because British residents were the only 
ones permitted to legally import wine, spirits, and tobacco, many worked in these particular 
trades.94 As part of the governors’ efforts to encourage British settlement, those Britons who 
lived in the town did enjoy certain privileges, such as the freedom to travel into Spain, and 
eligibility to participate in certain administrative duties, such as serving on the civil court (once it 
was established).95 But as demonstrated by the census figures listed above, British settlers, 
regardless of their roles within the territory, were still significantly outnumbered by Gibraltar’s 
Mediterranean population, a reality that was frightening to many of its governors. 
 
 Because the vast majority of Gibraltar’s inhabitants were migrants from different states, 
each resident brought with him or herself different cultural norms, practices, customs, and 
beliefs. Blending a variety of peoples and cultures, which seemingly were distinct on the outside, 
                                                          
92 Apparently Colonel Congreve, according to a petition signed by four British women who had since returned to 
England, had discouraged them from remaining in Gibraltar, whereas Governor Kane had eagerly granted properties 
to current and former soldiers. See TNA, CO 91/1. 
93 Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 56. 
94 GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1766, fo. 53-56, 58-59, 91-96, 99-100, 117-118, 194. These imports were 
highly restricted and closely monitored because of the governors’ fear of a drunk garrison and also an unhappy 
Spanish neighbor (because of smuggling). Offenders were fined, jailed or even exiled. For examples, see GGA, 
Diary 1778, 6 October 1778. 
95 For examples of Britons crossing the Spanish lines, see GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1766, fo. 236; GGA, 
Letters to Consuls Lisbon & Cadiz, 1769-1797, fo. 26-27. For British residents serving in civil courts, see GGA, 
Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1766, fo. 32-34, 251. 
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over time these groups fused together to create a unique Gibraltarian identity that pulled from the 
residents’ many backgrounds. Yet in the eighteenth century, each of these ethnic groups were 
more distinct than in later years, both on their own accord – likely due to differences in language, 
religion, profession, and even place of settlement on the Rock – and because of the governors’ 
efforts to create distinct categories of individuals. Despite these distinctions, the majority of 
residents worked together to help further the growth of the territory and assist the garrison and its 
needs accordingly. This is not to say that there were not disputes, which were expected in any 
trading community, especially in a middle ground like Gibraltar, but in general the greatest 
divide was between Gibraltar’s multiethnic residents, Britons included, and its British 
administrators. 
 
The Governors of Gibraltar 
Governors, as established in the Tudor period, were “men who commanded military 
garrisons within conquered regions.”96 This definition was still applicable in the eighteenth 
century, especially in Gibraltar, where a central part of their duty was as commander of the 
armed forces stationed there.97 Because Gibraltar was in a constant state of alert for most of the 
eighteenth century, the military duties of the governor were vitally important for the maintenance 
of the garrison and the continued British possession of the territory. It was the responsibility of 
the governor to keep a constant eye on Britain’s European competitors, many of whom also 
proved to be enemies of Gibraltar at some point during this period. Spain, who actively besieged 
                                                          
96 Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1550-1660 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), p. 149. 
97 A. Mackillop and Steve Murdoch, eds., Military Governors and Imperial Frontiers, c. 160-1800: A Study of 
Scotland and Empires (Boston: Brill, 2003), pp. xxvii-xxviii. Throughout this dissertation, governor and commander 
will be used interchangeably when discussing the leadership of Gibraltar. 
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the garrison twice during the eighteenth century and militarized its borders several other times, 
posed an almost constant threat to Gibraltar, and France, who was often allied with Spain in its 
efforts to take the territory from Britain, also presented a risk to the garrison’s safety.98 From 
their situation in the midst of a “hostile” sea, Gibraltar’s governors were ordered to monitor the 
movements of these potential enemies and keep an ear to the ground for any rumors of potential 
attacks. In the meantime, it was their responsibility to ensure the garrison was well fortified, the 
works were in good order, the soldiers were well trained and prepared for possible battle, and 
that there were sufficient arms and munitions should hostilities erupt. Because of these needs, it 
was pivotal, in the minds of the British government, that Gibraltar’s governors be well-
experienced military men. 
 As Stephen Constantine has shown, the commanders of Gibraltar were indeed men with 
significant military experience. Upon their appointment to the office of governor during the first 
century of British rule (1707-1814), two were brigadier-generals, two were major-generals, nine 
were lieutenant-generals, and two were full generals. The additional thirteen appointed lieutenant 
governors, who served as replacements for absent governors, and the twelve officers who were 
put in charge of the garrison temporarily also held high military ranks, ranging from colonel to 
lieutenant-general.99 Nor were these governors young men, with most of the commanders being 
                                                          
98 While France and Britain were allies during the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1721), King Louis XV of 
France and King Philip V of Spain signed the first of several Pacte de Famille in 1733, in which the French 
monarch promised his help to the Spanish king in restoring Gibraltar to Spanish hands. This pact truly came into 
action in 1779 during the War of the American Revolution when the two states besieged Gibraltar for the next four 
years. 
99 See Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 71. His data is based on lists from Jackson, Rock of the 
Gibraltarians, and entries in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. For individuals who were appointed to 
posts more than once, the original rank at their first appointment was used, unless they were promoted to a higher 
position (i.e. from lieutenant governor to governor), in which case both ranks were used. 
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between the ages of fifty and eighty at the time of their appointment.100 These men were well-
versed in the ways of the British military, and many of them had served in British possessions or 
military engagements across the globe. This was not uncommon for British governors during this 
period, as several scholars have shown the “webs” of “colonial lives” that these men held across 
the empire.101 Many of the veterans of Williamite War in Ireland (1688-1691) and of the Jacobite 
rebellion in Scotland (1745) served as royal governors in British territories throughout the 
empire, and the majority of these governors had extensive military and garrison experience 
beyond those particular times of service.102 
 As military men with many years of service to the British crown, these governors 
appeared to be well fit to serve as representatives of Britain and its empire. In many ways, their 
past history with the military demonstrated their qualifications for the job ahead. Their time 
spent in other garrisons prepared them well for their future duties, introducing them to the 
bureaucracies of rule, the development of civil and military policies, and the practice of 
techniques and politics to help stabilize volatile areas.103 For the British government, these past 
positions demonstrated their military skills, their administrative capabilities, and their loyalty to 
                                                          
100 Nor were these men particularly youthful. As Constantine has shown, among the governors whose birth year is 
known, the eldest at time of appointment was 80 and the youngest (the Duke of Kent) was 35. The average age was 
56, a number which may be even higher if the dates analyzed aligned with the period focused on in this dissertation 
(the Duke of Kent was governor from 1802 to 1820). The vast majority of governors covered in this dissertation 
were at least 60 at the time of their appointment, and for many of them, their time in Gibraltar was near the end of 
their careers. See Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 71. 
101 See Allison Games, Webs of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560-1660 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008); David Lambert and Alan Lester, eds., Colonial Lives across the British Empire: 
Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Geoffrey 
Plank, Rebellion and Savagery: The Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania, 2006). 
102 See Stephen Saunders Webb, “Army and Empire: English Garrison Government in Britain and America, 1569 to 
1763.” William and Mary Quarterly Third Series 34 (1977), p. 15; Geoffrey Plank, Rebellion and Savagery: The 
Jacobite Rising of 1745 and the British Empire (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2006). 
103 Webb, “Army and Empire,” p. 19. 
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the crown.104 Having been placed in tricky situations throughout their careers, these men had 
proven that they could respond to crises as they developed, a skill that was especially desirable 
for governors in a territory distant from Britain.105 Their many roles abroad showed the value of 
their experience, as well as the desire of the British government to use this knowledge in sites 
across the empire, even if the needs in and particularities of each location varied.106 Because of 
their histories abroad in service of the Crown, these men appeared to be “effective agents of 
imperialism.”107 
 To gain a better understanding of the men who held this role in Gibraltar, I will give a 
brief overview of four of the governors that play a significant role in the forthcoming chapters. 
These include Lieutenant Governor Richard Kane (1720-1721, 1725-1727), Governor Humphrey 
Bland (1749-1752), Lieutenant Governor and later Governor Robert Boyd (1768-1777, 1790-
1794), and Governor George Augustus Eliott (1777-1787).108 As these short biographies will 
show, Gibraltar’s governors were invested and skilled military men with experience across the 
globe fighting for Britain and its interests. Their lives were dedicated to protecting the state and 
its holdings, a commitment that continued during their time in Gibraltar. They sought to support 
the British Protestant vision of Gibraltar and encourage the growth of the territory in that 
direction. This included supporting British settlement, privileging British property holders, 
introducing British institutions and practices, increasing British revenue and reinforcing the 
                                                          
104 Ian K. Steele, “Governors or Generals? A Note on Martial Law and the Revolution of 1689 in English America.” 
William and Mary Quarterly Third Series 46 (1989), p. 313. 
105 It could take several months for advice from London to reach the garrison, and Gibraltar’s governors often had to 
act independently from the British government (unless later commanded otherwise).  
106 See Games, Webs of Empire, p. 148. 
107 Webb, “Army and Empire,” p. 19. 
108 For a comprehensive list of Gibraltar’s governors, lieutenant governors, and acting governors, see Tito Benady, 
“Governors of Gibraltar,” Gibraltar Heritage Journal 2 (1994), pp. 73-78. 
58 
 
British garrison. Their focus as British military men was to secure the territory for Britain in the 
present and in the future. Yet, as will be discussed in the following section, the governors’ 
military skills and administrative efforts were not always positive for those under their 
leadership.  
 
Richard Kane (1662-1736) 
 Kane was born in northern Ireland in 1662 and entered the Royal Regiment of Ireland in 
1689. He served with the regiment during the Williamite Wars in Ireland, including the Battle of 
the Boyne, the Battle of Athlone, the Battle of Aughrim, and the Siege of Limerick, as well as 
across the Continent during the Nine Years’ War, in which he was wounded and his regiment 
was rewarded for its bravery, and the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1710 he was appointed 
colonel of his own regiment of Irish foot, which participated in the (largely failed) Canadian 
expedition in 1711. In 1712 Queen Anne appointed Kane lieutenant governor of Minorca, a 
position in which he remained for the next eight years, until he was sent to command Gibraltar in 
1720. At the time Britain was in the process of concluding the War of the Quadruple Alliance 
against Spain, and having shown himself to be a competent leader administratively and 
militarily, Kane was ordered to reinforce the garrison. He remained in Gibraltar for one year, 
returned to his post in Minorca as lieutenant governor for another four years, and then was again 
sent to Gibraltar to serve as lieutenant governor in 1725 when it seemed that a Spanish attack 
was imminent. When the new lieutenant governor, Jasper Clayton, arrived in 1727, Kane 
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returned to Minorca to prepare it for possible attack as well. In 1730, he was finally made 
governor of Minorca, where he died in 1736.109 
 Kane’s service to the Crown took him across the European and American continents, 
finally settling him in the Mediterranean where he served loyally for 25 years. During his time in 
power in that region, he proved himself to be an ardent defender of Britain and all that it stood 
for. As a protector of the Protestant faith, he expelled a parish priest and his vice curate from 
Gibraltar after they refused to lift the excommunication of a Roman Catholic resident turned 
Protestant. As a supporter of British liberties, he proposed a new constitution and other legal 
reforms in Minorca, which eventually were implemented in 1754. And as a defender of British 
territories, he reinforced Britain’s precarious possessions against Spanish attack, detaining 
additional troops to support the existing garrison and improving the garrison’s works. Kane 
strengthened the existing northern defenses, widened and strengthened the existing Moorish wall 
to make the Grand Battery in the north, built the South Barracks on the undefended south face of 
the Rock, and rebuilt the Landport, all in an effort to ensure Gibraltar would remain in the hands 
of the British monarch. As the inscription on his memorial in Westminster Abbey declares, “He 
who under four sovereigns had borne arms with the greatest shrewdness, courage and dignity, 
who had served God with all his heart and played the role not less of a Christian than of a good 
solider.”110 
 
 
                                                          
109 Bruce Laurie, “Kane [formerly O’Cahan], Richard,” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. 
Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Tito Benady, “The Governors of Gibraltar I 
(1704-1730),” Gibraltar Heritage Journal 9 (2002), pp. 54-56. 
110 “Richard Kane,” http://www.westminster-abbey.org/our-history/people/richard-kane.  
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Humphrey Bland (1686-1763) 
 Also of Protestant Irish birth, Bland served in the Irish army beginning in 1704. It 
appears that he served during the War of Spanish Succession in the Low Countries and fought 
against the Jacobites during the 1715 rebellion. In 1727 he published his Treatise of Military 
Discipline, a work that detailed the contemporary practices of the army, including its drills and 
training, the duties of its officers, and the rules in quarters, camp, field and the garrison. His 
Treatise was reprinted nine times by 1762 and was thought to be one of the most widely used 
drillbooks of its time. After the publication of his treatise, Bland rose quickly through the ranks 
and was made Quartermaster-General of the Forces on the British establishment in 1742, a 
highly regarded senior staff appointment with the military which he held until his death. He later 
served in Flanders, Dettingen, and the Low Countries during the War of the Austrian Succession, 
and with the outbreak of the Jacobite rebellion in 1745 he returned to Britain to serve with the 
army in Scotland. After the Battle of Culloden, Bland led the pursuit against the fleeing 
Highlanders, and later commanded one of the four military districts put into place following the 
rising. In 1747, after a brief return to service in the ongoing war in the Low Countries, he was 
made commander-in-chief in Scotland, a position he held until he was appointed governor of 
Gibraltar in 1749, and one he returned to from 1753 until 1756 when he had to leave for health 
reasons.111 
 Bland was sent to Gibraltar by the British crown in an effort to “redress the several 
Grievances which the Inhabitants of that City had loudly complained of.” Prior to his term as 
governor there had been a number of complaints about previous governors’ abuse of the position, 
                                                          
111 J. A. Houlding, “Bland, Humphrey,” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and 
Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Plank, Rebellion and Savagery. 
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and the British government sought to rectify the reputation of that post by instituting “such 
proper Rules as would effectually remove [these grievances] for the future.”112 Bland appeared to 
be a prime candidate for that position, known for being a methodological and strategic planner 
and disciplinarian who had many years of service for the Crown. Like Kane, Bland showed 
himself to be dedicated to promoting, supporting, and protecting Britain and its interests. To this 
end, Bland worked to encourage British settlers to the territory and increase the King’s revenue 
by reforming the system of property ownership. He also advanced the interests of British 
merchants and British markets by instituting specific regulations that favored these individuals. 
Having encouraged Parliament to enact new legislation, Bland instituted the first truly British 
civil court system in the territory.113 As he explained in his Account of Lieutenant General 
Bland’s Conduct, a treatise he wrote in 1751 detailing his experience as governor and providing 
guidelines for his successors, he “aim’d at nothing farther than doing Strict Justice both to my 
King and Country in the Command I was honor’d with.”114 
 
 
 
                                                          
112 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 2. Bland’s predecessor, William 
Hargrave, had been accused of several abuses, as had some of Gibraltar’s earlier governors. In 1749 an anonymous 
author published a tract entitled Reasons for Giving up Gibraltar, which included in its argument that the territory’s 
governors were worse than any other colonies’ leadership (outside of one unnamed exception). The author 
contended that “as bad Governors are a Dishonour to their Country, so ought not any Place to be kept, where none 
but such Governors preside, as it is much better to lose a particular Acquisition than a general Reputation.” See 
Reasons for Giving Up Gibraltar (London, 1749), pp. 21-22. 
113 The First Charter of Justice passed in 1721 decreed that Spanish law would remain in force in Gibraltar. While 
the Second Charter of Justice, passed in 1740, sought to change this practice and institute British law instead, the 
charter never reached the garrison because the Judge Advocate refused to leave Britain until he was compensated 
accordingly. Because the judge never did leave for Gibraltar, the Second Charter was never enacted in Gibraltar – no 
one even knew it existed until decades later. 
114 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 88. 
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Sir Robert Boyd, c. 1710-1794115 
 An “Anglo-Scottus,” Boyd was baptized in Surrey and attended Glasgow University prior 
to entering the army as a civilian storekeeper. He served as the deputy judge advocate and deputy 
commissary of the musters in Minorca prior to and during the siege of Minorca in 1756. During 
the siege, Boyd tried to row in an open boat to Admiral Byng’s fleet with a message from the 
garrison’s commander; he was later called as a witness at Byng’s court martial. He served a 
number of campaigns with the allied Hessian troops in Germany as both commissary general and 
a commander of a company of foot guards. In 1760 he was nominated to command a regiment in 
India, recommended by Commander-in-Chief Lord Robert Clive as “one of the best, if not the 
best officer in the King’s service,” but he was not sent. Instead, after the end of the Seven Years’ 
War, he sought a governorship; when his regiment was posted to Gibraltar in 1768, he was 
named lieutenant governor, a position he held until the arrival of General Eliott in 1777. He did 
return to the garrison to help defend Gibraltar during the Great Siege from 1779 to 1782, playing 
a significant role in defeating the enemy’s floating batteries by recommending the use of red hot 
shot. Boyd was made a knight of the Bath in 1785 in recognition of his service, and he returned 
to Gibraltar as governor in 1790, a position he held until his death in the territory in 1794. He 
was buried in the walls of his own creation, the king’s bastion, where an inscription remains 
today.116 
 Like the others, prior to his appointment in Gibraltar Boyd’s past military experiences 
abroad had distinguished him as a skilled commander and administrator, dedicated to serving the 
Crown and its interests. During his first term in Gibraltar, Bland sought to improve Gibraltar’s 
                                                          
115 Boyd’s date of birth is unknown, but his baptism was recorded on April 20, 1710. 
116 Stuart Handley, “Boyd, Sir Robert,” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and 
Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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works, a desire that resulted in the construction of the king’s bastion, a fortress that could hold 
800 men and 26 cannon and mortars.117 He spent much of his years as governor dedicated to 
fortifying the garrison and recruiting troops, and as a soldier stationed there during the siege, he 
was responsible for submitting the plan that resulted in the final destruction of the enemy 
flotillas.118 Boyd also showed his loyalty to the British flag through his civil administrative 
efforts, which included ferreting out and exiling illegal aliens, recalling Mediterranean passes 
and their protection from non-Britons, limiting the Spanish Catholic influence in the town by 
separating Gibraltar’s church from its Spanish diocese, and promoting commerce among British 
merchants.119 These actions, he believed, were necessary for “a Governor intrusted by his 
Majesty, with the command of this important, most critically situated Fortress.”120  
  
Sir George Augustus Eliott, 1717-1790 
 Eliott, like Boyd, was also of Scottish birth, but unlike the other governors, he had formal 
military training, having attended the French military college at La Fere and the Royal Military 
Academy at Woolwich.121 He first volunteered with the Prussian army in an effort to expand his 
military knowledge, and later entered the British military, holding two commissions 
                                                          
117 After a major restoration project, the king’s bastion reopened as a leisure center in 2008 with a number of 
facilities, including an ice skating rink, movie theaters, a bowling alley, an arcade, a gym and fitness center, multiple 
restaurants, a youth lounge, a nightclub, and an internet café. 
118 GGA, Governor to Secretary of State 1791-1794 & 1795-1801. 
119 Boyd asked the Catholic Vicar, Messa, to draft a letter to the Pope requesting that the Church of Gibraltar be 
made independent of the Diocese of Cadiz because he feared that the bishop’s foreign connections would sway the 
vicar and his parishioners. He also worked to ensure that Messa was chosen as vicar, seeking a vicar who was more 
attuned to British interests. See Caruana, The Rock Under a Cloud, pp. 23-29. 
120 TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 27 September 1792, Enclosure No. 4. 
121 Each of these governors was born not in England, but in English possession (i.e. Scotland and Ireland). J. Russell 
Snapp has done excellent work analyzing how Scottish and Irish imperial administrators governed and how this 
differs from English ones. See J. Russell Snapp, “An Enlightened Empire: Scottish and Irish Imperial Reformers in 
the Age of the American Revolution,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 33, no. 3 (2001): 
388-403. 
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simultaneously. He served during the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years’ War. 
Prior to his appointment in Gibraltar, he became commander-in-chief in Ireland, a post he left 
after a few years in order to become governor of Gibraltar in 1777. He held this post for the next 
ten years, leading the territory through the four-year long Great Siege and the subsequent 
rebuilding process. His competent leadership during those trials earned him the title of knight of 
the Bath in 1783 as well as the title of baron in 1787. He died while in the process of returning to 
the garrison to resume the post of governor in 1790.122 
 While much of Eliott’s term as commander was spent in peacetime, his performance 
during the Great Siege largely defined his governorship of Gibraltar, portraying him as a stalwart 
general who would fight to the death to defend the staunchly British rock.123 Britons stationed at 
the garrison commended his performance with one officer’s wife remarking, “Of all men living, 
General Eliott is the most likely to keep possession of Gibraltar… He is, I think, take him all in 
all, a most excellent character.”124 Depictions of Eliott at the time showed him to have an 
unwavering commitment to the British flag and dedication to the defense of Gibraltar. Not only 
did he prepare the garrison for battle by overseeing the construction and improvement of its 
fortifications, but he also planned and executed a number of strategic attacks and bombardments 
on the French and Spanish flotillas. He became known for his austerity during the siege, refusing 
to indulge in a typical general’s fare but rather limiting himself to only vegetables and water or a 
                                                          
122 James Falkner, “Eliott, George Augustus, first Baron Heathfield of Gibraltar,” in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
123 Britain’s victory in the siege resulted in a great deal of propaganda that portrayed Gibraltar as a bastion of 
Britain. Some of these works include John Singleton’s painting, The Defeat of the Floating Batteries at Gibraltar, 
September 1782; James Jefferys’ painting also of the floating batteries at Gibraltar, John Trumbull’s painting, The 
Sortie Made by the Garrison of Gibraltar; Mozart’s Bardengesang auf Gibraltar, which commemorated the Great 
Siege; as well as a number of poems, siege accounts and diaries, and other narrative pieces declaring the greatness of 
Britain’s victory. 
124 Catherine Upton, The Siege of Gibraltar, From the Twelfth of April to the Twenty-seventh of May, 1781. To 
which is prefixed, some account of the blockade. (London: J. Fielding, 1781), p. 4. 
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quarter cup of rice a day as his rations.125 Eliott’s defense of the Rock became the representation 
of the victorious empire over its Franco-Spanish foes, and the governor was lauded by all for his 
service. As one poet wrote, “Firm as this Rock is ELIOTT’S steady Soul, / Watchful he guards, 
and wisely guides the whole… / Despising Death, and firm in ALBION’s Cause, / Make haughty 
SPAIN submit to BRITISH LAWS.”126 
 Alongside his military success, Eliott also demonstrated his dedication to British interests 
in the civil sphere. Like Boyd and the others, he also sought to promote British settlement 
through the restriction of privileges to only British Protestants, which included land and property 
ownership, Mediterranean pass protection, trading rights, and other benefits. He suppressed 
attempts by foreign inhabitants to obtain such advantages illegally and he instituted a number of 
legislative efforts to combat their efforts. Much like the other governors described above, Eliott 
displayed his loyalty to the Crown both through his military prowess and his stringent efforts to 
promote British and Protestant efforts in a territory of foreigners. 
 
 Gibraltar’s governors, in particular Kane, Bland, Boyd, and Eliott, brought to the garrison 
an expansive military background that spanned across the empire and the globe. Their 
involvement in various conflicts, rebellions, and wars shaped their view of the world and the 
residents that they were sent to govern. For many of these commanders, their newfound 
inhabitants came from backgrounds similar to those of many of the enemy troops they had 
fought over the years. This, combined with their efforts to put down the Jacobite rebellions at 
home, left them suspect of those who they believed were not fully dedicate to the preservation of 
                                                          
125 A History of the Late Siege of Gibraltar. With An Historical Sketch Of that Garrison from the earliest Periods. 
(London, 1804), p. xiv-xv. 
126 Upton, The Siege of Gibraltar, pp. 19-20. 
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Protestant Britain and its holdings, including Gibraltar. The governors’ extensive military 
experiences provided an education in the ideals of the British empire and encouraged them to 
uphold such beliefs and practices to the best of their capability. As J. Russell Snapp argues, these 
commanders, who came from the “fringes of the British Isles,” saw themselves as part of a larger 
whole; however, rather than celebrating the diversity as Snapp contends, I maintain that these 
governors were challenged by the composition of the population and the threat it presented to 
their ideas of a wholly British empire.127 These military commanders felt secure in their ability to 
defend the territory from outside harm, but did not know how to broach the challenge of 
governing a civil sphere with a minority of British peoples, laws, customs, and religion. 
 
The State of the Town & Garrison 
 When Britain acquired Gibraltar in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, it was granted “the full 
and entire property of the Town and Castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications, and 
forts thereunto belonging” (Figure 1.2).128 This title was later shortened to “the town and 
garrison of Gibraltar,” which remained the designation for the territory throughout the eighteenth 
century.129 As this title demonstrates, Gibraltar was divided into two halves, the civil (the town) 
and the military (the garrison). The civil sphere technically included Gibraltar’s (primarily 
foreign) residents as well as their shops, gardens, and trades, whereas the military realm 
encompassed the garrison members, fortifications and works, arms, and barracks. In actuality, 
this division was not so clear; the town and garrison overlapped in almost every way. Physically 
it was virtually impossible for this not to be the case; in a small space like Gibraltar it was not 
                                                          
127 Snapp, “An Enlightened Empire,” pp. 389-390. 
128 Appendix B: “Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht,” in Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians, p. 333. 
129 Gibraltar did not technically become a British “colony” until 1830. 
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feasible to enact two separate spheres. Instead soldiers were lodged in houses in the town, 
civilians were actively involved in supplying the garrison, and even the port was shared between 
trading and naval vessels.130 
It was especially impossible to separate the two spheres because both were under the 
control of the same governor. Gibraltar’s governor was the sole administrative head of the 
territory, appointed to command both the civil and military realms. He functioned as the 
representative of the Crown in Gibraltar and fulfilled its executive, judicial, and legislative 
powers, while in turn serving as military commander-in-chief.131 As Bland dictated in his 1727 
military treatise, prior to his term as governor, “All Persons in the [garrison] Town, whether 
Ecclesiastical or Civil, are subject to [the governor’s] Jurisdiction, as far as it relates to the Order 
and Preservation of the Town… His Power over the Military is [also] very Extensive; for all the 
Officers and Soldiers in the Garrison are obliged to obey him, without Controll.”132 While the 
governors were expected to govern both aspects equally adeptly, as military men they often 
gravitated toward a more militarized approach. While this did not legally include martial law, it 
did result in a number of restrictions, regulations, and other forms of strict administrative control. 
In the minds of the governors, Gibraltar was first and foremost a military territory and needed to 
be governed as such. 
                                                          
130 For some examples, see GGA, Diary 1778, 15 May 1778; GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 3, 1774-1778, fo. 
343-344. Not all of these interactions were considered positive by the governors; while they approved of civilians 
working for the garrison, they were not so pleased when civilians tried to employ soldiers or buy and sell soldiers’ 
wares. Many of these civilians were fined, jailed, or expelled from the garrison. For examples, see GGA, Civil 
Secretary’s Register No. 3, 1774-1778, fo. 198-199; GGA, Diary 1782-1794, 29 December 1792, 3 September 1793; 
GGA, Diary 1778, 10 September 1778. 
131 See Steele, “Governors or Generals?,” p. 110. 
132 Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of Military Discipline: In which is Laid Down and Explained the Duties of Officer 
and Soldier (London, 1727), pp. 193-194. 
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As a result, the military sphere encroached on many aspects of civilian life, including the 
daily schedule. The day itself was organized around military time: gunfire signaled the opening 
of Gibraltar’s gates first thing in the morning as well as their closure at the end of the day. The 
regular changing of the guards, formal parades down the town’s main streets, and routine 
training practices for the soldiers marked the time each day. On Sundays, the entire military 
command would march down the streets on their way to the Protestant chapel for church service. 
After the workday was over, soldiers and citizens alike were allowed to frequent the wine houses 
and taverns, but there were a number of restrictions in place.133 No gin or “drams” could be sold 
at any time or by any retailer because the soldiers were known to abuse these drinks, which in 
turn affected the health of the garrison.134 Those spirits that were allowed were strictly regulated 
to ensure that there was not an excess in the town because an ample supply could “destroy a 
much greater garrison than ours.”135 Without such restrictions, commanders believed that their 
men would be found “laying by Dozens, dead Drunk in the Streets” and getting into violent 
quarrels with one another.136 All taverns and public houses were required to shut their doors to 
all patrons before 10 PM, following the garrison’s schedule.137 After the firing of the final gun 
and until the first gun in the morning, civilians were confined within the garrison’s walls and 
often required to follow a strict curfew.138  
                                                          
133 See GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782, 4 December 1778, 23 December 1778; GGA, Diary 1792-1794, 18 
December 1794. 
134 See GGA, Diary 1777-1778, 24 November 1777, 2 March 1778; GGA, Diary 1778, 6 June 1778. 
135 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 19. 
136 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 17. 
137 See GGA, Diary 1777-1778, 7 & 9 June 1777, 9 September 1777, 15 September 1777, 14 December 1777, 6 
March 1778; GGA, Diary 1778, 25 June 1778, 10 July 1778, 22 October 1778. 
138 For more on this, see chapter 5. See also GGA, Diary 1792-1794, 22 October 1793; Constantine, Community and 
Identity, pp. 71-73. 
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Not all governors fully appreciated the overlap between the two spheres, however. As 
Governor Bland acknowledged, while the garrison’s commanders were well-trained militarily, 
many had little experience in the civil realm. “Soldiers are not much Versed in that Science,” he 
explained, so they needed “Fixed Rules to go by” so as not to “fall into Mistakes by following 
their own Erroneous Judgment, which most of us Military Men are apt to do, not so much from 
Design as the want of Civil Knowledge.”139 This was especially true in the governors’ 
administration of the civil courts, over which they had been granted the highest power.140 All 
civil appeals went to the governor and he was responsible for deciding the outcome.141 Yet, as 
Bland recognized, “we Military Men can’t be Conversant enough in the Laws of our Country to 
enable us to be Competent Judges wither to Try or Determine Civil Cases.”142 In his mind, the 
mingling of the civil and military spheres provided governors with many opportunities for 
mismanagement. As Bland remarked in his Account, “How Strange will it appear to any one who 
should take a View of the English Constitution, which is so wisely framed for the Ease, Safety, 
and Happiness of the Subject, to find that a place of such Importance to the Power and 
Commerce of Great Britain should be left for so many Years under the Arbitrary will of a 
Governor, without the least Check to Controul him.”143 
                                                          
139 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 13; TNA, CO 91/11, fo. 24. 
140 Although the Judge Advocate was appointed by the Crown, occasionally the governor was responsible for 
appointing a deputy judge to fill the role as a “temporary” replacement. It was not uncommon, however, for the 
temporary replace to serve longer than the formally appointed judge. 
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142 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 76. 
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Mary Loeback.” 
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The British government did attempt on occasion throughout the century to further divorce 
the civil from the military in Gibraltar and limit the governor’s power; however, none of these 
efforts came to much. In 1720, at the bequest of three British merchants in Gibraltar, Parliament 
established the First Charter of Justice in Gibraltar in an effort to institute “some Court of 
Justice… for the decideing of Disputes between Merchants and Traders.” Their solution entailed 
creating a summary judicatory officiated by the current Judge Advocate and two prominent 
merchants to determine “Please [sic] of Debt Accounts and other Contracts, Trespasses and all 
manner of other personal Pleas.”144 While this charter did enable greater civilian involvement, 
the Judge Advocate was typically a commissioned military officer with some knowledge of 
English law and the governor remained the head of the Court of Appeals.145  
In 1721 British merchants submitted another petition to Parliament, requesting the 
establishment of a true civil government, independent of the governor. Life under a military 
governor, they argued, left them feeling “[un]secure in their Properties” and unprotected from 
any infringements on their civil liberties. Protesting the “Great Prejudice and Discouragement 
attending their said Trade for Want of a Form of Civill Government Established in that 
Garrison,” the subjects begged that a “Civill Judicature may be forthwith Appointed, and proper 
Persons nominated to Go from hence.”146 A parliamentary committee considered the request, 
                                                          
144 BL, Lansdowne 767/1, “List of Papers Containing the Proceedings that have been had for the Establishing a Civil 
Government at Gibraltar,” fo. 10-17; TNA, PC 1/4/80, “Petition of William Hayles, William Jack, and John Gerardo 
Duque,” 12 July 1728. 
145 Many of the Judge Advocates did not have extensive legal knowledge, but until 1752 British law was not the 
only law practiced in the territory. This charter did not introduce any changes I the law code, signifying that the 
existing Spanish civil law would continue in force. See BL, Lansdowne 558, “Precedents, Law Cases, Charters of 
London Etc.,” fo. 24-28. 
146 TNA, PC 1/3/96, “Order Referring to a Committee a Petition (Enclosed) of the Merchants and Traders of 
Gibraltar,” 25 November 1721; BL, Lansdowne 767/1, “List of Papers Containing the Proceedings that have been 
had for the Establishing a Civil Government at Gibraltar;” TNA, PC 1/3170, “Gibraltar: Papers Relating to the 
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concluding that a civil judicature would indeed “Contribute very much to the Advantage of 
Trade in Generall and to the entire Satisfaction of all his Majesties Trading Subjects as well to ye 
Great Advantage of his Majesties Revenues.147 They drew up a proposal for government that 
included a mayor, alderman, justices of the peace, and two judges, one for common law cases 
and one for the admiralty.148 The Council requested that the Lord Chief Justice and Attorney & 
Solicitor General draw up a list of names to form the court, sending them the proposal in 
December 1722; it stalled there until the issue arose again in 1728. 
After the completion of the 1727 siege, the political situation in Gibraltar once again 
became an issue in Parliament, who sought to introduce specific changes to “distinguish the Civil 
more Strongly from the Military Government and to set Bounds between the Inhabitants and the 
Garrison.”149 The proposed governing structure would effectually remove the military governor 
from all involvement in the civil sphere by “exclude[ing] the Governor from any share in the 
Approbation, or Nomination of these [civil] Officers.”150 Under the new legislation, he would be 
forbidden to “let, hinder, or intermeddle with the Jurisdiction of the Civil Magistrate, or invade 
or break in upon the Priviledges thereby granted or intended to be granted to the Inhabitants of 
                                                          
147 BL, Lansdowne 767/1, “List of Papers Containing the Proceedings that have been had for the Establishing a Civil 
Government at Gibraltar,” fo. 10. 
148 London Journal (London, England), Saturday, January 19, 1723, Issue CLXXII. See also Daily Post (London, 
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Our City of Gibraltar.”151 This new establishment sought to divide the territory into two separate 
jurisdictions, limiting the power of the commander to the military administration. However, like 
the previous proposal, these changes floundered under review and the proposal disappeared from 
the parliamentary record, never moving beyond draft form. As later parliamentary 
correspondence noted, the suggested changes could have never come to pass – there were simply 
not enough British residents to fill the proposed government positions.152 Such a system, the 
government determined, was not “well adapted” to the situation of Gibraltar “where there are but 
few [British] Inhabitants.”153 
For Gibraltar’s residents, the lack of a proper civil administration caused a number of 
problems. As they understood it, Gibraltar was not just a military garrison but also a lively town 
with a vibrant civil sphere and commercial community.  Although Gibraltar never became the 
burgeoning port that Britons hoped during this century, it did have a number of goods travel 
through its harbor. Spanish and Portuguese vessels arrived with wines, oil, sugar, wood and other 
building materials, fruits, and other provisions, and left with British products such as cotton, 
wool, and manufactures from Britain, India, and North America.154 France brought luxuries like 
soap, perfume, confectionary, gold and silver threads, silk, sugar and coffee in return for North 
African goods, lead, copper, and North American herring. States with newfound or newly 
strengthened partnerships also sent merchants to the garrison to connect with their fellow 
                                                          
151 TNA, PC 1/4/95, “Board of Trade Report on Several Details Concerning the Charter of Incorporation to be 
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countrymen. The Italian city states Tunis and Algiers imported several provisions, along with 
legumes and grain, in exchange for British woolens, linens, and metals, North American fish, 
and Indian gums and spices. Morocco, as mentioned previously, provided the vast majority of 
garrison supplies as well as several North African specialty items to attract interested buyers 
while purchasing a number of British imperial goods.155 These trades were only as successful, 
however, as the governor allowed; he had the power to restrict the merchant’s movements, the 
types of goods imported and exported, the vessels’ access to the ports, and the storage facilities 
and conditions of the goods. Gibraltar’s governors regularly employed this power, instituting a 
number of restrictions and regulations on the territory’s trade which limited commercial efforts. 
Such exacting control proved the British idiom true that “Trade was never known [to] flourish 
under a Military Power.”156 
While some governors did try to respect the needs of the inhabitants, many overrode their 
concerns, citing the precedence of the garrison or offering no excuses at all. For instance, after 
the events of the Great Siege had largely leveled Gibraltar, the returning residents sought to 
rebuild. However, Governor Eliott refused to give them supplies from the garrison or even grant 
permission for them to gather the necessary supplies themselves. All materials, he contended, 
were to be used to reconstruct the garrison’s fortifications, works and barracks. Meanwhile, 
Eliott also imposed additional restrictions on trade and refused to help the town’s merchants fight 
against an arbitrary Spanish quarantine. Military peace had officially returned to Gibraltar, yet 
the civil sphere was still in turmoil. While the residents did not remain silent, submitting a 
                                                          
155 GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 4, 1779-1786, “1784 Considerations on the Trade of Gibraltar,” fo. 519-
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156 Joshua Gee, The Trade and Navigation of Great Britain Considered (London, 1731), p. 114. 
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petition to the government in London, their wishes went unheeded.157 The civil sphere, while it 
had occasional moments of flourishing, was largely subsumed by the military realm and its 
security. Throughout the eighteenth century Gibraltar remained largely a garrison community 
administered by a military governor; the town’s residents were at best supporting figures and at 
worst inconveniences and active threats. 
For Gibraltar’s governors, the territory did not mirror the British images that they had 
taught. The military garrison was lacking and the town was replete with foreign influences. Few 
British institutions had been established and few Britons had actually settled in the territory. 
Instead their citizens looked much like the enemies they had devoted their lives fighting against: 
Catholics and other non-Protestants who, they believed, could not be trusted to serve British 
interests. The governors were wary of their non-British, non-Protestant residents and the 
potential threat they posed to the garrison. In their minds, Gibraltar’s inhabitants were “the riff-
raff of various nations and religions ready to commit any fraud in their power,” “dregs of a 
motley people, expatriated from all parts of the Universe,” and “Vagrants, of all nations.”158 
Such a view of the population, not surprisingly, affected their governing of the territory, leading 
them to embrace a much more military and authoritarian approach to their administration.159 
Rather than granting their inhabitants the freedom to pursue their trades and participate more 
fully in the territory, Gibraltar’s governors sought to control all aspects of garrison life in hopes 
                                                          
157 See TNA, PC 1/16/13; TNA, CO 91/30; TNA, CO 91/31; TNA, CO 91/32; Constantine, Community and Identity, 
p. 87. 
158 TNA, CO 91/11, fo. 6-7; TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 27 September 1792. 
159 According to P.J. Marshall, the insistence on subordination and willingness to use one’s authority based on 
particular territorial needs was a development of the second half of the eighteenth century with the coming of the 
revolutionary era. Yet, in Gibraltar this practice is evident from the beginnings of British possession of the territory. 
See P. J. Marshall, “Empire and Authority in the Later Eighteenth Century.” The Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 15, no. 2 (1987), p. 118. 
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that they could better manage this problematic population and protect British Gibraltar from any 
potential harm. 
 
Conclusions 
 This chapter sought to explore the “situation” of Gibraltar by examining the many 
relationships that influenced the development of the territory, beginning with a regional 
perspective and focusing down to a local view. As this discussion shows Gibraltar was a site of 
encounter and contestation, acting as a “contact zone” on many levels. Negotiating between 
Morocco and Spain, Gibraltar sought to balance these two states and its own interests in such a 
way that would best serve the garrison. Although such goals were not always possible in light of 
the many complications that arose. More intimately, there was also constant “grappling” between 
Gibraltar’s governors and their inhabitants. Much like Pratt describes, these exchanges were 
defined by “asymmetrical relations” in which the commanders tried to assert ultimate control 
over their peoples. However, this “story-line” is more nuanced than the previous statement 
suggests. The need for this control was driven by fear. Gibraltar’s governors feared the foreign 
(non-British and non-Protestant) ideas, influences, religions, and cultures that their multi-ethnic 
residents carried. As military commanders attempting to keep order in a contested territory, these 
outside influences posed a problem and needed to be controlled. Such a view of Gibraltar and its 
peoples necessitated an administrative approach that sought to clamp down on any problems 
before and as they developed. In their “experienced” minds, this was best done through a variety 
of governmental tactics and technologies all focused on the production of knowledge about 
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Gibraltar’s peoples in an effort to “govern efficaciously.”160 This story of Gibraltar’s (foreign) 
population, their governors, and their attempts to manage the territory is the focus of the 
following four chapters. 
  
                                                          
160 Allen Chun, “Colonial ‘Govern-mentality’ in Transition: Hong Kong as Imperial Object and Subject.” Cultural 
Studies 14, no. 3/4 (2000), p. 437. 
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Figure 1.1: Map of the Mediterranean Sea and Gibraltar included in Letter to the Lords 
Commissioners for Trade and Plantations (London, 1720). 
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Figure 1.2: Map of Gibraltar (Officer, An Impartial Account of the Late Famous Siege of 
Gibraltar (London, 1728)). 
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Chapter 2 
“A Great Strengthening to the Garrison”: Population Management in Gibraltar 
 Ordered to fortify the garrison against the pressing Spanish threat, Governor Richard 
Kane arrived in Gibraltar in 1725, dedicated to strengthening its defenses. For Kane, Gibraltar’s 
security relied in part on its physical fortifications but also on its inhabitants. Upon his arrival in 
the territory, the population immediately gave Kane cause for concern. At the time a third of the 
residents were Spaniards, who he “looked upon [as being] very Improper for Gibralter.”1 A 
significant number of the Spanish inhabitants held prominent positions in the garrison, guarded 
the town at night, and several carried arms. Despite their fidelity to the British cause during the 
initial occupation, Kane still believed they could still pose a threat as the possibility of war 
loomed. “As Peace being Concluded between the Emperour & the King of Spain,” Kane 
explained, “there is reason to Suppose that the Spanish Inhabitants who remain’d here as Friends 
to the Emperour, are now friends to Spain.” He feared that the Spaniards “may ingage all the 
Inhabitants, who are of their religion” to “design for a surprize.”2 “Being of their [same] 
Religion,” Kane declared, the other Catholic inhabitants “might be easily gam’d by the power of 
the Priests to [Spanish] Interest if any Occasion should offer to Favour them.”3 If this were the 
case, the garrison’s safety could be compromised by these potential enemies, thus jeopardizing 
British possession and its Protestant presence in the Mediterranean. 
 The solution, in Kane’s mind, was to recruit British settlers and encourage the 
immigration of the town’s many Catholic foreigners. As he informed the Secretary of State, the 
                                                          
1 TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 
Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588. 
2 TNA, CO 91/1, Kane to Townshend, 25 September 1725, fo. 189. 
3 TNA, CO 91/4, Kane to Townshend, 18 August 1725, fo. 122-124. 
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Duke of Newcastle, “the Greater Number of British Protestants shall be here, and the fewer 
forraigne papists, the Greater Security it would be to the Garrison.”4 With a Protestant minority 
in a small Protestant territory surrounded by much larger Catholic states in a largely Catholic sea, 
Kane felt the need to secure the territory in favor of Britain. This was especially necessary in 
light of the current threats to the British state; there had been a number of recent attempts on the 
Crown by the Pretender and his Jacobite supporters, which included Spain and France, and the 
increasingly hostile Spanish monarchs seemed to be increasingly inclined to declare war with 
Britain. To British onlookers like Governor Kane, it appeared that British Protestantism was in 
jeopardy. As the former governor of Minorca, Britain’s other Mediterranean territory with a 
vocal Catholic majority, Kane was especially concerned by the possible dangers Gibraltar’s 
population could pose to the security of the territory. 
As a result, I argue that Kane sought to minimize any potential threats that might arise by 
embracing a series of colonial technologies in order to better “know” the residents and their 
potential to cause the garrison harm. He instituted the first town census in an effort to determine 
just how many male, fighting-age Catholics were in the garrison as well as how many of these 
inhabitants had arms and ammunition. In addition, he issued a number of legislative orders 
against foreigners to better protect the garrison, limiting their access to key parts of the territory 
and denying them additional arms. Kane also reinforced his earlier Alien Act, an order he had 
given in 1720 during the War of the Quadruple Alliance when it appeared that Spanish hostilities 
might threaten Gibraltar. This act required all “strangers” to register with the governor before 
visiting or settling in the territory; all those found in the town without permission would be 
expelled, as would any resident found harboring such a fugitive. Much like censuses and other 
                                                          
4 TNA, CO 91/4, Part II, Kane to Newcastle, 30 September 1726, fo. 223-224. 
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practices used in later centuries throughout the empire, Kane’s technologies served to count and 
catalog the foreign (Catholic) bodies as a dangerous group and restrict their movements and 
actions based on this knowledge. Such measures were necessary, he believed, in order to 
mitigate the foreign Catholic influence and protect the garrison from any internal threats.  
Seeing as the town had “hitherto been run away with by Genoeses and Foreigners,” Kane 
also endeavored to encourage British settlers to move to Gibraltar.5 Unlike the many foreigners 
with their allegiances to foreign states and the Pope, British settlers’ loyalty was thought to be 
unquestionable, supporting both the British king and his Protestant faith. The best means to 
support British settlement, Kane believed, was to make properties available to Britons. 
Unfortunately for the governor, he had limited options in that regard, lacking the authority to 
displace property owners, the majority of whom were foreign. As a result, he resorted to 
alternative solutions, such as moving soldiers from available homes and permitting construction 
on waste grounds. He also encouraged the departure of foreign owners from the garrison and 
restricted all subsequent property sales to British Protestants. Although Kane could not expel 
foreigners who had already settled in the garrison, he sought to make it more difficult for them to 
remain in the territory by limiting their property rights. By promoting British ownership, I argue 
that Kane sought to further claim the territory for Britain and mark it as a securely Protestant 
possession through the epitome of British order, property. Military fortifications were merely one 
form of a defense; a loyal and settled populace, he believed, proved to be the best support for a 
British garrison situated in an enemy sea. 
 Following the work of scholars like John Torpey and Bernard Cohn, this chapter argues 
that Gibraltar’s governors embraced practices and technologies of colonial governmentality early 
                                                          
5 BL, Add MS 15298, “General Report Relating to the Maritime Affairs at Gibraltar,” 1727. 
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in the eighteenth century, prior to the “modern” era of colonial control.6 These technologies, I 
demonstrate, were Kane’s response to the perceived internal and external threats to the garrison 
in effort to gain a sense of control in the territory. Religious fears generated by the specter of a 
growing Catholic – and hence foreign – population played a significant role in the governance of 
Gibraltar, especially in the early eighteenth century. Such concerns compelled Governor Kane to 
undertake the first census of Gibraltar, creating “ethnic intensifiers” as Elaine Ginsberg writes, in 
an effort to better know and control the foreign population.7 His findings led him to embrace 
restrictive policies against the existing foreign population and further limit access to the territory 
to foreign visitors and migrants. Kane’s fear also impelled him to link access to property 
expressly to confessional identity to such a degree that by the end of his term it was commonly 
assumed that none but British Protestants had the “rights by the laws of England to make a 
purchase either of the house or waxyard.”8 Kane’s worry surrounding foreign inhabitants and his 
determination to exclude Catholic foreigners from this privilege was both aided and stoked by 
the pressing threat of Spanish aggression and the continuing fears of the Pretender, both of which 
were a serious cause for concern for the small Protestant territory. To make matters worse, the 
loyalty of Gibraltar’s inhabitants to the Protestant Crown was largely unproven: the vast majority 
of residents were Catholic migrants from foreign states, many of which were currently allied 
                                                          
6 John Torpey, “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’” 
Sociological Theory 16, no. 3 (1998): 239-259; Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The 
British in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence 
Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); 
Stephen Legg, “Governmentality, Congestion and Calculation in Colonial Delhi,” Social & Cultural Geography 7, 
no. 5 (2006): 709-729; Jeffrey Monaghan, “Settler Governmentality and Racializing Surveillance in 
Canada’s North-West,” Canadian Journal of Sociology 38, no. 4 (2013): 487-508; David Scott, 
“Colonial Governmentality,” Social Text 43 (1995): 191-220. 
7 Elaine K. Ginsberg, “Introduction: The Politics of Passing,” in Passing and the Fictions of Identity, ed. Elaine K. 
Ginsberg (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), p. 6. 
8 TNA, PC 1/4/93, Complaint of John Bertie against Brigadier Jasper Clayton, 18 December 1728, fo. 25, 28. 
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against Britain, who had yet to demonstrate their loyalty to their new monarch. I argue that Kane 
feared that many of his trans-imperial subjects were merely “passing” as British loyalists and 
hiding their foreign allegiances.9 Under Kane’s command, Gibraltar sought to solve the 
population question by marking the Catholic body as foreign, disloyal, and undeserving of 
property and its place in Gibraltar. Such efforts, Kane believed, were necessary in order to secure 
Gibraltar’s present and its future for the Protestant nation and empire. 
 
Kane and the Population Question 
As Linda Colley has argued, in the first half of the eighteenth century, it appeared that 
“the old popish enemy was still at the gates, more threatening than ever.” Between the threat of 
Jacobite restoration in Britain and the many wars with Catholic states abroad, the menace of 
Catholicism seemed unrelenting to many British Protestants.10 This was especially true in 
Gibraltar, a small Protestant enclave in the midst of a Catholic sea with a majority of Catholic 
inhabitants. When Governor Kane returned to Gibraltar in 1725, only five years had passed since 
his last tenure in the territory. At that time Gibraltar had also been stricken by the Catholic threat. 
In 1720 Britain was in the midst of an Anglo-Spanish war, the War of the Quadruple Alliance, 
during which Spanish forces made an attempt to infiltrate Scotland in support of the Jacobite 
                                                          
9 The literature on passing is typically related to race or gender, but I believe it plays a role in a variety of binary 
oppositions, like in this case British versus foreign. For a greater discussion of passing, see Sharra L. Vostral, Under 
Wraps: A History of Menstrual Hygiene Technology (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008); Linda Schlossberg, 
“Introduction: Rites of Passing” in Passing: Identity and Interpretation in Sexuality, Race, and Religion, ed. Maria 
C. Sanchez and Linda Schlossberg (New York: NYU Press, 2001); Brad Epps, “Passing Lines: Immigration and the 
Performance of American Identity” in Passing: Identity and Interpretation in Sexuality, Race, and Religion, ed. 
Maria C. Sanchez and Linda Schlossberg (New York: NYU Press, 2001); Amy Robinson, “It Takes One to Know 
One: Passing and Communities of Common Interest,” Critical Inquiry 20, no. 4 (Summer 1994): 715-736; Elaine K. 
Ginsberg, ed., Passing and the Fictions of Identity (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996); Shompa Lahiri, 
“Performing Identity: Colonial Migrants, Passing and Mimicry Between the Wars,” Cultural Geographies 10 
(2003): 408-423; Thomas Kidd, “Passing as a Pastor: Clerical Imposture in the Colonial Atlantic World,” Religion 
& American Culture 14, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 149-174. 
10 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 25. 
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cause and threatened to attack Gibraltar.11 While the Jacobite forces were defeated, thanks in part 
to poor weather as well as the power of British forces, the threat was still present those few years 
later. Also, even though the Spanish assault on the garrison never materialized in 1720, the 
Spaniards’ heavy armaments surrounding the border of Gibraltar had an effect on the governor 
and his people, suggesting that if war were to come to the territory, it would not be an easy 
victory. Upon Kane’s second arrival to the garrison, the situation in Gibraltar did not appear all 
that different than it had during his first tenure as governor: both the Jacobites and the Spaniards 
were an ever-present threat, weighing on the minds of many Britons. 
The Jacobites had long been a concern for the British Crown. Supporters of the Catholic 
Stuart family, beginning with King James II and following his line of heirs, the Jacobites sought 
to restore the Catholic line to the British throne. The most recent attempts by Jacobite supporters 
were in the not-so-distant past: there was the 1715 rising, the 1719 Spanish-supported invasion, 
and the 1721-1722 Atterbury Plot. The Jacobite rising of 1715 was the most successful attempt 
of the three. Supporters of the Old Pretender, “James III,” launched an attack in Scotland, where 
they were more successful, and later western England, where they were less so. By the time 
James Edward Stuart landed in Scotland his army was already dwindling, especially in 
comparison to the advancing British forces. He left Scotland a month later, unsuccessful in his 
aims and with many of his military leaders captured, held prisoner, or executed. The 1719 
invasion was less promising, with the majority of the Spanish-led invasion force failing to reach 
England, and the Atterbury Plot was discovered before any true attempts could be made. 
                                                          
11 For fears of a Spanish invasion, see TNA, CO 91/1, 8 September 1720; TNA, CO 91/7, Elrington, 30 July 1720 & 
3 August 1720; TNA, CO 91/6, Cotton to Craggs, 19 January 1719. 
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However, this series of successive attempts by the Pretender and his supporter suggested that 
despite defeat the Jacobite problem was still unresolved.  
With the Stuarts firmly established in Rome, and still supported by Spain and France, the 
Jacobites remained a concern for British administrators in the Mediterranean.12 As missives to 
Whitehall from the British ambassador to France demonstrate, the exiled Stuarts had many 
supporters in that state who were eager to turn Britons against their king. “The Roman Catholick 
Priests here,” Robert Sutton, the British ambassador to France, wrote, “run about all the Country, 
endeavouring to make Converts & preaching Rebellion to the King’s Subject… They are all 
known to be favourers of the Pretender.”13 Similar sentiments were thought to be present 
amongst the Spanish government as well, as British servants in that state contended that “the 
King of Spain, is entirely in the Pretender’s Interests.”14 With the exiled Stuart families and their 
supporters tromping around the courts of Catholic Europe, garnering the support of those peoples 
and their monarchs through their unwielding devotion to the Catholic faith and their desire to 
overthrow the Protestant Hanoverians, their activities were a constant source of conversation for 
British officials in the region.15 When the Pretender and his supporters were thought to be on 
board ships sailing through the Straits of Gibraltar, the issue struck close to home for the British 
government in the territory.16 The peoples of those supporting Catholic states were also a 
                                                          
12 As Linda Colley argues, one of the key fears of Britons was that a Jacobite victory would give advantage to 
France because people believed that the Stuarts would “operate… under the shadow of French power and in support 
of French interests.” See Colley, Britons, pp. 77-79. 
13 TNA, SP 78/168, Robert Sutton to James Craggs, 4 July 1720, fo. 134. 
14 TNA, SP 78/179, Wilkins to Robert Walpole, 2 October 1723, fo. 126. 
15 Discussion of the Stuarts and their movements permeates the Foreign State Papers from France, Spain, Portugal 
and others during this period. See TNA, SP 78, SP 89, and SP 42. 
16 See TNA, SP 89/30/40, Colonel Lord Stanhope to Captain Purvis, R. N., 15 September 1722, fo. 79; TNA, SP 
42/17/173, State papers related to a letter from Lord Vere Beauclerke, commander of HMS ‘Lime’ at Gibraltar Bay, 
14 November 1722; TNA, SP 89/32, Newcastle, 30 May 1726; TNA, CO 94/214, D. Houlis to Newcastle, 12 March 
1726; TNA, CO 91/4, Part I, 24 January 1726. 
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concern as administrators worried that they would spread Jacobite ideals and propaganda. For 
many Britons, Jacobitism was closely tied to foreignness and Catholicism, and individuals who 
identified as European Roman Catholics were often deemed suspect of possible Jacobite 
sympathies. As a British consul in Spain commented regarding the travels of a “Romish” priest 
from Seville, “our Precautions against such dangerous emissarys to our Constitution and happy 
Establishment especially att this time, cannott be too great.”17 Although Jacobitism was never 
directly tied to the foreign Catholics in Gibraltar, their ties with the states supporting the Stuarts 
and their Catholic faith did make the governor and other British Protestants wary of their 
loyalties.  
 More importantly, when Kane arrived in 1725 there was the pressing threat of yet another 
Anglo-Spanish war. While the previous war had concluded only four years before with the 
British alliance declared the victors, the Spanish monarchy was dissatisfied with the resulting 
peace treaty. King Philip V and his queen Elizabeth Farnese were angered by Britain’s continued 
possession of Gibraltar, believing that Britain had violated its secret accord to return Gibraltar to 
Spanish hands.18 In an effort to recover Gibraltar, the Spanish monarchs sought the help of their 
neighbors. France had long shown its willingness to help the Spanish cause in regaining 
Gibraltar, and in April 1725 Philip reached an agreement with his former enemy, Charles VI, the 
Holy Roman Emperor. Charles, angry with the British monarch after a quarrel over the Ostend 
                                                          
17 TNA, CO 94/214, Holloway to Carteret, 17 November 1722. 
18 In 1721 King Philip threatened to end all of Britain’s trade with the Spanish West Indies if George I did not 
promise to restore Gibraltar. In response, George’s minister, Charles Townshend, drafted a secret letter signed by 
the king “promising you to make use of the first favourable Opportunity to regulate this Article, with the Consent of 
my Parliament.” Philip, not recognizing the significance of this stipulation – Parliament was unlikely to approve 
such a measure as it would enrage most Britons – accepted the offer. When Gibraltar did not return to Spanish hands 
at the conclusion of the war or anytime thereafter, he and his wife attacked the British government for violating their 
agreement. “Letter from George I to the King of Spain: On the Restitution of Gibraltar (1/6/1721),” The History and 
Proceedings of the House of Commons: Volume 8: 1733-1734 (London, 1742), p. 356. See also Jackson, The Rock 
of the Gibraltarians, pp. 122-123; Hills, Rock of Contention, pp. 256-258 
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Company, pledged that he would not oppose “the restoration to [Philip] of that fortress and the 
port [of Gibraltar]” and offered to help mediate the process.19 He also agreed as part of a secret 
treaty that if Britain refused the offer, he would supply arms to the Spaniards and send aid to the 
Jacobites.20 British ministers refused Charles’ offer at mediation, choosing instead to solidify its 
own alliances. As relations between Spain and Britain quickly soured, it seemed likely that war 
would soon follow.21 
 With these increasing tensions in the territory, British administrators sent Colonel 
Richard Kane to serve as Lieutenant Governor of Gibraltar, believing him to be the best 
candidate during the garrison’s time of need.22 Kane had served as lieutenant-governor in 
Minorca, being the first British official to formally hold the post since its conception in 1712; he 
had also acted as commander-in-chief in Gibraltar from 1720-1721 at the end of the last Anglo-
Spanish war. During his time in Minorca, Kane had shown himself to be an adept military 
governor and colonial administrator. He re-organized the army and supported the construction of 
new defensive works; he proposed a constitution and initiated legal reforms; he relocated the 
capital and built a road connecting the old and new locations; he introduced new agricultural 
methods and imported new varieties of foods and new breeds of cattle; and he suppressed the 
                                                          
19 Hills, Rock of Contention, 258-259. The Ostend Company was a private trading company established by Charles 
VI in 1722 to trade with the East and West Indies. Competing with British, Dutch, and French trading companies, 
the Ostend Company was largely successful in its early years. Its presence angered many of its competitors, 
especially because the Ostend Company drew many of its employees from the ranks of their own companies. It was 
abolished in 1731 under the Second Treaty of Vienna because of British pressure and Charles’ desire to secure his 
daughter’s succession to the throne. 
20 In return, Philip granted Charles the same rights for the Ostend Company as the English and Dutch to trade in its 
colonies. 
21 For a more in depth overview of this time period see George Hills, Rock of Contention: A History of Gibraltar 
(London: Robert Hale & Company, 1974), pp. 226-262; William G. F. Jackson, The Rock of the Gibraltarians: A 
History of Gibraltar (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Press, 1987), p. 115-132;  
22 TNA, CO 91/1, Townshend to Kane, 10 July 1725. 
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hostile Catholic inhabitants who were eager to depose him.23 This combination of qualifications, 
in particular his military skills and ability to work with foreign populations, made him especially 
attractive to British administrators who desired a strong authoritative presence in Gibraltar.24 
Kane’s greatest concern upon his arrival was not just the crumbling fortifications, but 
more importantly the significant foreign population. As future governors observed, the 
inhabitants were “chiefly… Jews, Moors, and Papists of different Nations,” who they judged 
“may prove of dangerous Consequence to the Town.”25 Of the little more than 1,000 inhabitants 
in total, only ten percent were British Protestants, who the governor believed could be trusted to 
act in the interests of the state. Almost forty percent of Gibraltar’s residents were Spaniards, 
natives of the neighboring antagonists, and an additional forty percent were Roman Catholics 
from other states, and thus potentially unsympathetic to Protestant Britain. In light of the charged 
political climate and the recent union of Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, Kane worried about 
this overwhelmingly foreign Catholic majority. His experiences in Minorca had shown him that a 
vocal and involved Catholic population could cause a number of problems for a British 
(Protestant) territory and its governor.26  
                                                          
23 Bruce Laurie, “Kane, Richard (1662-1736),” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew 
and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Benady, The Settlement of Jews in Gibraltar, pp. 94-
95. 
24 The current governor, David Colyear, Earl of Portmore, spent little time in Gibraltar, instead delegating authority 
to a series of lieutenant-governors. The current lieutenant-governor, Colonel Stanhope Cotton, was also absent from 
the garrison, which is why Kane’s presence was requested. See Benady, “The Settlement of Jews in Gibraltar,” p. 
94. 
25 GGA, Crown Land Series A, Bland’s Court of Enquiry, fo. 1-2. Although the statement was made by Governor 
Bland, the population composition during Kane’s tenure (and throughout the eighteenth century) was strikingly 
similar if not “worse.” Britons comprised approximately 24% of the population in 1753 whereas they were only 
10% of Gibraltar’s residents in 1725. 
26 The Minorca clergy issued a series of complaints against Kane in 1720, to which he responded and was vindicated 
by the approval of the King-in-Council. For his version of the dispute, see A Vindication of Colonel Kane, 
Lieutenant-Governor of Minorca, Against the Late Complaints Made Against Him by the Inhabitants of that Island 
(London, 1720). 
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In Kane’s opinion, Catholics were dangerous for a number of reasons. He feared that 
their missionaries could serve as spies or encourage rebellion among the people; their religious 
practices could “debauch” the soldiers, leading them to convert to Catholicism and then leave the 
King’s service; their bishops, who were from Spain, could promote Spanish interests; their 
services could encourage parishioners to pray for Catholic kings or take an oath of fidelity; their 
collections could be used to support foreign (enemy) states; and their churches could offer 
sanctuary to criminals, a common practice in Catholic churches.27 For Kane and many 
Protestants, the Catholic faith was directly tied to Britain’s former (and current) enemies and 
competitors, suggesting that belief in one resulted in loyalty to another. The power of the Pope 
was also seen to be dangerous for British administrators. As the representative of God, a 
directive from him, they believed, could result in outright rebellion by the Catholics in the 
territory. For many Britons, Catholics were believed to be as bound to their priests and the 
Pope’s teachings as a slave was to his master. If the Pope called his followers to rise up against 
the unfaithful Protestants, the garrison was likely to fall.28 In a largely Catholic sea, British 
Protestants already felt very vulnerable. 
In the opinion of many Britons, and Gibraltar’s governors, foreigners’ connections to 
their home states and Catholics’ loyalty to the church always threatened their allegiance to the 
British monarch, regardless of proof to the contrary.29 Although most of Gibraltar’s foreign 
inhabitants had “behaved faithfully in the first Siege,” Kane was concerned that such loyalties 
                                                          
27 BL, Add MS 23637, “Generall Orders for the Troops and Inhabitants in the Garrison of Gibralter,” fo. 39-59, 90-
91; A Vindication of Colonel Kane. 
28 As Caitlin Anderson has argued, for many eighteenth-century Britons, “slavery” and “popery” were synonymous. 
See Caitlin Anderson, “Old Subjects, New Subjects, and Non-Subjects: Silences and Subjecthood in Late 
Eighteenth-Century Grenada,” in War, Empire and Slavery, 1770-1830, ed. by Richard Bessel, Nicholas Guyatt, and 
Jane Rendall (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 213. 
29 Anderson, “Old Subjects, New Subjects, and Non-Subjects,” p. 213. See also chapter 4 for a greater discussion of 
this. 
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were fleeting.30 With the weakened state of the garrison due to its dilapidated fortifications and 
lack of troops, the governor was concerned that his inhabitants could easily plan a successful 
attack from within the territory. Secret attacks had occurred in the garrison before; when English 
forces occupied Gibraltar in 1705, a group of Spanish inhabitants who had remained in the town 
helped Spanish forces plan an assault on the territory. The attack was thwarted when the soldiers 
were caught sneaking up the shepherds’ path on the eastern rock face. In light of this past 
history, and his experiences with embittered Spanish Catholics in Minorca, Kane was reticent to 
embrace Gibraltar’s residents. In his mind, these peoples could easily be convinced by their 
national and religious ties to betray the British state. 
 Not only did the Catholic foreigners pose a direct threat to the garrison, but in Kane’s 
opinion they also hindered the Protestant growth of the town. As previous British residents 
complained, the Spaniards and other foreigners “had the best houses in the town whereas the 
English subjects, including the soldiers, were not granted such luxuries.”31 Foreign property 
owners were seen as causing a number of troubles for the governor and the British state. 
Financially, they were a bane for the king’s revenue because they could collect the profits from 
their properties and send them to their home countries. Rather than “return[ing] to our Mother 
Country,” these funds were “entirely lost to England.”32 More importantly, the lack of available 
properties discouraged any new British settlers from moving to Gibraltar, thus limiting the 
Protestant establishment in the town. Trusting that they “are much more to be relied on than the 
                                                          
30 TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 
Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588. 
31 BL, Add MS 38853, “Representation of the Hardships the Garrison Lies Under,” fo. 85 and TNA, CO 91/1, fo. 
102-103; TNA, SP 41/34, Colonel Bennet to Officers of Ordnance, 25 February 1712, fo. 161. Colonel Bennet also 
accused the Jews of being “indulged” by governors who gave the immigrants the best homes in exchange for high 
rents and fees. BL, Add MS 10034, Reports Relating to Gibraltar 1704-1770, “Some Remarks Concerning Gibraltar, 
Humbly Offer’d by Colonel Joseph Bennet,” fo. 136-140 and TNA, CO 91/1, fo. 17-19. 
32 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 4-5. 
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Papists,” Kane believed that British residents would “prove a great strengthening to the 
Garrison” and help counterbalance the foreign Catholic threat.33 Yet without the advantages of 
property ownership, it was unlikely that settlers would be attracted to garrison life with few of 
the advantages of other British territories.34 Consequently, Kane “resolved to get the Garrison 
cleared of them [foreign property owners] as occation should offer” in an effort to increase the 
Protestant hold on the garrison and better secure the territory.35 
 Yet, short of expelling the inhabitants, Kane was powerless to remove foreign residents 
from their property. The Charter of Justice did not grant the power for governors to “Determine 
Property of Houses, or Land,” and it was uncertain “how far [governors] have a Right to make 
such Grants.”36 If an owner was not willing to sell a property, and it had been lawfully granted, 
the governor had no power to act. As one British minister explained, “An idea also prevails there 
of Real property… [it is] understood, that His Majesty is precluded, even in the precinct of that 
single fort, by claims of private property, from employing the Houses and ground necessary for 
quarters and other Military conveniences, unless He can prevail upon the proprietors to part with 
them.”37 Unless the governor could convince the owners to sell their property or discover that it 
                                                          
33 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 4-5. See also TNA, CO 91/1, “Rules Humbly 
Proposed for the Better Government of His Majesty’s Town of Gibraltar, by Lieutenant General Bland,” fo. 123. 
Although these quotes were made by Governor Bland twenty years later, Kane echoed many of these sentiments. 
34 As a small territory with little arable land and limited trade opportunities, not to mention a poorly developed civil 
sphere with few rights for its citizens who were ruled by a military governor, Gibraltar was not all that attractive to 
British settlers. 
35 TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 
Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588. 
36 BL, Add MS 36137, Henry Pelham to Lord Hardwicke, 27 January 1728/9, fo. 139.This issue arose again during 
Bland’s Land Enquiry in 1749 when he and British authorities sought to determine if former commanders had the 
authority to make land grants. There was no record that the Crown had ever “empower[ed] or authorize[d]s any 
Governour, Lieut. Governour, or Commanding officer here to give or make grants, gifts, or Sales of Land or houses 
here.” TNA, PC 1/5/6, “Answer of General Joseph Sabine to the Complaint of Ensign Russell,” 8 August 1731, fo. 
2. 
37 TNA, CO 91/2, Al Wedderburn to Rochford, 5 September 1773. 
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had been “illegally given,” he was limited to marketing the sale of the few existing titles.38 As a 
result, Kane sought to “Encourage rather than Prevent” the sale of foreigner-held properties in 
order to reap the financial and tactical benefits of an increased Protestant population.  
 Although the governor could have expelled foreign landowners from Gibraltar as a whole 
in an effort to support British settlement, such a decision would have been unwise. Without its 
foreign residents the garrison would be seriously handicapped. Foreign inhabitants were 
responsible for much of the garrison’s operations, and their loss would be a serious blow to its 
functioning.39 As another governor explained, “foreign Inhabitants are the persons who usually 
equip Vessels and furnish funds for the purchase of  provision and other supplies, and the 
Patrons and Seamen employed in fetching such provisions & supplies.”40 This was especially 
true during wartime as those foreign residents who remained were required to “assist in the 
Fortifications & other Public Works carryed on in this Garrison.”41 With war seemingly on the 
horizon, and a lack of troops to perform additional duties or complete the necessary construction 
projects, Kane recognized the value of his foreign residents. In addition, he did not want to 
further anger the garrison’s neighbors by evicting their countrymen as this could incite further 
diplomatic and military consequences.42 Kane faced a true dilemma: “should these People (who 
                                                          
38 BL, Add MS 36137, Henry Pelham to Lord Hardwicke, 27 January 1728/9, fo. 139; Add MS, 23643, Clayton to 
Pelham, 10 October 1728, 45-46. The only exception was the quartering of troops. 
39 Jennifer Ballantine Perera, “The Language of Exclusion in F. Solly Flood’s ‘History of the Permit System in 
Gibraltar,’” Journal of Historical Sociology 20, no. 3 (2007), 216. 
40 TNA, CO 91/31, Elliot to the Home Secretary, 25 June 1784. 
41 The foreign workers were divided by religion and a leader was appointed to be the Spanish (later Genoese 
sergeant) and Jewish sergeant. Workers were compensated for their time, but if they refused to work, they would be 
punished and turned out of town. GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1766, 14 December 1756, fo. 180; Tito 
Benady, “Spaniards in Gibraltar after the Treaty of Utrecht,” Gibraltar Heritage Journal 7 (2000), pp. 125-126; 
Benady, “Genoese in Gibraltar,”p.  87. 
42 This was a concern not just in regard to the Spaniards but also the Moroccan residents of the garrison. Kane was 
apt to remind the British Secretary of State that the current Jewish inhabitants were a violation of Article X of the 
Treaty of Utrecht; however, he and other British administrators recognized that with the current state of the garrison 
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are a reall use to the Garrison) be turn’d out of Town before any rupture should happen, It would 
occasion jealousies, & might be a means to put a Stop to these Supplys of fresh provisions… but 
on the other hand to let them remain in Town, & put it out of their power to Injure us.”43 For the 
time being, he decided that “not all the Papists in the Town are our Enemies,” but he also 
requested the king send another regiment to strengthen the garrison.44 In Kane’s mind, the 
garrison was on a possible brink of crisis, which needed to be averted by whatever means 
possible. 
 
Population Management: The Census & Alien Act 
Having decided against turning his foreign workers out of the garrison, Kane resolved to 
get a better sense of Gibraltar’s current inhabitants. As part of his efforts at population 
management, Governor Kane issued the first town census since the territory passed into British 
hands. Censuses not only served as a means to appraise the population, but more importantly, 
they were employed as a management tool, signifying underlying concerns about security. As a 
“system of registration,” according to John Torpey, states employed censuses as a means to sort 
and store knowledge about their subjects in order to “embrace,” or rather control, their 
populations.45 They were often issued during times of diplomatic instability or times of economic 
prosperity, during both of which the governors were anxious as to what types of people the town 
was attracting.46 As scholars have argued, numbers like those provided by the census were “part 
                                                          
and its needs for supplies, especially if war was declared between Britain and Spain, Britain needed to focus on 
keeping Morocco as an ally. See TNA, CO 91/1 & CO 91/4. 
43 TNA, CO 91/1, Kane to Townshend, 25 September 1725, fo. 189. 
44 TNA, CO 91/4, Kane to Townshend, 18 August 1725, fo. 122-124. 
45 Torpey, “Coming & Going,” pp. 245-247. 
46 Censuses were taken in 1725, 1736, 1753, 1767, 1777, 1787, and 1791. There were also occasional surveys into 
particular population groups, such as British subjects in 1781, Roman Catholics in 1782, Jews in 1784, and Genoese 
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of the illusion of bureaucratic control and a key to a colonial imaginaire in which countable 
abstractions… created the sense of a controllable indigenous reality.”47 According to Bernard 
Cohn, “a number was, for the British, a particular form of certainty to be held on to in a strange 
world.”48 With this knowledge, commanders believed that they could try to manage the 
population to the best of their abilities, or at the very least be aware of potential dangers lurking 
nearby. 
Undertaking a census was not an easy or quick task; each inhabitant had be found, 
questioned about his or her origins and/or religion, and then tallied. In a territory like Gibraltar it 
was not necessarily easy to locate every resident as many were constantly on the move, heading 
out on their boats to fish or to trade, and others did not have a permanent residence in the town. 
Without all individuals having a consistent and stable address, a census became particularly 
difficult.49 Nor was the population truly centralized – while most lived in town, others like the 
Genoese lived on the eastern shore of Gibraltar, divided from the town by the Rock itself. To go 
to such an effort to count each individual suggests that Kane, and future governors, were driven 
                                                          
sometime between 1804 and 1815. These lists are even more detailed as they included the names, country of origin, 
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See GGA, Box: Demography; GGA, 1777 & 1791 List of Inhabitants; GGA, Orders, 1749-1793 Placarts, 1793-
1802, Orders 1st July 1749-22nd Feb 1793; GGA, The Alien Question. A History of the Permit System, 1704-1871. 
Draft Report May, 1871, “Memorandum on the Right of Residence in Gibraltar;” Constantine, Community and 
Identity, pp. 19-20, 24-25. 
47 Norbert Peabody referencing Arjun Appadurai, “Number in the Colonial Imagination” (1993). Norbert Peabody, 
“Cents, Sense, Census: Human Inventories in Late Precolonial and Early Colonial India,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 43, no. 4 (2001): 819-850. See also Bernard Cohn, “The Census, Social Structure and 
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University Press, 1987), pp. 224-254. 
48 Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996), p. 8. 
49 As the census developed in Gibraltar, so did governors’ efforts to create order among properties. Various 
initiatives were begun to create street names and number houses in order to better track residents and where they 
lived. See GGA, Orders, 1749-1793. Placarts, 1793-1802, “Orders 1st July 1749 – 22nd Feb 1793;” 7 October 1765 & 
15 April 1778, fo. 173-174. 
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by specific motives. This “fact-finding” mission was not an innocent undertaking, but rather 
served as a means to further the governor’s ultimate objectives of promoting Britishness and 
attempting to subdue the population. As Nicholas Dirks argues, “in certain important ways, 
knowledge was what colonialism was all about.”50  
In his 1725 census (Figure 2.1), Governor Kane divided the population into distinct 
ethnic and religious groups. He created seven primary categories: “British” (113), “Spaniards” 
(400), “Genoese” (414), “French” (23), “Dutch with Spanish Wives” (15), “Mores” (5), and 
“Jewes” (137). Each of these categories was divided between males (732) and females (381) and 
included a tally of males from the ages of 16 to 60 (366). On the side were two additional lists: 
the number of Spanish clergy (4), which included “Seculars” (2) and “Franciscans” (2), and 
“Males Jews & from what Nations,” which included England (4), Holland (3), Leghorn (17), 
Barbary (86), and Turkey (1).51 Kane also included the number of Spaniards that “have bore 
arms since the Siege,” which totaled 52. In total, there were 1,113 inhabitants of Gibraltar, and 
only 113 of them were British.52 
Although Kane’s census was not extensive as future ones, which included the residents’ 
age, country, occupation, years in the garrison, by what governor’s permission they came here, 
and cattle held, it was a technology used in the service of colonial knowledge gathering for the 
                                                          
50 As Nicholas Dirks argues, “Colonial knowledge both enabled conquest and was produced by it; in certain 
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and Its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India by Bernard S. Cohn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 
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purposes of understanding the ethnic and religious composition of the garrison.53 The creation of 
these specific categories suggests that the governor was most concerned about where his foreign 
inhabitants had come from and also their religious affiliations; during this period, one’s birth 
place often signified one’s faith. While some of the inhabitants may have already divided 
themselves among similar lines, these particular categories were fixed on individuals by the 
commander regardless of how they personally identified themselves. In light of the geopolitical 
conflicts at the time, when alliances shifted constantly and Britain could quickly find itself at 
odds with any European state, this picture of the population helped assure governors that they 
could quickly determine who to trust and who to be wary of. These categories also served to 
create what Elaine Ginsberg calls “ethnic intensifiers.” Ethnic or racial divisions, she argues, 
were created primarily for the purposes of domination, exploitation, and persecution of particular 
groups.54 In this particular situation, Kane focused his attention on finding and controlling the 
foreign Catholic bodies and their potential threat to his administration and continued British 
possession of Gibraltar. 
As evidenced by the categories Kane devised, his focus was on the brewing war and the 
urgency of containing possible enemies within. In a letter to the Secretary of State Charles 
Townshend, Kane noted that he had discovered at least 300 male Roman Catholic residents who 
could be convinced to turn against the British cause.55 Although only two of the categories were 
explicitly religious – Jews and Moors – the ethnic division also served as a religious designation. 
As Kane understood it, the Spanish, Genoese, French, and even Dutch inhabitants, by virtue of 
                                                          
53 Cattle was broken down into mules, burros, horses, cows, goats, and sheep; this and the category regarding 
governor’s permission were only included in the 1791 census, not the 1777 list of inhabitants. See GGA, 1777 & 
1791 Lists of Inhabitants.  
54 Ginsberg, “Introduction: The Politics of Passing,” p. 6. 
55 TNA, CO 91/1, Kane to Townshend, 25 September 1725 fo. 189. 
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their Spanish wives, were all Roman Catholics. For him this meant that over 550 of the 
garrison’s males were “Papists,” and at least 300 of them could serve as soldiers, being within 
the ages of 16 and 60. In comparison to the 57 British males, 55 of which were between 16 and 
60 years old, the town’s Catholic population appeared both vast and powerful. If each of the 
British males had guns, they would only slightly outnumber the armed Spaniards, which Kane 
would have seen as a serious problem. Crediting his newfound knowledge of these numbers 
provided by his census, the governor believed that he truly understood the sheer force of Catholic 
power in the territory and the possible threat their presence posed. The health of the state or 
empire was commonly tied to its territories having the “proper proportion of people,” and Kane 
had found Gibraltar to be seriously unbalanced.56 By dividing the community in such a way, 
Kane became even more aware of Gibraltar’s British (Protestant) minority.  
Toward this end Kane instituted several more garrison regulations restricting the actions 
of foreigners. “Strangers,” which included many of Gibraltar’s foreign residents, were not 
allowed to “walk about the Fort” or ask any questions related to the garrison.57 Nor were they 
allowed to wander at night or be found “Stragling on the Iseland.” Offenders were to be taken up 
the guards and sent as prisoners to the governor.58 In addition, foreigners who had not previously 
declared their arms were to do so immediately on penalty of imprisonment and possible 
expulsion. From that point forward, no foreigner was permitted to bring any arms or ammunition 
into the town. If they were found with undeclared weapons, they would be declared “Rebells to 
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(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 161. 
57 The distinction between “stranger” and “foreigner” was not well understood in the garrison. “Stranger” was 
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58 BL, Add MS 23637, “Orders to be observed by the Captain Commanding the Guard at New Mole,” fo. 98-100. 
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his Majestee & punished as such.”59 These orders were posted only months after the 1725 
census, suggesting that Kane’s survey compelled the governor to take more ardent strides to curb 
his (Catholic) foreign residents.  
In addition to these restrictions placed on current residents, Kane also renewed the “Alien 
Act,” which he had put in force during his term as acting commander in chief at the conclusion 
of the War of the Quadruple Alliance in 1720. Although the war did not directly involve 
Gibraltar, Britons were still concerned that an attempt would be made on the garrison by the 
neighboring Spaniards. As a result, Kane issued the first order against the presence of foreign 
visitors in Gibraltar. The orders stipulated that all “strangers” had to state their name, country of 
origin, and business in the town before they could be admitted to the town. Visitors also had to 
present papers for the governor, town major, or judge advocate to inspect in order to ensure the 
validity of their claims. If the request was approved, the visitor would be allowed to enter via the 
secured gates which were locked from dusk until dawn and guarded round the clock. “Strangers” 
traditionally had to be hosted by a resident who would be held responsible for breaches of 
conduct. The hosts were also required to report the names, origins, and business of any visitor to 
the governor before granting accommodation.60 Yet “permission to enter Gibraltar never carried 
with it the right to reside,” as the order emphasized.61 Non-residents who wanted to settle in the 
garrison had to petition the governor for a permit authorizing a long-term stay.62 If these rules 
                                                          
59 BL, Add MS 23637, “Orders,” 17 August 1726, fo. 68. 
60 See GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1766, fo. 62; GGA, Miscellaneous Papers 1749-1779, 1755 Papers, 10 
March 1750/1, 8 December 1755; 1756 Papers, 26 November 1756, 8 August 1770, 10 June 1772, 27 September 
1775. See also Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 18. 
61 Perera, “The Language of Exclusion,” p. 215. 
62 There are examples of requests for residence permits in the arrival records, demonstrating that it wasn’t entirely 
uncommon for people to ask the governor’s permission rather than hiding out in the town. See GGA, Miscellaneous 
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were not followed, both the resident and the visitor could be expelled from the garrison or face 
more serious consequences.63 
 Such restrictions were necessary, Kane (and future commanders) argued, to ensure the 
security of the garrison. As they contended, unknown strangers were “inconsistent with the 
Safety of the Place” because of their “Clandestine manner.”64 These hidden aliens could learn the 
garrison’s secrets and weaknesses and orchestrate a secret attack. To the governor, the garrison 
was of the utmost importance and strangers would only cause trouble.65 This was especially true, 
the commanders believed, because the garrison tended to attract “unsavory characters.” Although 
there is little evidence of the truth of their statements, Kane and future governors were convinced 
that Gibraltar was comprised of “the riff-raff of various nations and religions ready to commit 
any fraud in their power.”66 Some were deemed “Vagabonds,” being former residents who had 
“been turned out of the Garrison” in the past.67 Others were “convicted of buying stolen Goods 
and Soldiers Necessarys” or known for “being insane & burthensome” to other residents.68 Such 
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foreigners to the garrison by taking away their Mediterranean pass privileges (see chapter 4). Others ordered that 
those who introduced strangers “will be proceeded against as Spies” for their treasonous actions. See GGA, 
Miscellaneous Papers 1749-1779, 1756 Papers, 26 November 1756, 8 August 1770, 10 June 1772, 27 September 
1775; GGA, Diary No. 4 June, 1782 – June, 1786, Wednesday 10 August 1785. See also GGA, Orders, 1749-1793. 
Placarts, 1793-1802, “Orders 1st July 1749 – 22nd Feb 1793,” 1770 January 2, fo. 55, 1776 April 4, fo. 149. For 
examples of individuals turned out of the garrison for being found without a permit, see GGA, Diary No. 4 June, 
1782 – June, 1786, Sunday 18 June 1786, Monday 19 June 1786; GGA, Diary No. 5 July, 1786 – Dec, 1788, 
Monday 7 May 1787. Constantine, Community and Identity, p. 18. 
64 GGA, Governor’s Letter Book, 1749-1766, 8 December 1755, fo. 147. 
65 For some of the fears surrounding aliens see Perera, “Language of Exclusion,” pp. 211-212. This piece also offers 
insight into the alien question as it developed into the nineteenth century. 
66 TNA, CO 91/11, Humphrey Bland, fo. 6-7. 
67 GGA, Orders, 1749-1793. Placarts, 1793-1802, “Orders 1st July 1749 – 22nd Feb 1793;” 11 February 1785, fo. 
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troublesome foreigners, Kane argued, could jeopardize the safety of the garrison, but with the 
help of this act the governor believed he could better secure the territory.  
While Kane justified the act as a means to prevent dangerous visitors to the garrison, it 
also provided him with legal cover for the more expansive form of control over Gibraltar’s 
population, which he sought in the face of possible war. The Alien Act served as a means for the 
governor to prevent the influx of additional Catholic residents, enabling him to restrict entry only 
to British Protestants if he so desired. Because the governor had the sole authority to grant 
permission for residence in the territory, he could theoretically control the growth of the 
population. After learning that Catholics comprised eighty percent of the town’s residents, it is 
likely that Kane would have sought any opportunity to restrict their power, including denying 
entry to additional “Papists.” This act, in conjunction with the census, gave Kane the sense that 
he “knew” the territory and its structure and that he had some form of control over it.69 By 
identifying the garrison’s residents and placing limits on who belonged, the governor believed he 
could better manage the population and bring greater security to the territory. Such technologies 
gave Kane the sense that he could “see” potential threats, mark those who he believed needed 
additional surveillance, and monitor that population accordingly.70 Such practices served to 
better “define” the people of Gibraltar in order to facilitate Kane’s administration.71 It is not 
surprising, in that regard, that future governors followed Kane’s precedent; throughout the 
eighteenth century, censuses or lists of inhabitants were used hand-in-hand with various orders 
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against the harboring of foreigners.72 These techniques of governmentality provided Gibraltar’s 
commanders with a sense of control and order in a territory whose population was not so easily 
categorized or constrained. 
 
Encouraging British Settlers: Property in Gibraltar 
 In addition to Kane’s efforts to prevent the migration of Catholic foreigners, he also 
sought to explore possible housing situations to encourage British settlement. The results of the 
census presented the governor with the stark reality that Gibraltar was truly not a British-
populated territory. In his mind, a stronger Protestant population would help balance out the 
foreign Catholics, restoring the “proper proportions” of the territory, and these members could 
work to support the garrison and ferret out any possible plots against it.73 In an effort to entice 
British settlers, Kane sought to make more properties available for current and future British 
migrants, recognizing the attraction ownership played in other British colonies. Property was a 
key bulwark of social and political order in eighteenth-century Britain, playing a significant role 
in determinations of social class, political participation, and above all, identification with the 
Protestant nation. Property ownership served to “attach a man to his country,” giving him a 
vested interest in the state’s well-being, which it was believed that he would then fight to 
protect.74 Consequently, property rights were deemed especially productive in colonial territories 
as they helped to validate possession, legitimize state power, and mark the land as one’s own. As 
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Sudipta Sen has argued, “property rights… made the colonial extension of rule both legal and 
natural.”75 Drawing on these ideas, Kane sought to encourage British property ownership both to 
encourage new settlement and reinforce British possession of the territory. 
One way of making more properties available to prospective Protestant settlers was to 
move the troops out of their current residences into new quarters. The garrison’s housing 
situation was also severely limited and in great need of repair, so many soldiers occupied the 
available town properties owned by the Crown. “The houses where they now quarter,” Kane 
believed, “would be Convenient for British Subjects who should Incline to come and Inhabit 
here.”76 He requested additional funds from the Privy Council to build new barracks and 
pavilions to quarter the troops, extoling the usefulness of such buildings for the territory. The 
extra housing would make the troops more comfortable while opening up the existing homes for 
any interested settlers. If Parliament was willing to fund this construction project, he believed it 
would bring “Greater Security” to the garrison for several reasons.77 The troops would be better 
prepared for duty, no longer crowded into unfit spaces, and Britons would be able to live 
comfortably in the town. 
Kane also took it upon himself to utilize the vacant land that was available in the 
territory. As a means to promote settlement, Queen Anne had reportedly “given Incouragement 
to all British Subjects to build upon any Wast grounds within the Town of Gibraltar.”78 Because 
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all unclaimed land was owned by the king, the governor was authorized to grant permission for 
construction following the terms of the proclamation. So long as the land did not “Interfere with 
the fortifications or inconvenience the rest of the town” it was available for any willing Briton.79 
The opportunity was especially attractive as Kane pledged that no troops would be quartered in 
these “convenient houses” so long as he was governor.80 Kane accordingly granted “Severall 
plots of those Grounds… all to British Protestants.” Most of these titles were given to “Severall 
Officers of the Troops,” who “built handsom Houses” on the unused land.81 The buildings, he 
argued, were “Necessary for the good of the place, and for the Ornament thereof.”82 If there was 
more housing available for interested Britons and if the town was more becoming, he believed, it 
would attract more Protestant settlers and help secure the territory for Britain. To ensure that the 
new owners were recognized by future governors as the legal possessors of such property, Kane 
issued written grants and registered each title with the Judge Advocate. This record of 
ownership, Kane suggested, would help legitimate the Protestant landowners’ claims and remind 
                                                          
PC 1/4/93, Complaint of John Bertie against Brigadier Jasper Clayton, 18 December 1728, fo. 3-4; BL, Add MS 
23643, Clayton to Pelham, 10 October 1728 OS, fo. 45-46. 
79 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 6-7. 
80 BL, Add MS 36137, “A Copy of the Governor of Gibraltar’s Instructions,” fo. 144-145. 
81 According to Governor Clayton, there was a 1713 decree that permitted British soldiers who completed their 
service to remain and settle in town. Yet by 1731, the Crown declared that “no Officer has any right, or title to any 
House here” and he empowered the governor to “dispose of the Houses” as he “judged best for the service” 
regardless of the funds put into the home. See TNA, PC 1/4/93, Complaint of John Bertie against Brigadier Jasper 
Clayton, 18 December 1728, fo. 27. TNA, CO 91/2, Sabine 27 June 1732. There is a lengthy dispute between 
Lieutenant Colonel William Kennedy and Governor Sabine over a house Kennedy claimed as his own. Former 
governors, the Secretary of the Southern States, and even the Privy Council were involved, but Sabine’s decision 
held. See TNA, CO 91/2, Sabine 27 June 1732; Newcastle to Sabine, 31 August 1732. 
82 TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 
Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588-589. 
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future governors of the importance of perpetuating proper British (Protestant) ownership “for His 
Majesty’s Service, and for the good of the place.”83 
With the escalation of Anglo-Spanish hostilities at Gibraltar’s border in late 1726, Kane 
finally had the opportunity to “get quit of those [Catholic] people” and make room for additional 
British settlers.84 Once armed forces occupied San Roque, the Spanish frontier town adjacent to 
the garrison, many of the Spanish residents were anxious about remaining in Gibraltar. Kane 
issued an order granting all Spaniards permission to leave the territory prior to the outbreak of 
war, at which point, no one would be allowed to depart.85 Many inhabitants chose to leave, 
desiring to “Dispose of theire houses & Effects, and retire from the Town.”86 Kane eagerly 
permitted the sales so long as they were to the “proper” inhabitants. As his successor noted, the 
governor “never gave leave to a foreigner either to build or purchase, but only to His Majestys 
                                                          
83 TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 
Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588-589. The text of Kane’s grants are as follows: “"Form of 
Col.o Kane's Grants for building on new foundations. 
[Insert formal title] Whereas the Commander in chief in His Majestys City of Gibraltar being impowered to make 
Grants of the wast grounds of that City to all such Subjects of Great Brittain as shall build and improve upon the 
same as is set forth on the other side in the Memorial of AB, I have thought it for His Majesty's Service, and for the 
good of the place that the improvement should be made which is there proposed, And therefore I do by the Authority 
aforesaid hereby give and grant unto the said AB, to be enjoyed by him, his heirs, Executors, Administrators, or 
Assigns for ever, the sole possession of all the grounds, or premises which he has desired by the said Memorial to be 
granted and established to him, upon which he is to build convenient houses, in as short a time as he can with 
conveniency, and as that building must be expensive from the great quantity of Rubbish that must be removed from 
thence to make room for the Building, And as an encouragement to his speedy building upon the premisses, it is 
hereby promised that no part of the said buildings shall be taken from him for quartering the Troops during the time 
that I shall command here, and thereby recommend that the same dispensation may be continued to AB by the 
Officer who shall succeed me in the command of this Garrison. Given at Gibraltar &c - Rich.d Kane… Form of 
Col.o Kane's consent to the purchases made by several persons of house from those Inhabitants who had the prince 
of Hesse's grant. As Lieu.t Governour and Commander in chief in the Garrison, and Cap.t Paterson being an Officer, 
and a protestant Subject of Great Britain, I do hereby give my consent to his making the purchase within mentioned. 
Gibraltar the day of... Rich.d Kane.” BL, Add MS 36137, fo. 154-155. 
84 TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 
Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588. 
85 See Benady, “Spaniards in Gibraltar,” p. 127. Once war was declared, Kane supposedly expelled the Spaniards 
from the territory while allowing other foreign inhabitants, such as the Genoese and Jews, to remain. I have not 
discovered the official orders in the primary sources; however, it is repeatedly cited in secondary works. 
86 TNA, CO 91/4, Part III, “Governor Kane’s Response to The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 
Queries Relating to Gibraltar,” 10 December 1728, fo. 588. 
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Natural born subjects who were protestants.”87 He confirmed each of the purchases, granting the 
new owners with official titles and written rights to their new properties. By doing so, Kane was 
able to transfer several homes “from those [foreign] Inhabitants who had the prince of Hesse’s 
grant” to British Protestants whose very presence would help support the territory.88 
Under Kane’s leadership, a key technique of colonial governmentality in Gibraltar was 
the guarantee that property would only be passed down to British settlers. In the service of this 
promise, he restricted property ownership to only “Natural Born Protestant Subjects” in an effort 
to “get by degrees the Property out of the Hands of Foreigners and Papists.”89 Kane mandated 
that property held by foreign owners could not “descend to or be enjoyed by any other than 
Protestant Subjects of His Maj.y his Heirs or Successors, Except such Children or Heirs at 
Law… or assigns as shall be natives and Inhabitants of this Town and Garrison.” If the owner 
wanted to sell his property, “it must be done to a Protestant being one of His Maj.s Natural born 
Subjects, and not a Foreigner or of another Religion.”90 While this was not made law in Gibraltar 
until more than twenty years later under Governor Humphrey Bland, Kane did keep detailed 
records of his actions and decisions surrounding property. By doing so, he created a historical 
archive that privileged British settlers and codified his ideas on property ownership.91 This 
                                                          
87 TNA, PC 1/4/93, Complaint of John Bertie against Brigadier Jasper Clayton, 18 December 1728, fo. 27. 
88 BL, Add MS 36137, “Form of Colonel Kane’s Grants for Building on New Foundations,” fo. 155. According to 
Governor Clayton’s 1728 land enquiry, approximately 43 home owners had written grants from previous 
commanders, many of which were from the Prince of Hesse shortly after the garrison was taken by English and 
Dutch forces in 1705 as a “reward [for] his faithful Vassals & Subjects, who complying with their duty, remained in 
the City.” As Clayton noted, most of those with grants from Hesse were foreigners who “followed his Fortune” and 
had benefited from their loyalty. See BL, Add MS 36137, “Form of Prince of Hesse D'armstadt's Grants of Houses 
in the Garrison of Gibraltar translated from the original in Spanish,” fo. 154. 
89 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 4. 
90 GGA, Crown Land Series A, Bland’s Court of Enquiry, fo. 208. 
91 See Antoinette Burton, Dwelling in the Archive: Women Writing House, Home, and History in Late Colonial 
India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Betty Joseph, Reading the East India Company, 1720-1840: 
Colonial Currencies of Gender (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 
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served to legitimate his property grants, as demonstrated during the 1749 property inquiry, and 
further the British Protestant mission. Through his use of the census and his manipulation of the 
law, Kane attempted to mark Gibraltar as British not just in the current generation, but in future 
ones as well. 
 
Conclusion 
 During a property inquest begun in 1728, begun in part by Kane's earlier actions 
surrounding ownership, Governor Jasper Clayton came across a French resident who he believed 
was not fit to own land. The man, he complained, “calls himself a faithfull Subject of Your 
Majesty’s,” but was in actuality “a Foreigner and subject of France, a pretended protestant upon 
his coming here, but a professed Roman Catholick when he had once got settled.”92 If he could 
lie about his religion, the governor suggested, what would prevent him from shifting his loyalty 
away from Great Britain? The French and British had been uneasy allies, especially since 
France’s efforts to help Spain regain Gibraltar, and the governor feared that the Frenchman could 
be convinced to ally with countrymen. His Catholicism and implicit blind devotion to the Pope 
also led Clayton to doubt his loyalty to the British Protestant state. The man, Clayton argued, 
could pose a threat to the garrison and was thus undeserving of property ownership. As a French 
Catholic, he “had no right by the laws of England to make a purchase either of the house or 
waxyard,” rules which the governor believed should apply to Gibraltar as well.93 As Kane’s 
successor, Clayton fully embraced the former governor’s ideology about property ownership and 
also sought to rid the town of foreign owners and encourage Protestant settlement in the garrison.  
                                                          
92 TNA, PC 1/4/93, Complaint of John Bertie against Brigadier Jasper Clayton, 18 December 1728, fo. 25, 28. 
93 TNA, PC 1/4/93, Complaint of John Bertie against Brigadier Jasper Clayton, 18 December 1728, fo. 25, 28. 
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Kane set a precedent during his time as governor by embracing a myriad of technologies 
to limit Catholic influence and promote Protestantism in Gibraltar. Not only did he establish a 
standard embraced by all future governors surrounding property rights, but his use of census and 
acts against foreigners also became common practices employed by most of the garrison's 
commanders. By the end of the eighteenth century, governors took a census of the population at 
least once every decade, making special inquests into particular populations as concerns arose; 
the Alien Act was reinforced and expanded, including even British Protestant settlers as 
requiring the governor's approval before entering the territory; and the restriction of property 
ownership to only British Protestants became law under a government-mandated property 
enquiry in 1749 and was continually supported by future governors. 
 With the continuation and expansion of these measures, Gibraltar's governors 
demonstrated that they continued to struggle with the town's multiethnic and multi-religious 
population. While Kane was fixated on cataloging and containing the foreign Catholic body in 
the 1720s, spurred by outside events and the composition of the population, future governors 
extended their fears to encompass all of Gibraltar’s foreign population and the troubles it posed 
to British administration of the territory. At the root of these technologies of management was 
the people of Gibraltar and the governors' lack of trust in their foreignness. Yet despite their best 
efforts, including those mentioned in this chapter, the composition of the garrison did not 
change. By the end of the eighteenth century, British Protestants remained a significant minority 
and Gibraltar continued to serve as a Mediterranean meeting ground rather than a bastion of 
Britons. 
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Figure 2.1:  Kane’s 1725 Census (TNA, CO 91/1,”The Number of Inhabitants in Gibraltar,” 20 
August 1725, fo. 195) 
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Chapter 3  
“The Health and Pleasure of the Town”: The Management of Disease in Gibraltar 
In May 1750 Governor Humphrey Bland received word of an outbreak of the “plague” in 
southern Morocco, which was reportedly killing two hundred people a day.1 Although the news 
was not a surprise to the governor, who expected an epidemic to transpire “generally every 
Summer,” it was still cause for alarm, especially because of the closeness of the contagion.2 An 
outbreak in Gibraltar could be catastrophic for the small territory: inhabitants would have 
nowhere to flee, allowing the plague to spread quickly throughout the population, immobilizing 
merchants and soldiers alike.3 An infection would devastate the town’s trade and supplies as “no 
European Vessel would come near it” and place the garrison at risk for capture, weakening the 
military against any potential attacks.4 As Bland exclaimed, “should the infection get into the 
Town… the very thought of [which] Strikes Terror, as it would in all Probability carry off the 
                                                          
1 Because there were not many physicians in the region to confirm the diagnosis, it is uncertain if the epidemic was 
actually the plague or a disease resulting from nutritionally deficiencies in the region. However, the Moroccan cities 
and Bland still treated the outbreak like the plague, so it will be addressed as such in this chapter. Mr. Carvalho, the 
British Vice Consul in Tangier, noted that it was a confusing plague because some of the infected recovered after a 
few days of bedrest. He suggested that some of the deaths were due to eating yarma, a root vegetable that was 
thought to be poisonous during the dry season. Because Morocco was experiencing a time of scarcity, many of the 
subjects had to resort to this vegetable instead of bread to satisfy their hunger. British Consul Latton in Tetuan 
echoed Carvalho’s sentiments, starting that the disease plaguing Fez and Tetuan in May was the “usual Sickness at 
this Season occasioned moorly from the Excess of those People vorsirously devouring Quantitys of Fruits without 
the Assistance of either Bread or Meat to support Nature.” See TNA, CO 91/11, Isaac Dias Carvalho to James Read, 
19 May 1750, fo. 43-44; TNA, CO 91/11, Latton to Bland, 3 August 1750, fo. 77. 
2 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 57. 
3 This did occur during the five yellow fever outbreaks in the early nineteenth century, resulting in the loss of 
thousands of lives. See L. A. Sawchuk and S. D. Burke, “Gibraltar’s 1804 Yellow Fever Scourge: The Search for 
Scapegoats,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 53, no. 1 (1998): 3-42; L. A. Sawchuk and S. 
Benady, Diary of an Epidemic: Yellow Fever in Gibraltar 1828 (Gibraltar: Gibraltar Government Heritage 
Publications, 2003); L. A. Sawchuk, S. G. Benady, and S. D. A. Burke, Passing Through the Fever: Anatomy of an 
Epidemic (Toronto: Diva Media, 2005). 
4 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 79. TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 17 July 
1750, fo. 71. It was the fear of a weakened military, scholars have noted, that led the imperial government to 
promote disease prevention among soldiers. This knowledge and practice was then later applied to the general 
population. See William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (New York: Anchor Books, 1976), p. 274; Erica 
Charters, “Making Bodies Modern: Race, Medicine and the Colonial Soldier in the Mid-Eighteenth Century,” 
Patterns of Prejudice, 46.3-4 (2012): 214-231. 
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greatest part of the Garrison and Inhabitants, and occasion the loss of the Fortress to Great 
Britain.” If such circumstances were to occur, the governor pronounced, “I should rather have 
Courted Death, than outliv’d such a loss to my Country.”5 For Bland, the plague was both a 
danger to the garrison’s health but also to his reputation as commander and the territory’s 
standing within Christian Europe. If the disease could not be prevented from entering town, its 
presence would suggest that he was an ineffective governor, unable to control the influences of 
his southern neighbors and the troubles they brought with them. 
For many in the early modern world, disease, especially the plague, was a true threat to 
one’s health. Yet during the eighteenth century, as Aaron Shakow argues, the plague “became 
less… epidemiological than… discursive.”6 In Christian Europe, I contend, disease carried 
significant cultural, religious, political, and economic connotations as well as significant 
consequences for those believed to be a site of infection. States that were deemed contagious 
suffered the consequences at all levels of society as trade suffered, revenue diminished, supply 
networks were disrupted, and the territory was marginalized and isolated.7 For most of Europe, 
scholars maintain that infection was equated with Islam and this ideology was propagated and 
reinforced discursively and in their actions.8 Treatises abounded about the diseases of the Islamic 
world, calling North Africa and the Ottoman territories “sanctuaries” of disease because of their 
supposed belief in predestination. Although many of the Islamic practices were not all that 
different from those of Christian states, all ships, goods, and people that passed through those 
regions were subject to extensive quarantines and other sanitization measures. Territories that 
                                                          
5 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” 1751, fo. 79. 
6 Aaron David Abraham Shakow, “Marks of Contagion: the Plague, the Bourse, the Word and the Law in the Early 
Modern Mediterranean 1720-1762,” p.  xiii. 
7 Shakow, “Marks of Contagion,” p. 199. 
8 I will use “Muslim” and “Islam” interchangeably in this chapter. 
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were not Islamic but had close relationships with Muslim states were also penalized, especially if 
their health standards were deemed insufficient by other Europeans. Ports, like Gibraltar, that 
remained on or outside of the sanitary border were in jeopardy of being associated with the 
Islamic states and treated as such. 
 Gibraltar’s position on the Straits and its regular communication with North Africa, as 
well as the frequent travels of its residents back and forth from those states, made the territory 
suspect for many Europeans. Lacking institutionalized protective measures like quarantine, 
Gibraltar was often penalized by its European neighbors, in particular Spain, for it close 
relationship with Morocco.9 Upon Governor Bland’s arrival to the garrison, he recognized the 
territory’s many failings that could possibly endanger the health of the town. The town itself was 
unclean, leaving opportunities for infection, and there were no preventative measures in place to 
thwart the spread of disease. Eager to fix these problems, Bland established several technologies 
to monitor and close those breaks in security in an effort to keep “diseased” bodies separate from 
healthy ones. This included establishing a position to clean the town as well as one to examine 
all incoming ships to the port and introducing proper quarantine measures like those practiced in 
the rest of Christian Europe. With the arrival of the plague in 1750 across the Straits, Bland 
stepped up his efforts even more, establishing strict quarantine practices and cutting off almost 
all communication with North Africa. Yet he was unable to embrace these practices fully 
because of the need to keep an alliance with his Moroccan allies and facilitate the ongoing 
diplomatic negotiations. Even in a time of great risk for contagion, Gibraltar could not be closed 
off entirely to its “diseased” southern neighbors. 
                                                          
9 As Amira Bennison argues, the militancy of the Iberian frontier had religious, culture, and political effects. See 
Amira K. Bennison, “Liminal States: Morocco and the Iberian Frontier between the Twelfth and Nineteenth 
Centuries,” in North Africa, Islam and the Mediterranean World: From the Almoravids to the Algerian War, ed. 
Julia Clancy-Smith (Portland: Frank Cass, 2001), pp. 13-17. 
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 As scholars like Krista Maglen and Alison Bashford have argued, quarantine and other 
methods of disease control were a means of “drawing and policing of boundaries.”10 While most 
have focused on quarantine as a strengthening of national borders, I maintain that these borders 
were also cultural and religious. The presence of disease and the practices surrounding it served 
to “accentuate” the many differences between the Mediterranean states.11 For Governor Bland, 
and other Christian Europeans, I contend, the practice of quarantine defined and separated 
Christian from Muslim, Europe from Africa and the Ottoman territories, designating the former 
as the civilized standard and the latter as the diseased other.12 Although there were many similar 
beliefs and practices shared by the faith groups, disease served as an opportunity for European 
peoples to set themselves apart from their African and Ottoman neighbors, arguing that their 
views were more advanced and legitimate.13 These “health-driven” boundaries were not only 
national and global also locally focused, offering the governor an opportunity to survey and 
police all those wishing to cross into town. Under the excuse of quarantine, Gibraltar’s 
commanders could record all bodies arriving at the port, monitor the actions of all those seeking 
                                                          
10 Alison Bashford as quoted in Krista Maglen, The English System: Quarantine, Immigration and the Making of a 
Port Sanitary Zone (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 21. See also Maglen, The English System, 
Introduction; Paul Slack, “Responses to Plague in Early Modern Europe: The Implications of Public Health,” Social 
Research 55, no. 3 (1988), pp. 433-434; Mark Harrison, “Disease, Diplomacy and International Commerce: The 
Origins of International Sanitary Regulation in the Nineteenth Century, Journal of Global History (2006) 1, no. 2, p. 
202. 
11 Charters, “Making Bodies Modern,” p. 230. See also Nabil Matar, Europe through Arab Eyes, p. 7. 
12 According to Bennison, to be Christian and/or Muslim was a political, cultural, and religious issue. See Bennison, 
“Liminal States,” pp. 13-17. 
13 Michael Pearson, “Medical Connections and Exchanges in the Early Modern World,” PORTAL 8, no. 2 (2011): 1-
15; Justin Stearns, “New Directions in the Study of Religious Responses to the Black Death,” History Compass 7, 
no. 5 (2009): 1363-1375; Nükhet Varlik, “From ‘Bête Noire’ to ‘le Mal de Constantinople’: Plagues, Medicine, and 
the Early Modern Ottoman State.” Journal of World History 24, no. 4 (2014): 741-770; Birsen Bulmus, Plague, 
Quarantine and Geopolitics in the Ottoman Empire (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), chapter 3. As 
Osheim has shown, there were divides even within Christianity relating to disease as the Catholic Venetians thought 
that the Lutherans and Presbyterians were also inefficient in preventing the plague because of their beliefs in 
predestination. See also Duane J. Osheim, “Plague and Foreign Threats to Public Health in Early Modern Venice, 
Mediterranean Historical Review (2011) 26, no. 1, p. 75. 
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to enter the town, and restrict entry to those people whom they deemed suspect for infection. 
This practice afforded Bland, or so he believed, a sense of control over these foreign visitors and 
inhabitants who had traveled to foreign climes. 
Yet, like most borders, I argue that those created by quarantine were not entirely 
impermeable. Although Governor Bland hoped to set himself and Gibraltar as firmly a Christian, 
European territory, one with all the trappings of quarantine and free from the diseases of the 
south, he could not fully do so. Even when the 1750 plague was at its worst across the Straits, 
Bland had to keep communication open with his Moroccan neighbors. Gibraltar depended a great 
deal on its suppliers in North Africa and the British government was not willing to abandon its 
relationship with those cities, regardless of their health practices. If Bland were to cut off 
communication entirely, he would risk angering these allies, starving the garrison, and 
precipitating attacks on Gibraltar’s vessels by the corsairs. Such consequences were not 
sustainable for the garrison, thus requiring Bland to budge on the rules of quarantine. Yet his 
desire to align Gibraltar with the European community led him to cater to the Spanish 
government’s wishes when an outbreak did occur. Such an approach, he argued, was necessary 
to demonstrate to Christian Europe that Gibraltar was worthy of inclusion and was willing to 
embrace their institutions of health governance. Despite these efforts, his decision was later 
challenged by the British government who demanded that he reopen communication with 
Morocco. As it turned out, I demonstrate, quarantine was not a simple solution and the border 
between the regions, especially in Gibraltar, was not easily maintained or policed. Instead, there 
were many “openings” in Bland’s attempted barriers, which served as “points of contact and 
contagion” and blurred the distinction between diseased and healthy.14 
                                                          
14 Maglen, The English System, p. 6. 
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The Threat of Disease in Gibraltar 
When Governor Bland first arrived in the territory in 1749, he was taken aback by the 
town’s “Poisonous Condition” and the many present threats to “the Health and Pleasure of the 
Town.”15 Most importantly, Bland was troubled by the situation of the territory itself; located a 
mere six miles across the Straits from North Africa and directly on the Mediterranean Sea, 
Gibraltar appeared to be in a prime position to contract disease. As Bland warned his successors, 
“the Plague breaks out generally every Summer in Africa, and in some part of the Grand 
Signior’s Dominions bordering on the Mediterranean.”16 Although the region was free from 
illness upon his arrival, Bland, and many of his contemporaries, viewed the Ottoman territories 
and North Africa as a harbor for infection. These territories were seen by many Christian 
European states as “almost a perpetual Seminary of the Plague” and believed to be “never quite 
free from a Pestilential Disorder.”17 The plague, they argued, was a “Poison, which [was] bred in 
the Eastern or Southern Parts of the World.”18 Such views were espoused and endorsed by 
European medical professionals and state administrators alike, who declared that “every place 
within the extent of those dominions… or connected with them” was considered to be “always 
                                                          
15 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 28, 29. 
16 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 57. Egyptian scholar, Alan Mikhail, has shown 
that in that region a new plague epidemic broke out on average at least every nine years (not annually) from 1347 to 
1849. Consequently, the plague was a large part of peoples’ daily lives in these areas, but it was not necessarily as 
prevalent as contemporaries portrayed it. See Alan Mikhail, “The Nature of Plague in Late Eighteenth-Century 
Egypt,” Bulletin of the History of Medicine 82, no. 2 (Summer 2008), p. 251. 
17 Mead, A Short Discourse, pp. 27-28; BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 36. 
18 Richard Mead, M. D., A Short Discourse Concerning Pestilential Contagion, and the Methods to be Used to 
Prevent It, 3rd ed. (London, 1720), pp. 18-19. 
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liable to suspicions” of disease.19 To many Europeans, these territories were a site of “permanent 
infection” that posed a risk to all of their neighbors and commercial partners.20  
Gibraltar, with its “proximity to the Coast of Barbary… [and] the Necessity there is of 
Constant Communication and Correspondence with many Ports on that coast for fresh 
provisions,” was seen to be at a great risk for contracting disease.21 The garrison’s reliance on 
North African suppliers for all of its provisions, including cattle, sheep, fowl, dried goods, and 
metals, required regular and frequent contact with those states and its peoples.22 Boats traveled 
across the Straits almost daily with Jewish and Muslim merchants from Tetuan and Tangier, who 
were permitted to enter the garrison and stay for a short time to gather any goods to trade in their 
home cities.23 In addition, merchants from Gibraltar, typically of Jewish and Genoese 
backgrounds, frequently traveled to the North African coast to facilitate British trade in that 
region and gather any other necessary supplies. Because Spain was largely unwilling to help 
supply the garrison during this period, Moroccan traders and their goods were in high demand.24 
Gibraltar also served as a small, regional trading hub, which meant that there were a “number of 
                                                          
19 BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 36. 
20 Aaron David Abraham Shakow, “Marks of Contagion: the Plague, the Bourse, the Word and the Law in the Early 
Modern Mediterranean 1720-1762,” pp. 29-30, 199. See also Osheim, “Plague and Foreign Threats to Public 
Health,” p. 69. 
21 TNA, CO 91/2, “A Scheme or Proposal for the Better Preservation of the Health and Regulation of Quarantine 
and Prattick in Gibraltar,” May 1754. 
22 TNA, CO 91/62,”Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 43; GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 4, 1779-
1786, “1784 Considerations on the Trade of Gibraltar,” fo. 519-524. 
23 This relationship was allowed per the 1721 Anglo-Moroccan treaty which promised peace between the two 
countries on both land and sea, allowed duty-free trade and anchorage at each state’s ports, and guaranteed the 
protection of all law-abiding citizens while residing in the other’s territory. This treaty was renewed several times 
throughout the eighteenth century. See chapter 1 for a greater explanation of this. J. A. O. C. Brown, “Anglo-
Moroccan Relations and the Embassy of Ahmad Qardanash, 1706-1708.” The Historical Journal 51 (2008), pp. 
618-619. 
24 The borders between Spain and Gibraltar had been closed since the 1727 siege and there had been a number of 
threats and possible attacks on the garrison between then and 1750. 
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Ships touching from all parts in the Mediterranean.”25 Some of these vessels came directly from 
Ottoman territories, while others merely docked in Ottoman ports for a short period of time on 
their way to Gibraltar. Other North African cities, such as Tunis and Algiers, also sent their 
traders and goods to Gibraltar’s port to facilitate trade with the British and other states 
represented there. Each of these areas was considered to be high risk for disease, suggesting that 
the people on board their ships were potential carriers. In addition, the goods that these Ottoman 
and North African merchants brought often included those that were considered to be most 
contagious, such as fur, feathers, silk, hair, wool, cotton, and flax.26 As a result, both 
“suspicious” people and goods that could be ripe with infection crossed Gibraltar’s borders daily, 
helping to support the garrison with supplies while simultaneously putting it at a risk for disease. 
While this belief was unsupported by the practices of many Islamic states, it colored relations 
between Christian Europe and the Muslim world related to health.27 
Because of this association between Islamic belief and the spread of disease, many 
Christians viewed the religion of Islam itself as a “plague” and being Muslim as a key risk factor 
for disease.28 Travelers from these regions were automatically considered to be infected with the 
plague, or another disease, and blamed for any outbreaks that occurred. For instance, authorities 
during the 1721 Marseilles plague epidemic blamed a visiting Turk, despite the fact that he was 
likely not the actual carrier or cause of the outbreak. No other alternative theories were 
                                                          
25 TNA, CO 91/2, “A Scheme or Proposal for the Better Preservation of the Health and Regulation of Quarantine 
and Prattick in Gibraltar,” May 1754. 
26 Mead, A Short Discourse, pp. 15-17. According to Mead, these goods were most apt to hold infection because 
they were mostly closely related to “Animal Juices” or were “the Substances found most fit to keep them in” (p. 17). 
27 Even during the 1750 outbreak, the Alcaide of Tetuan embraced quarantine practices, shutting the gates to the 
town and forbidding any visitors or returning subjects to enter once the plague arrived in neighboring cities. See 
TNA, CO 91/11, Latton to Bland, 8 May 1750, Pastrana to Read, 19 May 1750, fo. 27. 
28 Shakow, “Marks of Contagion,” pp. 20, 29-30, 199. See also Osheim, “Plague and Foreign Threats,” p. 69. 
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considered because the individual was a Muslim from the center of a diseased region.29 Muslims 
were not the only religious group to be considered to be contagious; this notion of the infected 
body applied to all non-Christian individuals living in the region. Jews also carried the blame for 
several outbreaks of disease, not just the plague, especially if they were residents of the Ottoman 
or North African territories.30 The “plaguy bodies” of southern and eastern peoples, like the 
Turkish man, were seen as a threat to all around them.31 
This belief also suggested that these individuals were impure in other ways. Many 
Europeans believed that the state of one’s body played a significant role in contracting disease. 
In essence, a person could become infected only if the body “favoured” it.32 Joseph Browne, a 
                                                          
29 Shakow, “Marks of Contagion,” p. 20. See also Slack, “Responses to Plague in Early Modern Europe,” 439; Todd 
M. Endelman, The Jews of Georgian England, 1714-1830: Tradition and Change in a Liberal Society (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1979), pp. 91-92. Slack argues that it became less common to blame foreigners for 
bringing in the plague in later outbreaks (as compared to the Black Death). 
30 Slack, “Responses to Plague in Early Modern Europe,” p. 439; Endelman, The Jews of Georgian England, pp. 91-
92. 
31 See Margaret Healy, Fictions of Disease in Early Modern England: Bodies, Plagues and Politics (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 88. 
32 The cause of disease was hotly debated in the eighteenth century and most people were divided into one of two 
camps: contagionists and miasmaists. Contagionists, as exemplified by Dr. Mead, the author of the ideas 
surrounding the British quarantine bill in 1721, argued that infection spread by contact with the diseased. According 
to Mead, “diseased Persons give it to one another, and Contagious Matter is lodged in Goods of a loose and soft 
Texture, which being packt up, and carried into other Countries, let out, when opened, the imprisoned Seeds of 
Contagion” (18-19). Once these particles were beathed in, they “tainted the saliva juice” and “fixed their malignity” 
in the stomach, causing nausea and vomiting. The contaminated person could then pass the disease to others or to 
good, especially those of a “loose and soft Texture,” like fur, feathers, silk, hair, wool, cotton, and flax, in which the 
infection could easily lodge itself. See Mead, 15-19. Miasmaists, on the other hand, believed that bad air was the 
cause of disease. Following Hippocrates’ trio of “airs, waters, and places,” those who subscribed to this theory 
argued that rotten matter created poor air, which caused illness when it encountered people with weakened 
constitutions. Natural sites, like marshes or places with standing water, and man-made environments, such as cities 
with their open sewers, slaughter houses and graveyards, were believed to be the primary site of diseased air. This 
view is represented by Joseph Brown, a British physician who contested Mead’s Discourse. Some historians argue 
that the Mediterranean states often followed the germ theory of contagion and prevention by quarantine, whereas 
northern Europe ascribed contagion more to miasma and protected itself by sanitation and lifestyle reforms. For 
further explanation, see Paul Slack, “The Disappearance of Plague: An Alternate View,” Economic History Review 
34, no. 3 (1981), p. 75; Harrison, “Disease, Diplomacy, and International Commerce,” p. 199; Watts, Epidemics and 
History, pp. 23-25; McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, pp. 281-282; Mary J. Dobson, “Contours of Death: Disease, 
Mortality and the Environment in Early Modern England,” Health Transition Review, vol. 2, Supplement (1992), pp. 
78-79; James C. Riley, The Eighteenth-Century Campaign to Avoid Disease (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987); 
Katherine Johnston, “The Constitution of Empire: Place and Bodily Health in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic,” 
Atlantic Studies: Global Currents 10, no. 4 (2013): 443-466. 
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leading London doctor and author, argued that contamination was caused by “the Domestick 
Enemy within, a broken Constitution and ill Habit of the Body; by which means the ambient Air 
and Diet hath such Influence or Effect on us.”33 Consequently, certain people were more apt to 
catch a disease than others. Bodies that were ripe for infection were believed to be already 
diseased because of bad habits, moral corruption, intemperance, licentiousness, and sin.34 
Disease was not just a medical diagnosis but rather a cultural and moral judgment and prevention 
could be facilitated by right living.35 For instance, during the 1750 outbreak, a British (Christian) 
captive held in New Fez noted that while hundreds of Moroccans were dying, “Not one of the 
Christians Died of that Sickness, except one of the Hanoverians.”36 As the Briton suggested, 
many Christians believed that the lack of outbreaks in Europe in the eighteenth century were due 
to their reformed ways of living and the righteousness of their religious beliefs. Muslims, who 
were viewed with contempt for being hot beds of contagion, were then also associated with 
moral depravity and “evilness.”37  
                                                          
33 Joseph Browne, L.L.M.D., A Practical Treatise of the Plague and All Pestilential Infections that have Happen’d 
in this Island for the Last Century (London, 1720), 22-23. See also Possonnier-Desperrieres as quoted in Sean 
Quinlan, “Colonial Bodies, Hygiene and Abolitionist Politics in Eighteenth-Century France,” History Workshop 
Journal 42 (1996), p. 109. 
34 Healy, Fictions of Disease, p. 30; Mark Harrison, Disease and the Modern World: 1500 to the Present Day 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 42. As a result, physicians urged patients to order their lifestyles and self-
government and regulate the body’s natural functions through diet and personal hygiene. All physical appetites were 
to be controlled according to this theory, which tied moral reform to disease prevention. See Browne, A Practical 
Treatise, pp. 8-9. See also Healey, Fictions of Disease, pp. 43, 122; Quinlan, “Colonial Bodies,” p. 108; Roger D. 
Lund, “Infectious Wit: Metaphor, Atheism and the Plague in Eighteenth-Century London,” Literature and Medicine 
22.1 (2003): 45-64; Michael Stolberg, Experiencing Illness and the Sick Body in Early Modern Europe (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 44. 
35 As Shakow has argued, in the eighteenth century the plague “became less… epidemiological than… discursive.” 
See Shakow, “Marks of Contagion,” p. xiii. 
36 TNA, CO 91/11, William Latton to Humphrey Bland, 1 June 1750, fo. 54-55. 
37 See Mead, A Short Discourse, pp. 38-39; Daniel J. Schroeter, The Sultan’s Jew: Morocco and the Sephardi World 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 51. This “evilness” was also associated with the “Poorer sort,” which 
is why in Britain quarantine regulations went hand-in-hand with the poor law. Many subjects credited this 
combination of efforts for the diminished threat of disease in the eighteenth century. See Slack, “Responses to 
Plague in Early Modern Europe,” pp. 447-448; Harrison, Disease and the Modern World, p. 44; Paul Slack, “The 
Response to Plague in Early Modern England: Public Policies and their Consequences,” in Famine, Disease and the 
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Such a conclusion served to ideologically separate the “diseased” Ottomans and North 
Africans from the more ordered, moral and “civilized” European Christians who had largely 
been free from plague outbreaks during the last century.38 For individuals like Bland, the peoples 
across the Straits could not be trusted, both in regards to their morals and their health.39 This 
distrust and division fueled European policies surrounding disease during the early modern 
period. Believing that Muslim countries were incapable and unwilling to prevent the plague’s 
spread, many European states saw it as their duty to protect themselves from the Ottomans and 
North Africans’ diseases. As Bland asserted, “this Stupid Infatuation has render’d it absolutely 
necessary for all the Christian Powers to prevent… that Fatal Distemper from being brought into 
their Dominions.”40 This task often involved creating physical boundaries or barriers between the 
two realms, mirroring and reinforcing the ideological divides that produced such policies. Goods 
needed to be closely examined, bodies needed to be monitored, and ships needed to be cordoned 
off in order to prevent the “contagion” of the Muslim world from infecting Christian states. 
While Christian Europe recognized it could not completely barricade itself from its Muslim 
neighbors, it did seek to control and monitor Islamic influences, limiting moments and spaces of 
exchange. Such surveillance and boundary-making techniques were believed to be especially 
                                                          
Social Order in Early Modern Europe, ed. by John Walter & Roger Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 187. 
38 See Schroeder, The Sultan’s Jew, pp. 50-51; Charters, “Making Bodies Modern,” p. 230; Nabil Matar, Europe 
through Arab Eyes, 1578-1727 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 135. In this portrayal of the 
diseased other versus the healthy, clean European, scholars have also shown the development of and relationship 
between disease and racial theories. See Charters, “Making Bodies Modern”; Quinlan, “Colonial Bodies, Hygiene 
and Absolutionist Politics.” Although the plague struck England and western Europe on average every ten years 
between the mid-fourteenth and mid-seventeenth centuries, there were few outbreaks after the Great Plague of 1665-
1666. See Rebecca Totaro, “Introduction,” in Representing the Plague in Early Modern England, ed. Rebecca 
Totaro and Ernest B. Gilman (New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 9. 
39 While it may or may not have been directly related to disease, this separation between Christian and Muslim 
seems to have pervaded many of Bland’s decisions and opinions regarding his Spanish and Moroccan neighbors 
during his governorship. 
40 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 67. 
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necessary for Christian ports on the Mediterranean, and even more so for Gibraltar with its 
porous borders and close proximity to and frequent contact with Muslim territories. These 
openings for “points of contact” also served as opportunities for infection with the passage of 
diseased bodies and goods.41 
The most common practice embraced by European port cities to create such boundaries, 
and police those crossing it, was quarantine.42 Quarantine “takes its name from forty days being 
the usual time that Ships from suspected places, lay at Anchor, before they are admitted to have 
any free communication with the People on Shore, which free communication is termed being 
admitted to Pratique.”43 Quarantined vessels were typically required to anchor away from the 
port, often in an enclosed station called a lazaretto, and were monitored by armed ships or guards 
to ensure that there was no contact between those on board and healthy subjects. Lazarettos 
offered European ports a strong and guarded barrier between the diseased and the healthy. As 
contemporaries described it, a lazaretto was “an Enclosure secured from any clandestine 
communication between those within, & those without, and constantly under the eye of a 
Governor assisted by some other Officer of Quarantine, and a certain number of Porters or 
Labourers, whose Business it is to receive, unpack, open, air and afterwards redeliver the goods 
                                                          
41 Maglen, The English System, p. 6. 
42 Maglen, The English System, p. 21. See also Shakow, “Marks of Contagion,” and Osheim, “Plague and Foreign 
Threats.” Many states also employed regulations on land borders in an effort to blockade themselves and remain free 
from disease. In 1679, officials in Madrid sealed off all land routes into the city from the south, which had been 
struck with the plague, to keep the capital disease-free. The Habsburgs employed a similar policy in the eighteenth 
century when combatting the plague in its eastern territories, establishing a military “plague-control” frontier along 
the Ottoman border. These zones consisted of sentry posts and mobile patrols who were ordered to shoot any 
unauthorized passerby. Travelers coming from the Ottoman empire were strip-searched and quarantined for 48 days 
and their goods were also fumigated and quarantined, much like was performed in Mediterranean sea ports. When 
the state-funded “sanitary spies” reported an outbreak abroad, the security and surveillance doubled. See Watts, 
Epidemics and History, pp. 24-25; Boris Velimirovic and Helga Velimirovic, “Plague in Vienna,” Reviews of 
Infectious Diseases 11, no. 5 (1989), pp. 823-824. 
43 BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 36. 
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to their Owners.” In ports like Marseilles, Leghorn, Malta, and Venice, known for their high 
standards of quarantine, these were large, walled enclosures with several buildings on an island 
or secluded piece of land. The lazaretto was often a city in and of itself: there was lodging for all 
passengers and crew, guard houses for the soldiers, homes for the lazaretto officers, and “every 
conveniency” was provided. There were also large sheds in which the goods could be unloaded, 
aired, and stored for the duration of the quarantine. Passengers too were subjected to “airing,” 
being “searched, smoaked and [required to] undergo some whimsical ceremonies” before being 
permitted to leave the lazaretto and enter the port city.44 Within the lazaretto, life was tightly 
controlled as all those within were “monitored, registered, administered and placed under all 
sorts of surveillance.”45 Such administrative efforts with a close eye on those kept in quarantine 
for reasons of “security” were required by most European ports in order to ensure that no 
diseased bodies or goods contaminated others. 
This system was overseen by the port’s Magistrates of Health and managed by its Prattick 
Master, who was responsible for visiting each ship, interrogating the master, and inspecting its 
bill of health. The bill of health was the best means for the Prattick Master to determine the 
condition of those on board and the length of the ship’s quarantine, which varied depending on 
the vessel’s ports of call, length of voyage, and nature of goods carried.46 All ships were required 
to carry and present their bill of health upon entering any European port because it served as an 
official document for health governance throughout the Continent. It was signed and sealed by 
                                                          
44 See BL, Add MS 73688, “On Quarantine,” [1751-1753], fo. 41; BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the 
Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 36-40. 
45 Alison Bashford, “Epidemic and Governmentality: Smallpox in Sydney, 1881,” Critical Public Health (1999), p. 
310. 
46 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 63; BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the 
Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 36. 
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the Magistrates of Health at the vessel’s last port of call and detailed if the ship was “clean” or 
“foul,” meaning there was a disease onboard or in that port.47 This practice served as a form of 
knowledge transfer, enabling other states to join their powers and limit the spread of disease to 
their ports. If a vessel was marked as foul by the previous magistrate, the Prattick Master would 
immediately place the ship, its passengers and goods in quarantine. In general most ships 
originating from the Ottoman territories or North Africa were marked as, or automatically 
assumed to be, foul. This meant that they were typically subject to a forty day quarantine, and 
sometimes an additional ten to twenty-five day preliminary airing. Vessels coming from healthy 
(European) ports, on the other hand, were often given reduced quarantine periods, if any at all. 
Those ships that carried infected peoples on board, regardless of their origin, were also kept in 
quarantine for lengthy periods of time, either until all members were healthy, or if someone died, 
until sufficient time had passed afterward.48 In places with strict quarantine laws, ships and those 
on board could be delayed for up to seven months before they were allowed to go to shore or 
unload their goods for market.49 Although these methods may have seemed extreme, many 
Europeans supported this strict institution, arguing that it was necessary to closely watch 
potentially diseased individuals for such a lengthy period of time to ensure that they would not 
carry contagion to others once released. As one contemporary maintained, such technologies of 
                                                          
47 Typically these were the only two designations (clean or foul); however, Britain added a third category 
(suspected) later in the century and Marseilles created a fourth category (touched) as well. See BL, Add MS 38234, 
“Proposals by the Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 33-35; P. Froggatt, “The Lazaret on Chetney Hill,” Medical 
History 8, no. 1 (1964), 50. Vessels that failed to carry a bill of health or who falsified it were punished for their 
indiscretions. TNA, CO 91/62,”An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 58-59. 
48 BL, Add MS 38234, “Proposals by the Quarantine Committee,” 1800, fo. 34. 
49 Shakow, “Marks of Contagion,” pp. 169-170. 
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governance were necessary to “establish every guard against the only event which can do us 
lasting and essential mischief.”50 
Although quarantine had been a common practice throughout Mediterranean cities since 
the seventeenth century, when Bland arrived, Gibraltar had no such standards. Prior to his 
governorship, Gibraltar had remained largely free from disease, but this, its people credited, was 
only thanks to the “peculiar Care of Providence” which had “so long preserved them from this 
Distructive calamity.”51 In part the lack of specific prevention procedures was due to the British 
influence: as an island far from the origin of most epidemics, quarantine was not a consistent 
practice in Britain. It was used, however, reactively in response to confirmed outbreaks abroad, 
typically in the eastern Mediterranean.52 When word of an epidemic reached Britain, the British 
                                                          
50 BL, Add MS 73688, “On Quarantine,” [1751-1753], fo. 40. Quarantine practices were contested, especially in 
Northern European states like the Netherlands and England, who were further away from the “epicenter” of disease. 
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the number of complaints following the passage of the acts, especially after the expanded law passed in 1721. Critics 
argued that quarantine was financially costly as well as an infringement on free trade and incompatible with British 
freedoms. They complained that their competitors imposed unfair quarantine restrictions simply as a way to advance 
their own trade, and the question if it was even an effective means of stopping diseases’ spread. Many congratulated 
the many societal and sanitation improvements at home for keeping Britain free of the plague. See BL, Add MS 
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“Disease, Diplomacy, and International Commerce,” p. 203; Shakow, “Marks of Contagion,” pp. 169-170; Slack, 
“The Response to the Plague in Early Modern England,” pp. 451-452; Margaret Healy, “Defoe’s Journal and the 
English Plague Writing Tradition,” Literature and Medicine 22 (Spring 2003), pp. 36-37; Slack, “The Response to 
the Plague in Early Modern England,” pp. 185, 187; Slack, “The Disappearance of Plague,” p. 475; Froggatt, “The 
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government would circulate a notice informing its colonial administrators of the threat and 
announcing certain precautions that should be taken (Figure 3.1). However, because of Britain’s 
distance, and its lack of proactive quarantine efforts, it was not typically included in the 
Mediterranean networks of health officials who were in constant correspondence about potential 
threats for disease or developments abroad.53  
Not surprisingly then, there were no specific regulations given to governors in Gibraltar 
in relation to disease prevention.54 To outside states, in particular Spain, this made the town look 
poorly in a number of ways. With the absence of proper regulations, ships coming from Gibraltar 
could not be trusted to be free from disease. There was no careful monitoring of vessels, no 
surveillance of the people on board for any signs or symptoms of illness, and no thorough 
inspection of goods to ensure that they were not carriers of infection. Nor did Gibraltar have the 
means to produce bills of health and ensure their accuracy, lacking any health officials in the 
garrison. Its people were also deemed suspect. With more than twenty percent of the town’s 
inhabitants originating from Morocco, these residents were considered to pose a greater risk to 
the territory, especially those who traveled back and forth from their home state regularly. In 
addition to these residents, Gibraltar’s ports also admitted dozens of Moroccans bringing goods 
for the garrison. Unlike other European ports with their strict regulations, there were no clear or 
consistent boundaries in Gibraltar between the healthy and the (potentially) diseased.  
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53 Harrison, “Disease and the Modern World,” p. 60. 
54 Occasionally London officials did issue temporary quarantine measures against particular ports and states for its 
colonial officials. See GGA, Governor to Secretary of State, 1795-1801; GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1749-1779, 
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With Gibraltar’s failure to make sharp distinctions between clean and foul ships, bodies, 
and goods, many European states treated vessels that touched at its port as “if they had come 
from an infected, or Suspected place.”55 As observers noted, the lack of regulations “might make 
other Nations cautious of admitting British Ships into their Ports, and occasion an Interruption of 
Our Trade & Navigation.”56 If Gibraltar could not verify the health of its own vessels or others, 
all ships coming from that port might be quarantined for a longer duration to air their goods and 
monitor their travelers for disease.57 This would result in significant financial losses for vessels 
who touched in Gibraltar because of the extensive delays and impeded travel; others, who did not 
want such a hassle, would avoid the port altogether. 
While some states like Portugal were more forgiving of vessels coming from Gibraltar, 
others, in particular Spain, were not as lenient.58 As Bland complained, the Spaniards “think that 
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Italian city-states, quarantine was implemented as early as the fourteenth century, shortly following the end of the 
Black Death. See Watts, Epidemics and History, 23; Katherine Arner, “Making Global Commerce into International 
Health Diplomacy: Consuls and Disease Control in the Age of Revolutions,” Journal of World History 24, no. 4 
(December 2013), pp. 781-782; Mark Harrison, “Disease, Diplomacy and International Commerce,” p. 202. 
56 BL, Add MS 43425, Holdernesse to Blakeney & Beauclerk, 9 September 1751. This statement was made in favor 
of a British quarantine act, but the sentiment also applies to Gibraltar. 
57 BL, Add MS 73688, “On Quarantine,” [1751-1753], fo. 41. 
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every thing that comes from Turkey or Africa is infected.”59 Not surprisingly then, Gibraltar’s 
“close Correspondence” with North Africa invoked a great deal of fear in the Spanish 
government, which then refused to supply the garrison in the name of quarantine even when the 
region was free from disease.60 Spain’s “great Terror” of the plague, Bland argued, led them to 
“carry their Scruples to such an extravagant Length, that they exceed the Bounds of Reason and 
Common Sense.”61 In 1742 the Spanish government announced that all ships that traveled to or 
communicated with Africa would be refused entry into Spanish ports. Such measures were 
necessary, they claimed, to protect the state from any potential disease, despite the lack of 
infection abroad.62 For Spain, the health of their cities required a strict quarantine with closed 
borders, limiting any contact with the infected southern states. 
These pronouncements had a significant effect on those in Gibraltar, especially Governor 
Bland who was eager to appease Spain and make an alliance with his European neighbor. Even 
though the Spaniards had attacked the garrison several times in the past and steadfastly refused 
to supply Gibraltar for years, he sought to befriend the neighboring Spanish officials however 
possible.63 Although he recognized the need to maintain a relationship with Morocco for trading 
and diplomatic purposes, he felt that they could not be trusted. As he later wrote to the Secretary 
of State Bedford upon the 1750 plague outbreak, “I should not be sorry for it; but rather Rejoice 
if the whole Race of that Country were Extirpated from the Face of the Earth.”64 The Moroccans, 
                                                          
59 TNA, CO 91/62,”Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 80. 
60 TNA, CO 91/2, “A Scheme or Proposal for the Better Preservation of the Health and Regulation of Quarantine 
and Prattick in Gibraltar,” May 1754. 
61 TNA, CO 91/62,”Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 72. 
62 BL, Add MS 20926, “Circular of Quarantine Regulations Sent to Spanish Ports,” 15 June 1742, fo. 39-40. 
63 See TNA, CO 91/62, “Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” section 7. 
64 TNA, CO 91/11, Bland to Bedford, 21 July 1750, fo. 64 
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as he portrayed them, were “Treacherous Knaves” and “Thieves from their Cradles” who had 
terrorized Britain and its subjects with their “insolent behavior.”65 In Bland’s opinion Britain’s 
alliance with the Moroccans was one that needed to be maintained but not at the expense of 
alienating their Christian neighbors in Spain, who he believed would best support the garrison 
and Britain as a whole. 
Balancing Gibraltar’s relationship with the two states was especially tricky in regards to 
health. Unless Gibraltar were to “renounce all our Alliances with the Mahometans; and make 
open War upon them,” Bland argued, their Spanish neighbors would continue to punish the 
territory for its open borders with North Africa.66 For a state that attempted to entirely close itself 
off from the threat of “African” diseases, Gibraltar’s constant communication and its peoples’ 
travels to and from that coast were unacceptable.  As a later garrison governor protested, “I am 
sensible that the French & Spaniards make use of the Argument… that the Quarantine 
established for Ships on this Port, is on account of our Intercommunication with Barbary” rather 
than “on account of any danger to the publick health.”67 Yet for some states, Gibraltar’s 
negligence in regard to quarantine, alongside its close relations with its “diseased” southern 
neighbors, suggested that it too was a haven for disease, leading them to treat the garrison as 
such. The port’s blurring of the lines between healthy and diseased was repugnant to many of its 
European neighbors, but such porous boundaries were also necessary for the wellbeing of the 
garrison. 
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Bland & Technologies of Disease 
Upon his arrival, Bland immediately began to institute new practices to help ensure that a 
disaster like the plague would not strike the garrison. Initially, he took it upon himself to improve 
the condition of the town in an effort to prevent any disease from settling there. The town itself, 
he claimed, was polluted and unsanitary: the streets and lanes were full of refuse, there was 
rubbish lying throughout, the homes and streets were in disrepair, and there was not an official to 
take responsibility for helping keep the town clean. Such “Nastiness,” Bland believed, posed a 
serious risk for infection and was a threat to the community’s health. In order to prevent 
contagion, contemporary physicians argued that homes should be “more cleanly and sweet,” 
streets should be “washed and clean of Filth, Carrion, and all Manner of Nusances,” and the 
town itself should be cleaned nightly.68 Bland followed these suggestions to the letter, ordering 
inhabitants to keep all the areas around their houses clean, sweep their dirt into heaps, place their 
rubbish in the designated dung hills, and not to litter in the streets. All offenders, he warned, 
would be disciplined accordingly and forced to pay a fine or go to trial in front of the Civil 
Court. Embracing an involved and authoritarian attitude to regulating the civil sphere and its 
cleanliness, the governor argued a punitive approach was necessary in order to offer the greatest 
protection for his inhabitants. In addition, the governor established a new civil position of 
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scavenger, who was responsible for carrying away piles of dirt and rubbish and cleaning the 
streets nightly. Bland also initiated the repavement and repairs of the town streets to facilitate the 
inhabitants and scavenger’s efforts.69 Such improvements, he believed, would help keep the town 
free from contracting or spreading disease and prevent infection. 
Not only did Bland introduce health technologies on a more micro-scale, but he also 
embraced macro-level changes as well, establishing formal regulations for quarantine in 
Gibraltar.70 Recognizing the failure of past governors to record entering ships, track the bodies of 
those who could transmit disease, and restrict their entrance, Bland sought to rectify their 
oversights. He began by establishing the post of Prattick Master, a position that was vital to 
implementing and enforcing quarantine standards. With the help of James Read, the chosen 
officer, the governor could now institute similar policies of surveillance and separation as those 
practiced across the region.71 All arriving ships were visited by the Prattick Master or one of his 
deputies, who immediately inspected their bill of health. Those vessels arriving from the Levant 
not only had to present their paperwork, but were also required to undergo additional monitoring, 
which included a formal inspection by both the Prattick Master and the Master Surgeon before 
being admitted to prattique. These extra precautions were necessary, Bland argued, because “an 
Epidemical Distemper may Seize them in the Voyage, which might be Communicated to the 
Town.”72  
Ships suspected of illness were sent away from the town, often docked on the eastern side 
of the Rock in Catalan Bay and guarded by at least one vessel or guard watchtower whose 
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70 For more on the micro and macro politics of disease prevention, see Bashford, “Epidemic and Governmentality.” 
71 TNA, CO 91/62, “An Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 58; TNA, CO 91/2, James Read to Thomas 
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primary purpose was to monitor the quarantined vessels and their passengers. From there, it was 
virtually impossible for the quarantined people to get into town as they would have to cross a 
guarded pass over the mountainous face. The only people whom they might encounter were the 
Genoese fishermen and mariners who set up camp on the eastern beaches, but they too rarely 
crossed into the town. Contact was prohibited with all quarantined ships, and any offenders were 
ordered to cease and desist, otherwise the guards were instructed to shoot with the intention to 
kill. Although his regulations sounded especially punitive, Bland argued that “it is more 
Equitable a few Rash, Impatient People… should suffer than endanger the Lives of Thousands, 
that might be Infected by their going on Shore before the time of their Quarantine is Expired.”73 
These diseased bodies, Bland suggested, needed to be monitored at all times to ensure there was 
a distinct separation between them and the healthy.  
Although Gibraltar did not have enough space to erect a lazaretto, being one of the only 
ports in the Mediterranean without one, Bland did his best to ensure that the proper precautions 
were taken.74 With a lazaretto, appointed officers were assigned to caring for the quarantined 
individuals and goods and they, with all necessary provisions and equipment, remained within 
the station without traveling back to the port. Such complete separation was not feasible in 
Gibraltar, so Bland mandated that only the Prattick Master could come into contact with 
quarantined vessels. In order to supply those in quarantine, the Prattick Master would row out 
nearby the ship and place the supplies in an empty rowboat for the quarantined ship to tow in 
after his prattick boat had left. Any letters that those in quarantine needed to send ashore would 
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also be placed on the rowboat where they would be “Smoak[ed] with Brimstone Matches and 
washed with Vinegar” before being brought to the town.75 While these measures did help hamper 
the spread of infection, they were not as rigorous as practices employed in other Mediterranean 
port cities. Yet without additional funding from Britain and the establishment of a lazaretto, 
Bland could not feasibly improve upon his current regulations.76 Although the governor 
implemented new boundaries between the diseased and healthy and mandated stricter 
surveillance and monitoring for signs of infection, Gibraltar’s borders still had places of 
weakness where disease could creep in. 
Bland also sought to connect Gibraltar to the many Mediterranean networks of 
communication that monitored plague outbreaks. With a newly appointed Prattick Master and 
the institution of health officers in the town, Gibraltar was able to participate in such 
communication chains that existed across Christian Europe. These had developed hand-in-hand 
with quarantine regulations in many of the region’s key port cities, offering a means to convey 
important information and keep all participants in the know regarding any potential threats.77 In 
this regard, Gibraltar’s constant contact with and closeness to North Africa worked in Bland’s 
favor. As a future governor noted, those in Gibraltar have “more frequent, and better 
opportunitys than they can have in any other Part of Europe of knowing the State of the Health in 
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the Kingdoms of Fez, and Morocco."78 Not only could Bland glean information from the daily 
visitors to the garrison, but he was also able to establish informants in North Africa to keep him 
apprised of any developments there. As he noted, he stayed in close communication with the 
British consuls across the region as well as a group of Catholic priests in Mequinez, a number of 
Christian merchants in Tetuan, and “Jews of Credit in several parts of that Country.”79 This 
connectivity allowed him to make quick decisions and respond to any threats as they developed, 
without waiting for news from other states or instruction from London, at which point it could be 
too late to intervene.80 He could also dispel any false rumors about disease in the region, which 
could affect the garrison’s trade or increase its ships’ time spent in quarantine. In addition, as a 
credible member of these health networks, Bland could present new developments to the 
neighboring commandant in Spain, demonstrating Gibraltar’s commitment to disease prevention 
and his role in these efforts. With Bland’s contributions, Gibraltar became a key link in the chain 
of health-related knowledge throughout the Mediterranean. 
These innovations, Bland hoped, would demonstrate to Spain and the rest of Europe that 
he was invested in preserving the health of the garrison and those connected to it. By establishing 
these tactics of quarantine in the garrison, the governor sought to align himself with Christian 
Europe as being dedicated to disease prevention and preventing the ill effects of the town’s 
southern neighbors. By following in the footsteps of other European ports, the governor sought 
to embrace their practices and the associations that followed. These “Christian” methods would 
not only help rid Gibraltar of suspicion related to disease but also dispel the cultural and religious 
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associations that accompanied such beliefs.  The governor’s greatest fear, in many ways, was 
that Spain and the rest of Europe would “block [Gibraltar] up so close… so that [it] wou’d be left 
to [itself], and in a manner abandoned by all but the Moors.”81 This “abandonment,” he believed, 
could ruin Gibraltar, effectually renouncing its place within Europe and relegating it to the 
Muslim world with all its “undesirable” connotations. If that were to happen, he suggested, the 
territory would be lost to Britain, not only physically but also ideologically. As a British 
territory, albeit one with close connections to Africa, the governor needed Gibraltar to remain a 
clear part of Christian Europe, especially in regards to health. Otherwise, they feared, the 
southern Mediterranean influence, with its many Gibraltarian residents, could overwhelm the 
territory, affecting its well-being, its practices, and its reputation. Recognizing that Gibraltar 
could not be entirely cut off from North Africa, Bland sought to embrace European practices as 
much as possible in an effort to include the territory within the boundaries of Europe and 
dissociate it from the undesirable, “plaguy bodies” of its southern neighbors. 
 
The 1750 Outbreak: Plague across the Straits 
While he had shown his ability to respond to the general health needs of the town, 
Governor Bland’s ability to navigate the challenges of a potential epidemic was put to the test in 
May 1750. On May 6, Bland wrote to Secretary of State Bedford that the plague had once again 
broken out in Morocco. Recognizing that his day-to-day protective measures would not be 
suitable to contain the disease if it were to reach Gibraltar’s shore, Bland decided to institute 
more rigorous regulations. He immediately quarantined all vessels arriving from Morocco for 
forty days, or, if they refused to do so, forced them to leave the bay. To enforce this strict 
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quarantine, the governor requested that British administrators send a man of war to patrol the bay 
and monitor the quarantined ships.82 A week later the governor instituted more stringent 
restrictions, informing Bedford, “The Breaking out of the Plague… is a matter of too great 
Importance to Europe; but more Particularly to this Place… to be Neglected.”83 Without the aid 
of a lazaretto, Bland decided, it was too risky to keep any ship that had touched in Morocco at 
Gibraltar, even if it were put in quarantine. He sent away all such vessels and required all who 
wanted to dock at the port to be examined first by a guard boat that he had hired to enforce a 
proper quarantine. If the guards believed that the ship had been to Morocco, they informed the 
master that he was to sail away immediately or else be fired upon and sunk with all of the goods 
and people onboard. A few Gibraltarian settees that had been in Tangier when the plague first 
appeared were allowed to return to the port, but they were required to perform a lengthy 
quarantine in Catalan Bay under the eyes of a continual guard presence.84 Tightening the borders 
surrounding Gibraltar, Bland sought to keep his healthy garrison separate from anyone or 
anything that could bring in the North African disease. 
As Bland informed British Consul Latton and Secretary Bedford, in addition to the 
stringent quarantine restrictions, he felt that he was “under a Necessity of cutting off our 
Communication with Barbary” in order to secure the territory.85 Charged with protecting the 
safety of the town and garrison, the governor thought it would be contrary to his orders to allow 
any contact with the infected state. His sources abroad informed him that at least six to eight 
people were dying each day in Tangier and the disease continued to rage in Fez and Mequinez. 
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Areas such as Larache and Alcasa had reportedly already finished with the disease, as had 
Arzilla where it had “ceased for want of Fuel to feed the Flame, having destroyed all or the 
greatest pat of the Inhabitants.”86 Tetuan, one of the garrison’s most important suppliers, was 
reportedly free from the disease thanks to the efforts of the Alcaide who, Bland admitted, “was 
taking all the Precautions he Possibly could to keep it from them.”87 The Alciade had cut off all 
communication with infected towns and prevented all travelers from those places from entering 
the city, including the Alcaide of Tangier. He even “attends in person at the Gate of the Town 
and does not trust this Charge to any of his Guards,” believing that his utmost vigilance was 
necessary so that “this City may preserve her Health and the Communication with your 
Garrison.”88 
The governor was understandably concerned by the threat such an outbreak posed for 
Gibraltar. The majority of the cities and towns struck down by the disease, especially Tangier, 
were the garrison’s key suppliers and were typically in constant communication with its port. 
Also, news of the disease and the rising death tolls appeared to the governor to be accurate, 
coming directly from the English vice consul and Spanish friars living in that region. Yet, other 
factors came into play also in Bland’s desire to cut off communication with Tetuan and the rest 
of Morocco. In particular, there was the problem of Spain. With North Africa plagued by 
disease, the governor needed to court the Spanish government in order to receive provisions for 
the garrison. Seeing as the Spaniards were “so intolerably Scrupulous on the least Shaddow of 
Such a Disorder, lest the Distance be ever so Remote,” it was especially necessary, Bland 
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believed, to take whatever precautions necessary to facilitate that relationship.89 He did not want 
his European neighbors to “have any just Pretence of forbidding their Small Vessels with 
Provisions from coming here.”90 If the Spaniards refused to supply the garrison, the governor 
worried, he would be forced to reopen trade with Morocco or else starve.91 Implicitly, Bland was 
also concerned of the effect such contact with Morocco would have on his newly repaired 
friendship with Spain and the commandant of the Campo across the border. He feared, it seemed, 
that allowing communication with any towns in North Africa would cancel out all of his efforts 
to align Gibraltar with Europe and their methods of disease prevention. 
Although it appeared that Bland desired to break free from his North African ties, such a 
move was not entirely feasible. At the moment Tetuan was supposedly free from disease and 
embracing similar quarantine practices as Gibraltar itself, making it less necessary for the 
governor to sever ties with that city. Also, prior to the outbreak, British officials had been in the 
midst of negotiations with the Bey of Tetuan to release British captives taken by Moroccan 
corsairs. The London government had already sent a new consul, Mr. Petticrew, who was on his 
way to Gibraltar to help expedite the agreement. Eager to “get rid of that Troublesome, and 
Expensive Affair,” Bland did not want to let the plague “retard our Treaty.”92 Bland also wanted 
to avoid upsetting the Alcaide directly. As he informed Secretary Bedford, if the Alcaide 
“think[s] we Slight him too much at this time of Danger,” the leader could retaliate against the 
garrison. Once the disease passed, Gibraltar would likely return to Morocco for its supplies, 
those being more affordable and generally reliable than provisions from Spain. If the governor 
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angered the Alcaide in the meantime, he would likely raise the prices for the provisions. Or, the 
governor feared, the Moroccan leader might encourage his corsairs to raid and capture British 
ships in the Straits. As Bland conceded, it was necessary to “keep them in Humour” to “prevent 
their Molesting the British Trading Ships.”93 
Forced to navigate between the need for contact and the threat of contagion, Bland chose 
the latter. In the end, Bland decided to try to appease the Alcaide of Tetuan while favoring the 
desires of the Spanish government, “thinking it the least Evil of the Two.”94 Out of fear that the 
plague would eventually come to Tetuan, which it did a month later, and desiring to preserve his 
newfound friendship with Spain, Bland chose to suspend almost all contact with Morocco.95 He 
did, however, promise the Alcaide that he would send him a letter every ten to twelve days via a 
small boat which would remain in the Bay of Tetuan without any communication with land.96 
Despite this assurance, Bland did not follow through with his promise; in August the Alcaide 
complained that it had been forty days since he had last heard from the governor.97 The governor 
tried to reassure the Alcaide that his absence had been “much against my inclination,” driven by 
the “Obstinacy of the Spaniards” and their “jealous Temper.”98 Yet such actions were necessary, 
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he argued, both for the good of the garrison and “the Crown of Morocco.”99 Gibraltar, he 
maintained, was “of the greatest Consequence... to our Allies in all parts of Africa,” and by 
protecting it from harm, he was preserving Moroccan commerce by keeping it in friendly, British 
hands.100 
Despite Bland’s rhetoric in his letters to the Alcaide of Tetuan, it appears that he 
willingly chose to separate himself from North Africa and align himself with Europe. In doing 
so, the governor signified that he was fully invested in the health of the garrison and the 
preservation of Europeans’ health, even if it meant upsetting his Moroccan allies. As he 
proclaimed to Bedford, the health of the garrison “was of more Consequence to Great Britain, 
than that of Mr. Latton, our Captives, and the Friendship of the Alcaide of Tetuan.”101 No such 
dismissive statements were made regarding the relationship with Spain. Bland’s decision, in 
essence, said to his Christian neighbors that Gibraltar was one of them, regardless of its close ties 
with Muslim states and its many Moroccan residents. By instituting a strict quarantine, and even 
more so, cutting off communication between the garrison and Morocco, Bland tried to limit the 
influence of North Africa and close the spaces of contact and contagion while situating himself 
within the Christian, European fold. 
However, Bland’s isolation of North Africa would not last; while the plague continued to 
ravage North African cities, British officials urged Bland to reopen communication with the 
infected territory. Unwilling to further delay their negotiations with Moroccan leaders, the 
London government sent Consul Pettigrew to Gibraltar with orders to continue on across the 
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Straits.102 Despite his hesitation, Bland was required to heed the “interest of my King and 
Country” and reopen communication with North Africa, albeit on a limited basis.103 While the 
governor hoped that he could still maintain his friendship with the Spaniards, and keep the 
garrison free from disease, he was disheartened to have to compromise his views and allow the 
vexing Moroccan influence back into Gibraltar. Spain had supplied them “Plentifully with Fresh 
Provisions,” whereas North African corsairs were seizing British ships and the Alcaide had 
embraced a “peremptory and haughty manner” in his letters.104 Although Bland denied the 
Alcaide’s accusations that the governor had “changed [his] Sentiments, and turn’d them toward 
Spain,” his actions as well as his tone in his memoir suggest otherwise.105 Bland appeared to 
want to remain in Spain’s good graces, while “defer[ing] opening a Free Commerce” with 
Morocco. Such a relationship would establish Gibraltar as a civilized port within the boundaries 
of Christian Europe and with the power to control North African interests and their involvement 
in the territory.  
 
Conclusion 
 Disease, as mentioned previously, was not only epidemiological but also ideologically 
driven. As this chapter shows, illness carried with it several connotations, that of health, 
geography, religion, and culture. Disease prevention was also a loaded practice, suggesting that 
those who followed the stringent practices of quarantine and health governance were more 
enlightened and advanced than those who (supposedly) embraced religious doctrines of 
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predestination. Such technologies required a great deal of state and government involvement, 
necessitating close surveillance, the transfer of knowledge, and the production of explicit health-
related paperwork, including bills of health and notices of potential outbreaks, in an effort to 
prevent and contain disease. These differences served to create what was considered to be an 
uncrossable boundary between Christian Europe and the Islamic states of Africa and the 
Ottoman territories. As the chapter argues, practices of disease prevention sought to make 
sanitary borders between places of disease and those of health. These borders appeared on many 
levels, from larger ones (i.e. diseased state/region versus healthy state/region) to smaller ones 
(i.e. dirty house versus clean house). As a result, disease management required constant 
negotiation on a number of scales as well. Governors felt the need to implement both larger and 
smaller changes in an effort to properly control all aspects of disease. This included 
micropolitical tactics like reforming the body as well as macropolitical institutions like 
quarantine. Yet both sought to give those who controlled such practices the sense that could 
govern disease and create clear boundaries between the sick and the healthy. 
Yet, as Bland’s experience shows, disease management, and quarantine in particular, was 
not an all-encompassing practice; gaps remained, which allowed contact and intermingling 
between the two spheres. Despite Bland’s interventions in the health of the town and his embrace 
of governmental tactics of surveillance and discipline, the governor could not entirely control the 
process nor fully limit the exchanges between Gibraltar and its southern neighbors. Instead, the 
garrison was forced to remain open to all of its Mediterranean influences and the troubles they 
brought with them. Gibraltar’s borders could not remain entirely closed to any of its neighbors, 
influenced by all of the surrounding states and the opinions of those within them. Nor were its 
boundaries entirely dictated by Britain. For the most part, Gibraltar’s governors served as the 
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frontline and watchmen of disease, funneling information back to Britain rather than the reverse. 
As this chapter demonstrates, the health history of Gibraltar was contingent upon its relationships 
with the surrounding states and required certain practices of governmentality in order to define it 
as a “healthy” and secure port. 
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Figure 3.1: Example of a 1780 Order in Council regarding quarantine procedures  
(GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1780) 
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Chapter 4 
“Subjects of His Brittanick Majesty”: Passholders and the Construction of Belonging in 
Gibraltar 
Writing to the British consul in Lisbon in 1777, Governor George Augustus Elliot 
expressed his concerns about granting Mediterranean passes to several of Gibraltar’s residents. 
Mediterranean passes provided British subjects with the freedom and protection to travel the seas 
without the threat of capture by North African corsairs. While the passes were only to be granted 
to British subjects, Eliott feared that these individuals were not true subjects or worthy of the 
pass privilege. One of the inhabitants in question was Pasqual Scarnichia Sr., a mariner born in 
Naples who migrated to the garrison years prior. Although the Civil Court confirmed that 
Scarnichia was indeed a naturalized subject of Great Britain by act of Parliament, it did not 
assuage Elliot’s fears of the man’s loyalty.1 As he informed Hort, “I am nevertheless afraid that 
he, as well as many others who are now soliciting for passes here, have their connections with 
foreigners.” To Eliott these “connections” suggested that these mariners had the means and the 
motivation to work for other states rather than supporting the flag that protected them.2 
Mediterranean passes, Eliott believed, were a privilege available only to those who had proven 
themselves to be worthy subjects of the empire. Foreign passholders were just too great a 
problem for these governors, jeopardizing their efforts to secure the territory, govern their 
maritime subjects, and protect the name of Britain and the title of British subject. 
Following accords with Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, and Morocco, Charles II established the 
Mediterranean pass system in 1682 as a means to promote English trade by protecting his 
                                                          
1 GGA, Diary 1777-1778, 15-17 June 1777; GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 3, 1774-1778, Elliot to Fraser, 15 
June 1777, fo. 247-248. 
2 GGA, Letters to Consuls Lisbon & Cadiz, 1769-1797, Eliott to Hort, 11 September 1777, fo. 66. 
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subjects against attacks by the North African corsairs.3 Like privateers, corsairs were state-
sanctioned individuals given license by their leaders to attack enemies of the state. They were 
permitted to capture enemy ships and keep the vessel and its goods as prizes so long as they gave 
their sovereign a share of the profit. While some mariners and passengers on board the seized 
vessels were released upon arriving in North African ports, most were held for ransom by state 
leaders in order to garner additional profits. By the seventeenth and eighteenth century, North 
African corsairing was at its peak with cruisers operating across the Mediterranean, Atlantic, and 
North Sea.4 These corsairs traveled as far afield as the American colonies and northern European 
coats, attacking cargo and passenger ships and raiding seaside towns. In a seven-year period 
corsairs captured almost five hundred English and Scottish ships at sea along with entire 
populations of coastal cities and ports.5 During this period, the captivity crisis plagued European 
                                                          
3 The pass system actually began in 1662 following English peace treaties with Tunis and Tripoli. Per the Anglo-
Tripoli treaty, the vessel was allowed to proceed safely upon the master producing a pass from the Lord High 
Admiral of England or if the majority of the ship’s company were English subjects. It was not until the signing of 
the Anglo-Algiers treaty in 1682 that it became mandatory to carry a Mediterranean pass for safe passage without 
fear of capture, according to the terms of the agreement. Consequently, it was not until 1682 that the pass system 
was formalized due to the new requirements. See David Richardson, “Introduction: The Mediterranean Passes in the 
Public Record Office, London,” in British Records Relating to America in Microform, ed. by W.E. Minchinton (East 
Ardsley: EP Michform, 1981), p. 5. 
4 G. N. Clark, “Barbary Corsairs in the Seventeenth Century,” Cambridge Historical Journal 8 (1944), p. 23; Nabil 
Matar, “Introduction: England and Mediterranean Captivity, 1577-1704,” in Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption: 
Barbary Captivity Narratives from Early Modern England, ed. Daniel J. Vitkus (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001), p. 8. One reason for the growth of the corsairs in the early seventeenth century was the 1609 expulsion 
of the Moriscos from Spain. According to Nabil Matar, the Moriscos brought their many navigational skills as well 
as a deep-seeded hatred for Christians with them to their new home states in North Africa. Matar, “English Accounts 
of Captivity in North Africa and the Middle East: 1577-1625,” Renaissance Quarterly 54, no. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 
560-561; Matar, “Introduction,” p. 11. Other European renegades also played a large role in the corsairs’ success as 
many converted to Islam and fought for the North African states as they offered greater opportunities for conquest, 
loot, and wealth. See Matar, “Introduction,” p. 14; Clark, “Barbary Corsairs,” p. 23. 
5 According to Matar, from 1609 to 1616 corsairs captured 466 English and Scottish ships, a rate that was fairly 
typical throughout this period. In a single year in the 1630s, corsairs also captured the entire population of the port 
of Baltimore in Cork as well as 800 residents from the coast of Iceland. The corsairs’ peak in relation to British 
captives occurred between 1625 and 1640. Scholars suggest that it was the Europeans’ increased mobility and 
commercial traffic in these regions at that time that made corsair attacks even more likely. See Matar, “English 
Accounts,” pp. 563, 569; Clark, “Barbary Corsairs,” p. 23. 
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states and its peoples, limiting travel, impacting commerce, diminishing revenue, and bringing 
fear to many.6  
 Yet the Mediterranean pass system freed English subjects from such fears, granting 
protection to English carriers across the corsair-ridden seas so long as they confirmed their 
subject status. As one contemporary author noted, “the protection afforded by these passes is 
such, that no ships, which traverse the seas frequented by these rovers, ever fail to furnish 
themselves with them; whether in the trade to the East-Indies, Africa, or the Levant, or in the 
trade to Spain, Italy, or any part of the Mediterranean.”7 Per the 1682 regulations, in order to 
receive a pass, the owner, master, and two-thirds of the crew, as well as the ship itself, had to be 
English or colonial-built or a foreign vessel made free. The Surveyor of the Act of Navigation 
had to confirm that these requirements were met and the necessary paperwork and oaths had 
been submitted before a pass could be granted. The pass, issued by the Lord High Admiral, 
informed all readers that “the said Ship appearing unto us, by good Testimony upon Oath, to 
belong to the subjects of Our Soveraigne Lord the King, and to noe foreigner.”8 Produced on a 
unique parchment size, Mediterranean passes were cut into two halves with scalloped edges 
(Figure 4.1). The top halves were sent to the corsairs while the bottom halves were given to the 
                                                          
6 Hostages also caused difficulties for the state at home as the government was forced to see to their families’ 
complaints. Because those captured were typically the male breadwinners of the family, the loss of their income 
typically meant that those at home sank into poverty and had to petition the king for assistance. These demands were 
often quite vocal, bringing the corsair issue to the forefront of European domestic politics. As Nabil Matar has 
argued, in England they even played a significant role in disputes between the king and parliament just prior to the 
English Civil War. Nabil Matar, “The Barbary Corsairs, King Charles I and the Civil War,” Seventeenth Century 16, 
2 (2001), p. 244. 
7John Reeves, A History of the Law of Shipping and Navigation (London, 1792), p. 424. By the 1730s, the majority 
of English vessels carried this protection, and the government issued nearly 1,200 passes annually. According to 
historians’ calculations, approximately 25-33 percent of ships bound to Spain, Portugal and the West Indies carried 
passes, as did over 40 percent traveling to North America, 75 percent headed to the Mediterranean, and 90 percent 
bound to Africa and the East Indies. It appears that more expensive voyages necessitated additional protection and 
insurance coverage for such investments, which is why vessels traveling certain routes were more likely to carry a 
pass. See Richardson, “Mediterranean Passes,” pp. 9-10. 
8 Richardson, “The Mediterranean Passes,” p. 7. 
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masters to carry. When the corsairs stopped a vessel, the master would present his half, which 
would align with the corsairs’ piece, confirming its validity.9 Once the pass was deemed valid, 
English masters were permitted to proceed on their voyages “without any Lett, hindrance, 
seizure or Molestation.”10 
 This system was designed to privilege English traders in the Mediterranean and other 
seas by protecting them against one of the most powerful commercial hindrances at that time. 
Rather than functioning solely as a tool for monitoring and surveillance, I argue that 
Mediterranean passes originally served primarily as evidence of state assistance and the 
protection of its subjects. In her work on pilgrim passports, Radhika Singha made a similar 
argument, contending that these forms of identification were used to monitor travelers as well as 
demonstrate the state’s support of these individuals.11 By granting carriers the opportunity to 
travel without impediment, the Mediterranean passes suggested that the British state supported 
their maritime ventures as they worked for the interests of Britain. In 1722 this support was 
expanded to Britain’s Mediterranean territories, including “all Inhabitants, Subjects of Gibraltar” 
as eligible passholders.12 Following popular ideologies of the period, the Order in Council 
affirmed the importance of foreign commerce for the development and growth of the state by 
utilizing any and all resources that were available, including these newly adopted subjects.13 
                                                          
9 This method helped protect English sailors from any possible language barriers or misunderstandings that could 
arise. It was also designed to help prevent pass forgeries. 
10 Richardson, “The Mediterranean Passes,” p. 7. 
11 See Radhika Singha, “Passport, Ticket, and India-rubber Stamp: ‘The Problem of the Pauper Pilgrim’ in Colonial 
India, c. 1882-1925” in The Limits of British Colonial Control in South Asia: Spaces of Disorder in the Indian 
Ocean Region, ed. Ashwini Tambe and Harald Fischer-Tine (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 59. 
12 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Order of the Council,” 14 June 1722, fo. 2 
13 See Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 62-64. 
As Pamela Crossley has also argued, imperial policies could promote cultural diversity and assimilation 
simultaneously. See Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, “Conclusion,” in Empire at the 
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However, the order’s broad language was a source of concern for Gibraltar’s governors, in 
particular Governors Robert Boyd (1768-1777, 1790-1794) and George Augustus Eliott (1777-
1787). Not only did Gibraltar’s commanders shoulder any blame for their mariners’ abuse of 
pass protection, but they also felt that it was their duty as British governors to protect the name 
of Britain and the privilege of being a British subject. Because the Mediterranean pass system 
was intricately tied to subjecthood, they believed it was their responsibility to make sure that 
Gibraltar’s unworthy residents were not enjoying undue benefits just because of their location. 
 In response to this threat, Governors Boyd and Eliott established a formalized system for 
pass applications, employing conceptions of subjecthood used across the empire to determine 
who was indeed eligible to receive a Mediterranean pass. These governors, following a “logic of 
regulation” as described by Radhika Mongia, sought to restrict pass protection to only those that 
they deemed worthy, based on the mariner’s history of residency and service.14 As Tamar 
Herzog demonstrates in her work, it was not uncommon for states to divide migrants into those 
who willing integrated themselves into the community and served the monarch – these were 
deemed “good” immigrants – and those who were not willing or were different ethnically, 
racially, or otherwise.15 I argue that Gibraltar’s governors’ logic enabled them to better control 
those “bad” residents who the commanders believed were untrustworthy or suspect because of 
                                                          
Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and 
Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), p. 319. 
14 This is different from the “logic of facilitation” embraced by the British government which opened up 
opportunities for all in an effort to promote its own commercial interests. See Radhika Viyas Mongia, “Race, 
Nationality, Mobility: A History of the Passport,” in After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation, 
ed. by Antoinette Burton (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 197. See also Hannah Weiss Muller, “Bonds of 
Belonging: Subjecthood and the British Empire,” Journal of British Studies 53 (2014): 29-58. 
15 See Tamar Herzog, Defining Nations: Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), “Introduction,” especially p. 6. 
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their interest in and dedication to foreign states. By embracing strict definitions of “subject,” the 
governors believed they could best limit the movements of questionable residents and help 
preserve the sanctity of British subjecthood. For them, subject status was a tactic of governance 
with its ability to intervene in the problem of this mobile, foreign population. As “an instrument 
and object of social closure,” I maintain that the governors sought to employ subjecthood to 
ensure that worthy, loyal inhabitants could reap the benefits of the pass system while 
simultaneously restricting and isolating those they deemed problematic.16 Passes marked the 
privileged population of maritime Gibraltar, signifying that these individuals were worthy of 
British protection and could carry the name of British subject.17 
 As this chapter shows, subjecthood and Mediterranean passes were intricately tied 
together, and by managing one, Gibraltar’s governors believed they could in turn control the 
other. Governors Boyd and Eliott, fearful of the challenges that their multi-ethnic population 
posed to notions of subjecthood, as well as the very real financial and commercial threats it 
                                                          
16 Christian Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), pp. 16-17. Mongia argues that 
passport systems functioned not just to restrict but also to facilitate and enable movement, an idea that Radhika 
Singha also echoes. David Shearer, on the other hand, argues that passports allowed for the isolation of threatening 
populations and were a mechanism to protect the state from harm. See Radhika V. Mongia, “Historicizing State 
Sovereignty: Inequality and the Form of Equivalence,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 49, 2 (April 
2007), pp. 403-404; Singha, “Passport, Ticket, and India-Rubber Stamp, especially p. 59; Shearer, “Elements Near 
and Alien: Passportization, Policing, and Identity in the Stalinist State, 1932-1952,” The Journal of Modern History 
76, no. 4 (December 2004), p. 838. See also John Torpey, “Revolutions and Freedom of Movement: An Analysis of 
Passport Controls in the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions,” Theory and Society 21.6 (Dec 1997), p. 840; 
John Torpey, “Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate ‘Means of Movement,’” 
Sociological Theory 16, no. 3 (1998): 239-259. 
17 Christian Joppke, referencing Rogers Brubaker’s Citizenship and Nationhood in Germany and France (1992), 
notes that citizenship was a circular process that enabled states to remain “relatively closed and self-perpetuating 
communities… open only at the margins to the exogenous recruitment of new members.” In the case of Gibraltar, it 
was certainly a marginal site which the British government used to introduce new subjects with their unique talents 
and resources into the empire. See Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration, pp. 16-17. Mongia also argues that the 
“peculiar situation of the colony” enabled subjecthood to be modified according to the needs of the metropole. See 
Mongia, “Race, Nationality, Mobility,” p. 197. See also Andreas Fahrmeir’s discussion of how naturalization was 
primarily a local affair, conducted by each region’s customary procedures and differing from place to place. See 
Fahrmeir, Citizens and Aliens: Foreigners and the Law in Britain and the German States, 1789-1870 (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2000), p. 17. 
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posed to British maritime trade, reflected that changes needed to be made. Their commercial 
population, in their mind, was both unknown and uncontrolled: the mobility inherent in the 
lifestyles of these maritime peoples made it difficult to track and manage this particular group, 
and the vast majority were foreign-born which meant their motivations and actions were suspect. 
Because the mobile body was a difficult one to govern, as James C. Scott has shown, Gibraltar’s 
commanders felt the need to create and employ additional technologies of governance in order to 
better grasp this group of peoples and prevent them from jeopardizing British interests and its 
reputation.18 This required the production of an archive which could create a concrete field of 
knowledge of this population and offer the governors a means to control them. By answering the 
question of who counted as a subject in Gibraltar, the governors sought to ameliorate the 
Mediterranean pass problem, better control these mobile subjects, and create a system of 
governance that determined who was worthy of inclusion in the British territory and its empire. 
 
The Root of the Problem: The Expansion of the Pass System in Gibraltar 
 Governor Eliott’s fears about issuing passes to the Genoese mariners stemmed from 
concerns about the “scandalous abuse too often made of Mediterranean Passes.” As he had 
learned from his predecessor, Governor Boyd, there had been a growing number of 
“Gibraltarian” passholders, many of whom, contrary to regulations, did not actually appear to be 
British subjects or working for British interests. This problem, Boyd noted, was due to the 
imprecise language of the 1722 Order in Council that had expanded the qualifications for pass 
protection in Britain’s Mediterranean territories. “The present regulations of the Admiralty,” he 
                                                          
18 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 1-2. 
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explained, “say that the Governor is to issue Passes to His Majesty’s Subjects Inhabitants of 
Gibraltar of whatever Religion.” Boyd found these regulations puzzling as “I find all Inhabitants 
have been hitherto deemed subjects whether Natives or Foreigners.” As he understood it, this 
legislation appeared to empower all residents to apply for pass protection, regardless of their 
qualifications as subjects. 
Prior to the 1722 Order in Council the vast majority of Gibraltar’s mariners were unable 
to apply for pass protection because they were not born in any dominions belonging to the 
Crown of England.”19 There were no legal precedents in the garrison for inherited or adopted 
subjects of colonial acquisition, nor were there opportunities to apply for naturalization or 
denization in Gibraltar.20 This meant that only about ten percent of the population could legally 
apply for, receive, and sail under the protection of a British Mediterranean pass; the other ninety 
percent could not safely leave the garrison or participate in their trades thanks to its location in 
the epicenter of corsair activity.  As an early governor, William Hargrave observed, “the 
Spaniards and other Inhabitants of that Town, who are of a different Religion, are excluded from 
the Benefit of such Passes, whereby the Trading Ships and Vessels are exposed to the Algerines, 
                                                          
19 Quoted in Muller, “Bonds of Belonging,” p. 32. See her piece for a greater overview on legal decisions regarding 
subjecthood (pp. 32-33). 
20 Denization permitted foreign merchants to participate in all forms of trade, including colonial, but it did not 
release them from the heavy alien duties. Naturalization, on the other hand, freed the recipient from all burdens of 
his foreign status; however, this opportunity was only available to followers of the Church of England. Because 
those applicants for naturalization were required to take the sacrament prior to the bill being introduced, 
nonconformists and dissenters of any religious persuasion were excluded. For more on these legal processes, see 
Stephen Alexander Fortune, Merchants and Jews: The Struggle for British West Indian Commerce, 1650-1750 
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1984), pp. 44-45; Thomas W. Perry, Public Opinion, Propaganda, and 
Politics in Eighteenth-Century England: A Study of the Jewish Naturalization Act of 1753 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1962), p. 15-16; David S. Katz, The Jews in the History of England, 1485-1850 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), p. 242; Alan H. Singer, “Aliens and Citizens: Jewish and Protestant Naturalization in the 
Making of the Modern British Nation, 1689-1753” (PhD. Dissertation, University of Missouri-Columbia, 1999), p. 
6; Daniel Statt, “The Birthright of an Englishman: The Practice of Naturalization and Denization of Immigrants 
Under the Later Stuarts and Early Hanoverians,” Proceedings of the Huguenot Society XXV, no. 1 (1989), pp. 64-
68. 
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who, by the Treatys now subsisting, require such Passes shall be produced.”21 Without the 
participation of these migrants, Gibraltar seemed likely to fail, requiring the maritime and 
commercial skills of its foreign-born residents to support the garrison and its needs. 
 The 1722 Order in Council, however, sought to remedy this problem and facilitate the use 
of Mediterranean passes by Britain’s Mediterranean residents. The order declared that Gibraltar’s 
governors were now permitted to issue passes “to His Majesty’s Subjects, Inhabitants of 
Gibraltar, of what Religion soever they be when they shall apply for them.”22 The attached oath 
and bond employed similar language, permitting “people of the Town of Gibraltar who now 
dwell in the Town and are Subjects of His Brittanick Majesty” to participate in the pass system.23 
The new orders also compromised on other stipulations: those in Gibraltar were not obliged to 
crew the ship with a three-quarters majority of British seamen and they were allowed to sail 
foreign-built ships so long as they “wear the Colours commonly borne by those that belong to 
Great Britain.”24 Visually, the cut of the pass itself was also different, signaling to others that the 
pass and its bearer were protected by the British flag but operated under different regulations.25  
According to the language of the order, virtually any “inhabitant” of Gibraltar became a 
subject and was entitled to British pass protection. By including Gibraltar’s foreign-born 
                                                          
21 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Order of the Council,” 14 June 1722, fo. 1-2. Some early 
commanders tried to bend the rules by giving these residents a memorandum stating they were entitled to the rights 
of the pass, but this angered British merchants posted abroad. They argued that passes “were design’d only for His 
Majesties Subjects, & not to be sold to Forreigners,” and the governors were forced to stop this practice. TNA, CO 
91/5, Cotton to Methuen, 26 January 1716/17. 
22 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Order of the Council,” 14 June 1722, fo. 2. 
23 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Forms of an Oath to be Taken by the Masters of Ships or 
Vessels Belonging to Gibraltar,” fo. 4-5, “Bond from the Masters of Ships or Vessels, belonging to Gibraltar to the 
King,” fo. 7-8. 
24 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Order of the Council,” 14 June 1722, fo. 2. 
25 TNA, SP 89/37, Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty to Compton, 11 December 1730, fo. 51-53; TNA, ADM 
2/1319, Burchett to Clayton, 31 March 1730, fo. 12; TNA, SP 36/18, “Order in Council Settling the Fees to be 
Taken for Mediterranean Passes,” 16 March 1730, fo. 47-50. 
152 
 
inhabitants, such as the many Genoese and Jewish residents who were the primary commercial 
workers in the town, the order enabled these merchants and mariners to move about the region 
unhindered, free to pursue their trades. Many of these individuals were part of larger commercial 
diasporas that had a strong presence throughout much of the Mediterranean, North Africa, and 
Northern Europe.26 Covered by the protection of the pass system, these merchants were free to 
participate in the garrison’s economy and integrate it into their existing trade networks. Such 
work would not only bring profits for the individuals but also for Gibraltar and for Britain, 
introducing the state to new markets and furthering its growth and influence in those regions. By 
adopting these migrants as subjects, the British state was able to “lay hold of” these residents and 
utilize their many talents and resources.27  
It seemed that this order would be the solution to many of the garrison’s problems: its 
inhabitants could now gather the necessary supplies and provisions; they could further the town’s 
commercial growth; and they could travel around the region working in support of the garrison 
and its needs. Under this legislation mariners like Pasqual Scarnichia, Sr. could now fully 
participate as part of Gibraltar’s maritime community.28 Scarnichia, like many other foreign 
mariners, was of great use to the garrison and the British empire, fighting in both the Seven 
Years’ War and the War of the American Revolution as a privateer under British colors. His 
                                                          
26 See chapter 1 as well. 
27 Torpey, “Revolutions and Freedom of Movement,” p. 40. See also Singer, “Aliens and Citizens,” pp. 80-81. 
28 Archival records show that he was an inhabitant of Minorca when is sons were born in the 1750s and that he 
fought for Britain as a privateer in the Seven Years’ War. It is unclear when Scarnichia actually arrived in Gibraltar, 
but he is recorded in the 1778 List of Inhabitants Houses as owning a dwelling house on Artillery Street and Cannon 
Lane that he held under mortgage by a land grant from General Bland, which does not necessarily mean that his case 
was seen and approved during the governor’s 1749 Court of Enquiry. His bondsman, Alexander Mackenzie 
confirmed Scarnichia’s property ownership in 1777 when questioned about Scarnichia’s residence, stating that he 
owned a home behind the Catholic church that had cost him over £500 and which produced about 150 dollars 
monthly with a net worth of £2000. See GGA, Box: 1777 & 1791 Lists of Inhabitants, 1777 List of Inhabitants, 
1778 List of Inhabitants Houses, 1791 List of Inhabitants; GGA, Diary 1777 & 1778-1782, Tuesday 17 June 1777. 
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sons, Pasqual Jr. and James, also volunteered as privateers during the American Revolution and 
the French wars.29 The Scarnichias, both father and sons, were also prominent merchants, 
frequently sailing across the Mediterranean to provide supplies for the territory, even during 
wartime.30 These men were some of the few who remained in the garrison during the Great Siege 
(1779-1783) to gather supplies despite the risk of capture.31 According to the surviving pass 
registers, the Scarnichias were granted passes each year from approximately 1766 to 1797 and 
traveled across the region, appearing in Tunis, Malaga, Lisbon, Sicily, Genoa, and Larache for 
various commercial reasons.32 Even the Governor of Tangier remarked to Governor Eliott how 
glad he was to see Pasqual as he sent him home with provisions for the garrison. Scarnichia was 
known by leaders across the Mediterranean as being “a very capable man in His Nation’s 
Service” and offering a number of benefits for the garrison.33 Men such as him traveled and 
traded widely across the Mediterranean in the name of Britain; they fought under the British flag; 
and they helped strengthen existing ties and forge new relationships with markets and states 
across the region. 
In an effort to make the most of Gibraltar’s inhabitants’ skills, the state was eager to grant 
them subjecthood in order to encourage and support their movements. Subjecthood, as 
understood in the eighteenth century, emphasized the personal bond between the monarch and 
his people, which created a sense of belonging and loyalty. In return for the subjects’ pledges of 
                                                          
29 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 2, fo. 96-100, 109-111, 120-123, 153-156, 173-175, 184-185. 
30 GGA, Letters to Lisbon & Cadiz, 1769-1797, Eliott to Hort, 11 September 1777, fo. 66. 
31 GGA, Diary No. 4. June, 1782-June, 1786; GGA, Miscellaneous Papers. 1780-1783. 
32 The pass registers span from 1766 to 1777 and sporadically from 1784 to 1797. See GGA, Mediterranean Passes, 
Admiralty Book 1, fo. 10-11, 14-15, 20-53, 78-79, 86-91; Admiralty Book 2, fo. 58-59, 72-79, 212-213, 228-233, 
and several unnumbered pages; GGA, Diary No. 4. June, 1782-June, 1786; GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1780-1783. 
33 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers. 1780-1783, Abdelemalek Ben Mohamed to Eliott, 2 March 1783. 
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allegiance, the monarch was expected to offer protection to them and grant them certain 
privileges – in the case of Gibraltar, this included pass protection and the freedom of mobility.34 
In doing so, the mariners could access their markets more easily and securely, reduce their 
transport costs, shorten the length of their voyages, and earn greater profits. The success of the 
subjects in these areas also helped facilitate the development of the state. Following the pursuits 
of its newfound subjects, Britain could grow into new markets, solidify its standing in 
Mediterranean networks, and increase state revenue. By integrating these inhabitants into the 
British world, the state could harness their talents and resources while the migrants could travel 
freely and safely under the British flag, expanding their commercial pursuits.35 The state’s 
encouragement of subjecthood and its “elastic” use of the term appeared to be advantageous to 
everyone, allowing the government to access its Mediterranean peoples and enabling the 
commercial growth and protection of its residents.36 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 In the words of Tamar Herzog, belonging was “generated by the ability to use rights or to be forced to comply 
with duties.” Traditional privileges associated with subjecthood (and granted in other colonial contexts) were the 
right to hold property and equal consideration under the law, but these were not granted to foreign-born residents in 
Gibraltar, only to British Protestants. See chapter 2 for a greater discussion of property. See Tamar Herzog, Defining 
Nations, pp. 2, 4; Christopher L. Brown, “Empire without Slaves: British Concepts of Emancipation in the Age of 
the American Revolution,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 56, no. 2 (1999), p. 282. Other scholars 
have argued that conceptions of subjecthood and nationality varied according to location and is needs. See Mongia, 
“Race, Nationality, Mobility,” p. 197; Fahrmeir, Citizens and Aliens, p. 17. 
35 As scholars have argued, mobility was central to diasporic communities as their efforts focused on connecting 
disparate economies. These migrants had to establish themselves in new territories and integrate themselves into the 
local economy while still keeping close ties with the world beyond those borders. See Ian Coller, “Arab France: 
Mobility and Community in Early-Nineteenth-Century Paris and Marseille,” French Historical Studies 29, no. 3 
(Summer 2006), p. 436; Ned Landsman, “Introduction: The Context and Functions of Scottish Involvement with the 
Americas,” in Nation and Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas, 1600-1800, ed. by Ned 
C. Landsman (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2001). 
36 As Mongia has argued, this would classify as a “logic of facilitation.” See Mongia, “Historicizing State 
Sovereignty,” p. 197; Muller, “Bonds of Belonging,” pp. 53-54. 
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The Troubles of Elastic Subjecthood 
 By the late 1760s, which marked the beginning of Boyd’s first tenure in the garrison, the 
expanded pass protection for Britain’s Mediterranean subjects had reportedly become a problem. 
According to one regional consul, “hardly less than two hundred [passes] circulate in and about 
the Mediterranean in the possession of aliens.”37 While it is likely that some mariners took 
advantage of the lenient pass regulations in Gibraltar, the threat and fear of pass abuse loomed 
much larger, especially for Gibraltar’s governors. Granted the power to issue Mediterranean 
passes, but without a clear explanation of who qualified for the privilege, these commanders 
struggled to determine who was truly worthy to carry a pass. While other British subjects had to 
undergo a lengthy and rigorous process to receive a pass, there were no such procedures in 
Gibraltar. Instead, critics noted, all of Gibraltar’s inhabitants appeared to be “born Masters of 
Ships,” granted a pass simply because of their residence in the territory.38 Yet this idea that all 
inhabitants were eligible for pass protection and could claim British subjecthood troubled 
Gibraltar’s governors, especially Governors Boyd and Eliott. In their minds, all of Gibraltar’s 
foreign-born mariners posed a potential threat because of their mobility and their foreignness. 
 A mobile population was understood to be especially difficult to control and govern, 
which is why many governments sought to keep their peoples “sedentary.”39 These challenges 
were particularly true in regard to mariners who were granted the freedom to traverse 
unmonitored seas and carried with them the power of capital and contacts.40 As Clare Anderson 
has argued, the ocean was a “space of disorder” because of the constant migration and controlled 
                                                          
37 TNA, SP 89/79, Hort to Rochford, 12 February 1775, fo. 31. 
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mobility.41 These men, who were seen as an untrustworthy “underclass” by many by virtue of 
their being sailors, could pose a direct threat to the British territory without garnering attention 
from the appropriate authorities. Because the seas could not be heavily policed, it was possible 
for masters to slip through administrative efforts of control.42 In the minds of the governors, the 
mobile body was inherently suspect and itinerancy suggested that their loyalty to the British 
crown was unproven. For the commanders who were invested in securing an embattled British 
territory, the unhindered mobility of residents who could not be easily controlled or supervised 
appeared to be a recipe for administrative disaster.43 
 To make matters worse, the majority of these newly included mariners were foreign-born, 
suggesting that they had ties to other, competing and non-Protestant states. While this was not 
uncommon among diasporic communities, who were “at once mobile and permanent, existing 
geographically across multiple points,” this knowledge did not alleviate the governors’ 
concerns.44 As birth subjects of other states, these seamen had the potential to be allied with their 
home kingdoms, a bond which could prove stronger than that of their newly adopted homes in 
Gibraltar. The threat of these trans-imperial subjects with their ties to multiple states suggested to 
the governors that their allegiance to Britain might not be genuine.45 The commanders feared that 
these foreign mariners might align themselves with foreign states and interests, plot designs 
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against the garrison, and even bring other injurious people into the town. While these situations 
may have seemed extreme to some, Gibraltar’s governors felt that such actions were not out of 
the realm of possibility. As mentioned in chapter two, commanders feared that the Catholic 
population in particular could be moved by their religious ties or by papal orders and rebel 
against the Protestant authority in the garrison. More likely, these foreign and religious 
connections, the governor believed, would result in significant commercial, financial, and 
diplomatic losses for Britain as the traders worked for the benefit of their home states. 
 To Governors Boyd and Eliott, Gibraltar’s Genoese population seemed to be the most 
likely pass offenders because of their itinerant lifestyles and many foreign connections. As John 
Brathwaite, the secretary to the governor, complained, “The greater part of the inhabitants of this 
Garrison consists of Genoese comers and goers, that is persons who come here very poor and 
when they have made a little money retire again to Genoa and are succeeded by others of their 
Family.”46 The Genoese were some of the most itinerant of Gibraltar’s inhabitants, making 
frequent and irregular trips to the Italian city-states as many had families or even second homes 
still in Genoa. This peripatetic lifestyle not only made it difficult to track their comings and 
goings, but they were also difficult to monitor even when on land in Gibraltar. As mentioned in 
chapter one, the Genoese community lived in the Catalan Bay on the eastern side of the territory, 
separated from the town by the towering rockface. Many of its members lived in makeshift or 
overcrowded housing or simply slept on the beach.47 Unlike the town residents, who lived under 
the governor’s eye in numbered houses and were largely accounted for by the patrolling troops 
                                                          
46 GGA, Naval Correspondence, Admiralty Office 1757-1773, Brathwaite to Stephens, 3 October 1766. Leslie Page 
Moch would call this circular migration in that people returned home after a certain amount of time. The Genoese 
also participated in what she titles “chain migration,” in which there were already Genoese living in Gibraltar who 
aided newcomers in finding jobs and housing in their newly adopted homes. See Moch, Moving Europeans: 
Migration in Western Europe Since 1650 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), pp. 16-17. 
47 See Edward G. Archer, Gibraltar, Identity and Empire (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 37-38. 
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and guards, the governor was often unaware of just how many Genoese inhabitants there were or 
where they could be found. Theoretically, Genoese ships could come up to the eastern beaches 
and disembark people and goods without the governor ever being aware of the situation. Because 
they did not have the same housing situation of those in town, commanders also could not keep 
an accurate or consistent count of that population, and they were rarely policed by guards. While 
many of their professions required official government-issued passes to practice, as did their 
travels off of the Rock, it was still very difficult for commanders to monitor, know, and control 
this group of inhabitants. 
 As mobile foreigners, Genoese mariners were often accused of migrating to the territory 
simply because they found the British flag to be the “safest and best to navigate with.”48 As 
Governor Boyd complained to the Genoese consul, “notwithstanding the solemn Oaths which 
Inhabitants of this place take,” he believed “there’s scarce a Vessel they navigate, whose real 
Owner does not reside at Genoa.”49 Boyd judged that these mariners could not be faithful to their 
adopted home largely because they were rarely in it, with many of them spending the majority of 
their time at sea or at their original birthplaces in Genoa. Their transience, he and others 
believed, made it impossible for them to create the necessary bonds to the community which in 
turn demonstrated their allegiance to the British state.50 Boyd saw this group’s actions as 
contrary to that of a good British subject; in his opinion, their failure to truly settle down in the 
                                                          
48 GGA, Naval Correspondence, Admiralty Office 1757-1773, Brathwaite to Stephens, 3 October 1766. As Tristan 
Stein notes in his piece on Mediterranean passes, the Genoese were notorious for moving between flags. Tristan 
Stein, “Passes and Protection in the Making of a British Mediterranean,” Journal of British Studies 54, no. 3 (2015), 
p. 616. Herzog argues that migrants to Spain were accused of having similar motivations, driven by their desire to 
trade in Spanish America. Herzog, Defining Nations, p. 107. 
49 GGA, Letters to Consuls in Genoa, Leghorn, Barcelona, Alicant & France, 1770-1797, Boyd to Collet (Genoa), 
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territory suggested that they were not willing to play the role of faithful inhabitants.51 Their 
transience, in combination with their Roman Catholic faith, their strong communal ties, and their 
physical isolation from the rest of the territory, labeled them in Boyd’s mind as false British 
subjects.52 
 Included in this group of potential pass offenders was Pasqual Scarnichia, Sr. and his two 
sons, who, Boyd maintained, were not loyal subjects.53 On one of his recent voyages, Scarnichia 
disobeyed the terms of the pass, allowing his mate to navigate the vessel back to Gibraltar while 
he “removed [himself] with all his family to Genoa.” His sons had behaved similarly by re-
settling their families in Genoa.54 The mariners’ frequent trips to the Italian city-state and their 
families’ settlement there, Boyd believed, made them especially suspect of working for foreign 
states and masters. As he informed the Genoese consul, “Surely the moment one of these 
foreigners, who have resided for their own convenience, withdraws his family, he stands under 
the same predicament that he did before he came here.” Those who “settled under the protection 
of a foreign government” had divided their loyalties and could not be trusted with the privilege 
of a Mediterranean pass. Such actions were not evidence of one’s allegiance to the British crown, 
demonstrating that their intentions were not ones of loyal citizens. As Boyd declared, “I shall no 
more consider Mr Scarnichia as a vassal of Great Britain, a subject he could never be… Nor 
should his sons, tho’ casually born in the British dominions, be permitted to navigate vessels 
                                                          
51 Herzog, Defining Nations, p. 42. 
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53 Among the holdings of miscellaneous papers from this time appears to be a list of names of Genoese mariners 
who Boyd believed were potential pass abusers – Scarnchia’s name is on this list. See GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 
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which belong to their father or any other foreigner.”55 Although Scarnichia and his sons were 
subjects formally, in Boyd’s opinion, they had lost these rights through their demonstrations of 
allegiance to another state.56 Their blood ties to Genoa, he believed, were stronger than the sons’ 
birth ties to Britain, especially in light of their father’s evident affection for his birth state.57 In 
Boyd’s mind, the Scarnichia family could not be trusted to employ the pass protection as loyal 
British subjects and thus were undeserving of the privilege. As he informed his successor, 
Governor Eliott, these men were not true subjects of the Crown and should not be granted 
Mediterranean passes in the future. Otherwise, he feared, “our Nation [will be] made somehow 
accountable, thro’ out all those countries, for all the villainous Practices of those People who 
appear on our Colours.”58  
 Boyd and other British officials identified two primary classes of “villainous” peoples 
who participated in pass abuse. These offenders were either long-standing Gibraltarians who 
stood in for foreign masters during the pass application process or by foreigners who relocated to 
the Gibraltar solely to receive a Mediterranean pass. The former were known as “Captains of the 
Colours,” men who “take fictitious Bills of Sale of Vessels, and obtain Passes in their own 
Names, in order to skreen the property of Foreigners.”59  After completing the application 
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process and receiving the pass, the “master” would be compensated accordingly and replaced by 
the true (foreign) master of the vessel to complete the voyage and collect the profits.60 For 
instance, the British consul in Malaga came upon a ship carrying a pass under the name of 
Pasqual Dodero, a longtime Geneose inhabitant of the garrison. Familiar with Dodero, the consul 
was surprised when, during his inspection of the vessel, the captain was in fact another 
unfamiliar Genoese man with a largely foreign crew.61 While this practice was seen as 
“disgracefull” by loyal Britons, it did bring about significant financial rewards.62 As James 
Angus, a British subject in Gibraltar, reported, he received large sums from a Genoese house 
who had contracted him to obtain a pass from Gibraltar and return to Genoa with his 
merchandise. Angus was given fifty dollars for his pass expenses as well as 100 Genoa livres 
each month of his travels and an additional allowance of 130 livres monthly upon his return to 
Genoa; he was also granted permission to load any of his own merchandise in the vessel without 
having to pay additional travel expenses.63 In light of the many financial and commercial 
benefits associated with being a “captain,” it is not surprising that some inhabitants were drawn 
to this illicit profession. 
The “scheming” newcomers, on the other hand, were termed vandera” or “bandera” men, 
signifying their desire to fly under the protection of the British flag. These mariners were thought 
to follow a common practice:  
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Merchants (Foreigners) having a Ship, have sent a person (whom they intend to 
make Master of her) to Gibraltar with his Family, there to reside some Time till he 
has been rekon’d an inhabitant of that place & then he returns here & procu[res] a 
Certificate (which way we can not tell) that he has a Ship lying in this port owned 
by himself or some British Merchant, with which Certificate he repairs to 
Gibraltar & of Course has procured a Pass.64 
 
Capitalizing on the lack of residency requirements mandated for pass protection, vandera men 
were seen as relocating to the garrison solely to support their claims for a pass. If their 
application was approved, meaning that they were determined to be residents and that they had 
the necessary certificates for their vessel and its owner, the mariners could sail for the next year 
under British protection. Once the pass was received, the masters were largely unmonitored, 
which allowed them to work for the most lucrative offer rather than only those supported by the 
British state. The masters were required to return to Gibraltar once a year to renew the privilege, 
but they rarely had to divulge their activities for the past twelve months and were typically 
immediately granted another pass because of their previous applications. While some vandera 
men did not want to risk the chance of losing their existing pass, these mariners continued to sail 
with their expired pass since they were rarely seized by British officials or recognized by 
corsairs. By funneling their trade into foreign hands while having the advantage of British 
protection, these vandera men were deemed a blight to the British state and its commercial 
pursuits. 
                                                          
64 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1749-1779, 1776 Papers, “Information Concerning Mediterranean Passes Given into 
General Boyd,” “Report from the Masters of English Ships Relative to Trade in the Mediterranean.” 
163 
 
As an exclusive claim available only to Britons, pass protection was something to be 
coveted. British subjects and their ships had a monopoly on free travel in the corsairs’ seas 
because Britain was the only state granted this protection privilege from the corsairs. This gave 
British mariners greater access to commercial markets, reduced financial risks, and safe passage 
for all on board. The protection granted by the passes was so significant that many European 
traders sought out British masters to assist in their commercial ventures. Several Portuguese 
merchants, for instance, hired British vessels to transport their goods with the Mediterranean, 
desiring the added security in light of their close proximity to many corsair ports.65 Although 
British masters often charged costly freight rates, most European merchants preferred to pay 
British fees instead of the high insurance rates, which did not guarantee the same protection as a 
Mediterranean pass. Goods carried by British ships were much more likely to arrive safely and in 
a timely manner, which would reduce overall costs for owners and masters.66 As a result, British 
merchants had thrived in the caravan and intra-Mediterranean trade, expanding their commercial 
influence across the region and beyond.67 
If these adopted foreign subjects in Gibraltar were given passes, the governors feared, 
there would be significant material and ideological consequences: Britain’s singular protection 
would be endangered, its interests would be compromised, and the name of Briton would be 
tarnished. In their minds, British mariners would be put out of their jobs and replaced by foreign 
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seamen and vessels, who “[take] the bread out of the Mouth of the real Subject.”68 These 
seamen, willing to work for less money and already connected with the necessary merchants and 
owners, would be preferred over the more expensive and less accessible British mariners. As 
Governor Boyd lamented, “our Mediterranean Trade, once so flourishing as to employ eight 
thousand British seamen… [would] now be brought so low, as scarcely to give employment to so 
many hundred.” Foreign vessels covered by Mediterranean passes would also “never fail of 
getting Freights,” the governor charged, while “several of our [British] Merchant Ships have lain 
in the port of Genoa unemployed.”69 In his mind, this expansion of pass protection to 
undeserving foreigners would only hurt British masters, owners, and many others employed in 
commercial professions. The profits of their work, despite their “subject” status, the governors 
feared would “never Contribute towards Supporting the King,” resulting in a significant loss of 
state income.70  Nor could their actions while sailing under the British flag be monitored, which 
in turn could result in “much injury to the Trade of Great Britain and disgrace to her Colours.”71 
Not only did the governors believe these foreign subjects posed a threat to British 
commerce, but they also feared they would endanger the state’s relations with the North African 
powers. Because these adopted subjects were not of British origin, the corsairs could not rely on 
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what scholars have termed a “sensory regime of verification.”72 The nature of the population 
made it impossible to determine one’s residency based on appearance, accent, and other visual 
and auditory cues. “Having neither the appearance nor accent of Englishmen,” one British consul 
remarked, “it is utterly impossible to distinguish them from Spaniards, French or Italians.”7374 
Physically, culturally, and linguistically different from most Britons, the Mediterranean British 
subjects were not easily identified. As a result, the corsairs could not determine simply by 
looking at the mariners on board British ships if they were indeed entitled to pass protection or if 
they could be captured as enemies of the North African states. Desiring to improve their revenue, 
it was more likely that the corsairs would actually stop more ships flying a British flag, believing 
them to be fraudulent passholders because of the appearance of and dialects spoken by those on 
board. In 1751 a Moroccan corsair fleet seized a pass-carrying Minorcan ship whose entire crew 
was comprised of non-English speakers. The corsairs argued that they believed the ship was a 
French vessel masquerading as British and they were doing their duty by stopping affronts to the 
pass system.75 Attacks such as these wreaked havoc on Anglo-Moroccan relations, resulting in 
lengthy and expensive negotiations and diplomatic missions on both sides. 
With the expansion of pass protection, the corsairs were guaranteed to lose revenue, 
which in turn would hurt their states’ financial and domestic welfare and challenge their 
economic growth and security. As historians have shown, corsairing played a central role in 
North African economies through the income gained from prizes and ransom, and it was the 
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primary means for these powers to bring in and circulate forms of hard currency.76 The resulting 
instability would then also affect their states’ relations with Britain.77 In 1752 the Alcaide of 
Tetuan complained to the British consul that his cruisers had met with so many vessels flying the 
British flag, yet “every one the Property of Foreigners, and not one English subject on board.” 
Consequently, he had ordered his captains to bring in any and all vessels suspected to be foreign. 
British subjects were to be released upon their arrival at port, but they were no longer free to 
travel the seas without the threat of capture and the resulting delays and losses.78 Although this 
dispute was later resolved, the governors believed that complications caused by these foreign 
subjects would continue, resulting in the loss of British privileges and primacy. In their minds, 
situations such as these were a direct result of this elastic conception of subjecthood which 
embraced untrustworthy Mediterranean peoples. Subjecthood, to these commanders, was not 
something that should be given freely to all those who were present, but only to proven British 
subjects or those born under the British crown.  
In Boyd’s opinion, not even all Gibraltarians who had been formally deemed subjects 
should be eligible for protection. As he complained, “I have great reasons to believe the assertion 
very true ‘That many Vessels that are Foreign properly navigate in the Mediterranean with 
passes obtained here’ on the Oaths of the Inhabitants.”79 One such suspicious family was the 
Scarnichias, but by law they were all British subjects, Pasqual Sr. by virtue of his wartime 
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service, and his sons by virtue of being born in Minorca when the territory was under British 
rule. While Eliott did challenge their initial requests for passes under his governorship, the Judge 
Advocate supported their applications because they were legal subjects.80 As a result Eliott had 
to grant them pass protection, seeing as he was “directed to give Passes in virtue of such Oaths 
and their giving security.” The Scarnichias were not the only “suspicious” people who the 
governors hesitated to grant passes to; many of Gibraltar’s foreign mariners were thought to be 
unworthy of pass protection but, under the “present rules of the Admiralty,” were deemed 
subjects and thus entitled to the privilege of pass protection.81 This expansive interpretation of 
subject, especially for these mobile bodies who were unknown and unmonitored, the governors 
believed, was a hindrance to their efforts in preventing pass abuse and preserving the good name 
of Great Britain. It also denigrated the respect given to the British subject, a title that was 
supposed to be coveted by peoples across Europe, not one that was easily obtained by simply 
residing short-term in its Mediterranean territories. In the governors’ opinions, subjecthood 
should be limited only to those who had proven themselves worthy of the title.  By reformulating 
the definition of subject in Gibraltar, they believed that they could help preserve the institution of 
subjecthood and protect the British flag. 
 
Tightening Control: The Limits of the Subject 
As the pass givers, the onus was on Gibraltar’s commanders to ensure that passes were 
issued appropriately to the territory’s mariners. They were responsible for determining who 
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should be granted or re-issued a pass and preventing fraudulent masters from receiving or 
renewing the privilege. However, this was a difficult task. Once the pass was granted, the holder 
could usually travel without any hindrances, and once their ship left port, it was not guaranteed 
to return, making it even more difficult for the governors to monitor these mariners. The 
governors’ initial attempts to prevent the abuse of pass protection involved increasing 
surveillance of the pass-carrying masters and circulating shared knowledge of the masters and 
their uses of the pass. They spearheaded efforts to improve communication surrounding 
Mediterranean passes in the region, keeping up a monthly correspondence with regional consuls 
regarding suspicious mariners. They asked their fellow officials to closely examine the pass of 
each British ship that came into port, subject any questionable master to additional questioning, 
and take up any passes that they believed were false.82 The governors also helped bring about a 
1767 mandate that made such practices law by requiring all British ships arriving in foreign ports 
to display their passes to the local consul.83 Despite these efforts to police passholders, they 
recognized that their interventions were not successful – it was just too easy for pass offenders to 
evade these additional checks and interrogations. 
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enemies. Pass recalls also frequently followed Britain’s major wars, as the dates above indicate. Passes often fell 
into foreign hands upon a vessel’s capture, and they were also granted more loosely during wartime to offer 
protection to neutral vessels and non-Britons to ensure the supply of British forces and garrisons. Also, as state’s 
boundaries and territorial holdings shifted with each war, it was necessary to ensure that people who had previously 
been eligible for passes but afterward were not, such as the American colonists after their revolution, could not 
collect such benefits. See TNA, CO 91/22, Boyd to Weymouth, 22 February 1776; also Reeves, History of the Law, 
426. GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book, “Order in Council,” 28 August 1776, fo. 27-32; TNA, CO 
91/21, Boyd to Admiralty, 25 September 1769; TNA, CO 91/22 Boyd to Weymouth, 22 February 1776; GGA, 
Letters from Consuls, Malaga 1773-1776, Marsh to Rochford, 26 June 1775, fo. 43. 
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 In order to keep from perpetuating the problem of pass abuse, Governors Boyd and Eliott 
were eager to establish a legitimate means of distinguishing between fraudulent passholders and 
those who were truly “His Majesty’s Subjects, Inhabitants of Gibraltar.”84 By doing so, they 
could limit the access and mobility of those who they deemed unworthy or suspect while 
privileging residents who they believed were worthy of membership in the British empire.85 Yet 
this was difficult to do in Gibraltar, in which the majority of the population were foreigners by 
birth and there was little legislation to determine who should and should not be made a subject. 
Because the stipulations of subjecthood were different in the colonies, and because the British 
government offered little guidance on how to fix the situation, it fell upon the governors to 
determine what subjecthood would look like in Gibraltar.86 
As mentioned previously, Gibraltar’s commanders could not rely on a “sensory regime of 
verification” to easily identify who was a true British subject. Nor could the governors rely on 
“documentary regimes of verification,” seeing as the British government had done little to clarify 
subjecthood in the territory.87 Outside of the 1722 order, the only two pieces of naturalization 
                                                          
84 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Order of the Council with Instructions for the Delivery of 
Mediterranean Passes at Gibraltar and Port Mahon,” 14 June 1722, fo. 2. 
85 This is similar to Brian Boeck’s description of the Russian state’s efforts at containment during this period in that 
the governors were also trying to encourage the useful residents to stay in the garrison while keeping the pass 
abusers out. See Brian J. Boeck, “Containment vs. Colonization: Muscovite Approaches to Settling the Steppe,” in 
Peopling the Russian Periphery: Borderland Colonization in Eurasian History, eds. Nicholas B. Breyfogle, Abby M 
Schrader, and Willard Sunderland (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 41-60. 
86 As other scholars have argued, subject status looked different throughout the colonies, often tailored to individual 
needs. The British empire was not the only imperial power in the process of reconfiguring subjecthood. As Adrian 
Carton has argued, notions of French citizenship were also in flux, moving from an idea of birth and race to one of 
residence and culture. Eric Dursteler also mentions the expansion of the “national” borders in the Ottoman Empire 
to include individuals of a variety of backgrounds. Spain and Spanish America were undergoing similar debates, 
creating distinctive categories of “naturaleza” and “vecino,” according to Tamar Herzog. (The governors’ iteration 
of “subject” was fitting of Herzog’s “vecinos” in that they were adopted citizens as .opposed to “naturalezas” who 
were more often birth-subjects.) See Adrian Carton, “Shades of Fraternity: Creolization and the Making of 
Citizenship in French India, 1790-1792,” French Historical Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Fall 2008): 581-607; Eric R. 
Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Tamar Herzog, Defining Nations. 
87 Robertson, “Passport Please,” pp. 21-22. 
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legislation that played a role in such decisions were related to foreign marines who had served 
the king for two years during wartime (1740) and foreign Protestants who served in the Royal 
American Regiment or as engineers in the American colonies (1762).88 As these acts did not 
directly apply to the majority of Gibraltar’s residents, the governors were left to their own 
devices in determining subjecthood.89 
The first step was to establish a working definition of “subject,” one that was more 
specific than that related in the 1722 order. The problem for governors with the existing pass 
language was that it juxtaposed “subject” and “inhabitant” as two necessarily related terms when 
in fact they were not so. The pronouncement applied to “His Majesty’s Subjects, Inhabitants of 
Gibraltar” while the attached oath and bond referred to “people of the Town of Gibraltar who 
now dwell in the Town and are Subjects of His Brittanick Majesty.”90 Subjecthood was 
relational, a connection between a king and his people, whereas residency had to do with place 
                                                          
88 14 Geo. II, c. 7 in John Raithby, ed., The Statutes at Large, of England and of Great-Britain: From Magna Carta 
to the Union of the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. IX. From 1 George II. A.D. 1727. – To 15 George 
II. A.D. 1742. (London: George Eyre & Andrew Strahan, 1811), pp. 661-662; 2 Geo. III, c. 25 in John Raithby, The 
Statutes at Large, of England and of Great-Britain: From Magna Carta to the Union of the Kingdoms of Great 
Britain and Ireland, Vol. XII, From 1 George III. A.D. 1760 – To 7 George III. A.D. 1767, (London: George Eyre & 
Andrew Strahan, 1811), 127-129. Carpenter seems to date this as 1773; however, the initial act was passed in 1762; 
see A. H. Carpenter, “Naturalization in England and the American Colonies,” The American Historical Review 9, 
no. 2 (1904), 294. These two statutes led many inhabitants to claim subject privileges in light of their service to the 
garrison during wartime. All inhabitants who had remained in the territory were required to swear an oath of fidelity 
and allegiance to Britain and perform all duties the commander demanded of them. This daily labor and legal 
declaration of fidelity led many inhabitants to claim subject status and left governors confused as to whether they 
were indeed eligible for such privileges. Despite the many inquiries by these governors, London ministers failed to 
offer a clear response. See GGA, Diaries 1777 & 1778-1782, 3 &4 July 1779; GGA, Naval Correspondence, 
Admiralty Office 1757-1773, Brathwaite to Stephens, 23 June 1766; TNA, CO 91/31, Eliott to Sydney, 25 June 
1784; GGA, Letters to Consuls, Genoa, Leghorn, Barcelona, Alicante & France, 1770-1797, Eliott to Collet, 23 
October 1777, fo. 31. 
89 Some of Gibraltar’s inhabitants who stayed and manned the works during the Great Siege argued that they had 
served the king during wartime and should be made subjects with the accompanying privileges. However, Governor 
Eliott refused to consider such petitions and the issue was never formally resolved. 
90 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Order of the Council,” 14 June 1722, fo. 2; GGA, 
Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Forms of an Oath to be Taken by the Masters of Ships or Vessels 
Belonging to Gibraltar,” fo. 4-5, “Bond from the Masters of Ships or Vessels, belonging to Gibraltar to the King,” 
fo. 7-8. 
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and location. Both, however, were related to allegiance: a subject pledged allegiance to his king 
and an inhabitant typically felt allegiance to his place of permanent residence. Because the 
governors could not rely on birth to determine subjecthood, they instead focused on allegiance as 
shown through residency and service. Residency was a key component of the order and had 
become important to subjecthood in other places in the empire, while military service allowed 
non-Britons to become subjects per previous statutes.91 These two elements, the commanders 
believed, best indicated a person’s devotion to the empire they so loyally protected.92 
In doing so they drew on the precedent established by imperial administrators for other 
colonies. The 1740 Plantation Act, for instance, allowed North American colonists to apply for 
naturalization so long as they had resided in the territory for at least seven years without leaving 
for longer than two months.93 A 1774 act mandated similar requirements, stipulating a seven-
year residency before the person could claim subject privileges.94 Both of these statutes 
                                                          
91 Subject status in the North American colonies depended on fixed residence, likely because the goal in those 
territories was settlement. According to the 1740 Plantation Act, inhabitants of the North American colonies could 
apply for naturalization if they resided in the territory for seven years without leaving for more than a two-month 
period. 14 Geo. II, c. 3 in John Raithby, ed., The Statutes at Large, of England and of Great-Britain: From Magna 
Carta to the Union of the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. IX. From 1 George II. A.D. 1727. – To 15 
George II. A.D. 1742. (London: George Eyre & Andrew Strahan, 1811), pp. 672-675. Many scholars have marked 
this shift from birthright to residence as occurring after the Seven Years’ War with the acquisition of Quebec and 
other French territories. However, this act demonstrates that the British government was confronted with the 
challenge of managing and including a multi-ethnic subject population long before then. See Muller, “Bonds of 
Belonging;” Brown, “Empire without Slaves,” especially pp. 281-284; P.J. Marshall, “Empire and Authority in the 
Later Eighteenth Century,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 15, no. 2 (1987): 105-122. These 
authors also typically mark that period as a critical transition period between the “First” and “Second Empire,” 
which I would argue Gibraltar also complicates. 
92 According to Herzog, the Spanish empire designated immigrants as either good or bad, favoring those who were 
willing to integrate themselves into the Spanish community and take on the duties of membership, which included 
military service, at which point they were granted certain rights accordingly. These designations of “good” and 
“bad” were constantly negotiated through daily interactions, although some were assigned to the “bad” category 
because of differences in ethnicity, race, and/or customs. See Herzog, Defining Nations, “Introduction,” especially p. 
6. 
93 14 Geo. II, c. 3 in Raithby, Statutes, Vol. IX, pp. 672-675. 
94 14 Geo. III, c. 84 in John Raithby, The Statutes at Large, of England and of Great-Britain: From Magna Carta to 
the Union of the Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. XIII, From 8 George III. A.D. 1768 – To 14 George 
III. A.D. 1774 (London: George Eyre & Andrew Strahan, 1811), p. 794. 
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expressed the importance of long-term residence, suggesting that one’s permanence and physical 
constancy served as evidence of one’s devotion.95 By establishing oneself in a territory for an 
extended period of time, an inhabitant could prove his loyalty to the crown. Such fixity was 
difficult for many of Gibraltar’s mariners, especially the Genoese, which served to further 
legitimize the governors’ decision to focus on residency. As Governor Eliott argued when 
processing Pasqual Scarnichia’s application in 1777, the mariner had to enter an additional bond 
that he and his family would return to their Gibraltar home within six months before he could 
receive the pass. Scarnichia’s resettlement in the town, Eliott argued, would “remove the doubt 
of his being a real Inhabitant of this Garrison.”96 When a mariner’s “House and Family are now 
here” and had been for years, the governor did not doubt his allegiance.97  
While the governors privileged inhabitants who had remained in the garrison for several 
years, they also supported the claims of residents who had faithfully served the crown. This too 
drew on previous imperial orders that granted naturalization rights to those who had served the 
king during times of war.98 As “vassals” of the king, Gibraltar’s mariners demonstrated their 
fidelity to the British empire through their actions, providing the garrison with provisions and 
stimulating the town’s economy.99  Boyd and Eliott both altered the pass language to include 
                                                          
95 According to Stein, British admiralty courts also focused on residency in their decisions rather than the place of 
birth. See Stein, “Passes and Protection,” p. 621. 
96 GGA, Diary 1777-1778, 15-17 June 1777; GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register No. 3, 1774-1778, Eliott to Fraser, 15 
June 1777 & 16 June 1777, fo. 247-248. 
97 GGA, Letters to Consuls, Malaga & Carthagena 1769-1797, Boyd to James Marsh, 20 January 1774, fo. 16. 
Initially, Boyd was supportive of Scarnichia; when questioned by a regional consul, he informed the official that he 
had granted the pass willingly in light of his service and residence. 
98 14 Geo. II, c. 7 in Raithby, Statutes Vol. IX, pp. 661-662. 
99 GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register 1779-1786, Eliott to Morrison, 14 January 1785. A vassal is “a humble servant or 
subordinate; one devoted to the service of another” ("vassal, n. and adj." OED Online, June 2014, Oxford University 
Press). A subject, on the other hand, is “a person owing allegiance to and under the protection of a monarch or 
government” ("subject, n." OED Online, June 2014, Oxford University Press).  
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these considerations, permitting “those Men who have been usually employed in Navigating the 
Vessels of this place” as well as “seamen solely attached to and employed in the service of this 
Garrison.”100 These mariner’s faithfulness in helping meet the needs of the garrison convinced 
the governors of their loyalty to Britain. For the commanders, such constancy and fidelity to 
Gibraltar, a site of great imperial importance, demonstrated that they deserved the privileges of 
British subjecthood. 
 By establishing residency and service as the two pillars of subject status in Gibraltar, the 
governors created a population in the community that they believed were worthy of the title of 
British subject. However, they then had to tie this group to the institution of Mediterranean 
passes in order to legitimate their logic behind creating these distinctions within the community. 
They did so by instituting a formal process of examining and confirming such claims through 
Mediterranean pass petitions. In January 1785 Governor Eliott ordered that all pass applications 
would now be referred to a committee comprised of the Judge Surrogate of the Vice Admiralty 
Court and two or three of “the principal Inhabitants His Majesty’s Subjects concern’d in Trade.” 
This committee was responsible for investigating the petitioner’s documentation to ensure he met 
the necessary pass requirements. Representing both the authority of the British government and 
the voice of the civil sphere, the members could provide “the most authentic information” in 
such matters.101 They would then send their report to the governor, who made the final decision 
based on their recommendation.102 
                                                          
100 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, Boyd to Stephens, 4 August 1769, fo. 3-4; TNA, CO 91/16, 
Boyd to Stephens, 14 August 1769; GGA, Civil Secretary’s Register 1779-1786, Eliott to Morrison, 14 January 
1785. 
101 The Judge Surrogate was responsible for informing all legal decisions in the garrison in the name of the king. 
Being the only other imperially appointed post, his authority was second to the governor’s in the territory. 
102 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Orders to Consuls,” fo. 24-26. 
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 Previously, the governor made all pass decisions on his own, recording select information 
into the pass register log. This included the pass number, the pass cut, the date, the quality of the 
vessel and its name, where the vessel was from, the master’s name, the number of men on board, 
the number of guns, and the vessel’s tonnage. The list of passes also occasionally included the 
purpose of the voyage, the destination port, and the duration of the trip.103 These registers were 
mandated by the Lords of the Admiralty and were required to be sent back to them in London 
several times a year.104 While these records did offer governors a means to be able to define and 
track their maritime population, creating a concrete field of data that could be used to quantify, 
calculate, and survey these peoples, they did not offer the sophistication of Eliott’s pass 
application regime, which followed the applicant from the start of the process to its completion. 
With Eliott’s new formulation he was able to gather a greater amount of knowledge on the 
passholders and compile a more extensive archive of records. 
Eliott’s design enabled governors to feel secure that all pass applications had been 
thoroughly considered and only those mariners who had demonstrated their loyalty received the 
privileges of British subjecthood. His reforms of the pass applications resulted in a lengthy, well-
documented, standardized process which lent an air of authority to the system. Petitioners had to 
provide ample evidence for the application as the committee’s thorough investigation would 
allow them to suss out any “specious and ill founded claims.”105 Each step was recorded, 
creating an archive of requests and their outcomes which could be used for future applications. 
While this “paperwork” was thought to help ensure administrative accountability, it also enabled 
                                                          
103 See GGA, Admiralty 1 & Admiralty 2. 
104 This did not always happen in practice. Governor Sabine in the 1730s, for instance, frequently received scathing 
letters from the Admiralty for his failure to submit the proper documentation. See TNA, ADM 1/1319, fo. 350-351, 
370-372; TNA, ADM 1/1320, fo. 51, 68-70, 101, 178-179, 203, 244-245, 250.  
105 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Orders to Consuls,” fo. 24-26. 
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the governors to better track their subjects.106 Because the process required evidence of residency 
and service, these documents could be useful to the governors in questions of property sales, land 
grants, civil cases, or other legal situations.107 It also gave the governor a better sense of control 
over his population, making them more legible and easier to monitor.108  
This system, along with the other tools of pass surveillance, provided commanders with 
oversight of pass applications while also legitimating the granting process. The new regulations 
helped governors to refute claims of pass abuse caused by overly lenient commanders, especially 
since the application process employed a procedure similar to that used by the Civil Court and 
British consuls abroad in determining commercial disputes.109 For instance, when asked by the 
Lords of the Treasury why an inhabitant, Anthony Romagio, had been granted a pass, Governor 
Boyd informed them that the man’s application had been thoroughly considered, providing five 
additional enclosures demonstrating the process. These documents included the owner’s 
application for a pass as well as his oath and additional testimony, the minute of passes issued to 
Romagio as a master, and the judge’s certificate and reasoning behind why the pass should be 
granted. In addition, Boyd noted that Romagio “has been an inhabitant of this place many years, 
and navigated the Town vessels.” In light of his service and residency, Boyd believed him 
worthy of subject status. Seeing as “The term of residence which intitles inhabitants to the 
privilege of subjects, seems not to be well understood,” since it was not “defin’d by legal 
authority,” Boyd explained that in light of such considerations he and his committee felt the man 
                                                          
106 Kafka, Demon of Writing, p. 21. 
107 Fahrmeir, Citizens and Aliens, p. 100. As Fahrmeir argues, this allowed the government to further discriminate 
resident aliens and privilege its citizens. 
108 For similar efforts by Gibraltar’s governors, see chapter 2. Scott, Seeing Like a State, pp. 1-2. 
109 GGA, Mediterranean Passes, Admiralty Book 1, “Orders to Consuls,” fo. 24-26. 
176 
 
was deserving of such privileges.110 Because of the process was based on legal precedent and 
existing conceptions of subjecthood, the governor felt comfortable invoking his authority in 
making these decisions.  
Boyd’s response to the Treasury revealed that the governors had instituted a rigorous 
legal application process for Mediterranean passes, seeking to settle such problems at their 
source. As Romagio’s case demonstrates, the master had to prove through written and oral 
testimonies as well as garrison service and long-term residence that he was worthy of such an 
honor. Having lived for more than thirty years in Gibraltar, during which he dutifully supplied 
the garrison with provisions from across the region, Romagio seemed to meet British 
requirements of subjecthood. He, unlike the Scarnichias, seemed to the governor to be unlikely 
to sully the British name or flag. Even though his actions would be unmonitored as he traveled 
across the seas, the governor trusted that he would use this freedom of mobility appropriately, 
rather than becoming involved in illicit foreign trades. Having been thoroughly analyzed by a 
series of judges, Boyd felt secure that Romagio and his other passholders would not betray 
British interests. These particular mobile bodies were well-monitored and well-known, giving 
Boyd a sense of control over the mariners and their pursuits. The new pass application system 
enabled Boyd and future governors to feel confident about those granted such freedoms and the 
preservation of British honor. Subjecthood and the mobility it entailed, he believed, had been 
restored only to the deserving, returning to its proper role as a privilege rather than a right. 
 
 
 
                                                          
110 GGA, Governor’s Letter Books, 1791-1793, Boyd to Charles Long, 6 October 1791 fo. 125-126. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter argues the practice of Mediterranean passes in Gibraltar resulted in a 
constant negotiation of subjecthood in the territory. While the British government in 1722 was 
eager to embrace all of its productive Mediterranean peoples, in particular its foreign-born, 
maritime adopted subjects, this desire had unintentional consequences. As Gibraltar’s governors 
repeatedly expressed, this population, especially once given the freedom of mobility and the 
privilege of protection inherent in this grant of subjecthood, was not easily governed or readily 
trusted. They feared that the disloyalty of these mariners, who they believed were apt to work for 
foreign interests, would betray the allegiance inherent in the title of subject. The regulations put 
in place by the 1722 Order in Council, they argued, were counterproductive to fostering British 
trade and promoting British diplomacy in the region. As a result, Governors Boyd and Eliott 
sought to clamp down on opportunities for pass abuse by restricting and defining who could be 
considered a valid subject of Britain. In doing so, they created a system of pass reforms and 
legislation that required all applicants to undergo a lengthy process of investigation and approval. 
All steps of the process were closely documented, offering a concrete archive to which they 
could refer in the future for pass renewals or other civil matters. This archive not only served to 
legitimate their decision-making process, but it also provided a means to better track these often 
unmonitored subjects. This series of legal hoops that they imposed on hopeful masters, they 
believed, enabled them to better determine who was worthy of the privileges of protection and 
mobility, and who could truly be considered part of the garrison and imperial community.  
Governor Eliott and Boyd’s pass regime offered them an opportunity to intervene in the 
problem of Gibraltar’s mariners and Mediterranean pass protection. The deliberation over who 
could receive a pass enabled the governors to feel as if they had control over deciding who was a 
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viable recipient of the title of British subject. Through this process, the governors imagined that 
they could exclude the frauds and imposters, as well as the mariners who would not support the 
territory or Britain. In essence, this system, or so they believed, enabled them to better control 
the mobile Mediterranean body and secure the territory as British. By “improving” the pass 
system and establishing a formal means of determining subjecthood, Gibraltar’s governors 
sought to categorize their mariners as either productive subjects or “scheming” foreigners, 
privileging the former and punishing the latter through the gift of pass protection. Such an 
approach, they believed, would enable them to better execute their power over the territory and 
its peoples and promote its use for the success of Great Britain. 
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Figure 4.1: Mediterranean Pass for Henry Hitchcock’s Ship Neptune Snow  
(TNA, ADM 5117/8) 
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Figure 4.2: Mediterranean Pass for Henry Buese’s Ship Prince George Brigantine  
(TNA, ADM 5117/8) 
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Chapter 5 
“Military Tyranny” & “Outrageous Peyneists”: Revolutionary Rhetoric and the Crisis of 
Governmentality in Gibraltar (1792-1793) 
The early 1790s was a time of unease for leaders across the globe, but especially those in 
the Mediterranean, as unrest pervaded the region. Revolutions and civil war plagued several 
nearby states, including France and North Africa, as well as others further abroad, such as Saint 
Domingue. As David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam have argued, these revolts had 
“global or at least pan-regional repercussion and receptions.”1 War appeared to be on the horizon 
between France and the rest of Europe; as French radicals pledged their support to others willing 
to rise up against their governments; their neighbors, concerned about the incursion of such ideas 
and violence into their own states, made alliances against the revolutionaries.2 The surrounding 
states not only had to fear French swords, but also French tongues and pens as news of the 
revolution and its philosophies spread throughout Europe. Many neighboring monarchs feared 
that the French Revolution would be “a Forerunner to other Revolutions in Europe,” spreading 
the new radical political ideas like a “Contagion.”3 The debates between counterrevolutionaries 
and those in support of the changes in France raged throughout Europe and beyond, creating a 
discourse and language that defined this period.4 Gibraltar was no exception – it too was 
                                                          
1 David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Introduction: The Age of Revolutions, c. 1760-1840 – Global 
Causation, Connection, and Comparison,” in The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840, ed. David 
Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. xxix. 
2 The Declaration of Pillnitz, issued on August 27, 1791, stated that Austria would go to war against France if all the 
other major European states declared war on the French. While this was meant primarily to appease French émigrés 
and pledge Prussia and the Holy Roman Empire’s support for the French king, the National Assembly interpreted 
this as a direct threat upon the French revolutionaries, leading many to urge a formal declaration of war. In 
November 1792, the French revolutionary government issued the Edict of Fraternity offering military support to 
other radical groups seeking to follow in France’s footsteps. 
3 Paine quoted in David Duff, “Burke and Paine: Contrasts,” in The Cambridge Companion to British Literature of 
the French Revolution in the 1790s, ed. Pamela Clemit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 48. 
4 See Duff, “Burke and Paine,” p. 47. 
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intricately woven into the global revolutionary narrative, contending with unrest from within and 
the threat of revolution from without. This chapter argues that Gibraltar’s British merchants 
capitalized on the revolutionary fervor to pit the claims of commerce against the practices of 
governance and authority of the governor. In doing so, they made Gibraltar itself a potential 
security threat to the British empire as a whole. 
 Located at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, those in Gibraltar were privy to much of 
the news, and the anxiety, of the surrounding revolutions. For Governor Boyd, this unrest abroad 
posed a serious threat to “the Security of the Fortress” he had been charged with defending. 
Boyd recognized the power of the revolutionary ideas and violence circulating throughout 
Europe during this time and sought to protect the garrison from its incursion. This meant not 
only readying the troops and strengthening its fortification, but also securing the town and its 
inhabitants. Gibraltar served as a stopping ground, or even a place of exile, for many visitors 
from the turbulent states.5 Most residents had contacts throughout the region, keeping them well-
informed about the developments outside of the garrison, and travelers with personal stories and 
news from abroad passed through the port regularly.6 Between these personal narratives, in 
                                                          
5 After France declared war on Great Britain in 1793, French prisoners of war flooded Gibraltar in an effort to 
escape the reign of terror. The siege of Toulon in 1793 was particularly important to the garrison as many of its 
refugees fled from that city to Gibraltar until they could be moved to Britain. The delay in Gibraltar was often quite 
lengthy, lasting years for some refugees. Even prior to the outbreak of war, many French citizens and state officials 
frequently passed through the territory, including the Comte de Chalons and Consul du Rocher on his way to 
Morocco in 1792. See GGA, Diaries 1789-1792, 1792-1794; GGA, Miscellaneous Papers 1791-1794, 1793 Papers; 
GGA, Governor to Secretary of State, 1791-1794; TNA, CO 91/37, “Gibraltar, Original Correspondence,” 1 
December 1793 – 31 December 1795; TNA, CO 92/3, “Gibraltar, Entry Books, Correspondence,” 28 August 1794 – 
18 March 1810; TNA, FO 353/72, “Diplomatic Papers (F.J. Fackson),” 1 June 1792 – 30 June 1795; TNA, FO 
174/3, “Foreign and Commonwealth Office… General Correspondence from Gibraltar,” 1790-1798; TNA, WO 
1/288, Rainsford to Dundas, 3 November 1794, fo. 74-75, Horse Guards to O’Hara, 8 October 1795, fo. 131-133; 
BL, Add MS 23660,”Rainsford Papers… Letters Relative to Gibraltar, 1793-1795;” BL, Add MS 23661, “Rainsford 
Papers, Journal of Public Transactions at Gibraltar, 1793-1796;” BL, Add MS 23666, “Rainsford Papers, 
Miscellaneous Relating to Gibraltar, 1762-1796.” 
6 According to the 1791 census, at least 63 of the garrison’s inhabitants were from Savoy, which was occupied by 
French forces from 1792 through 1815. More than a dozen residents were from France, including at least four men 
who had moved to the garrison in 1789 or later.  See GGA, 1777 & 1791 Lists of Inhabitants, 1791 List of 
Inhabitants. 
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addition to outside correspondence and newspapers, especially those from Britain, Gibraltar’s 
inhabitants were likely quite aware of the events abroad.7 To Boyd, this spread of knowledge 
was not reassuring, especially in light of Gibraltar’s many foreign residents, who continually 
posed a threat to the garrison. If his inhabitants were to catch on to the revolutionary fervor, they 
could challenge his authority and endanger the safety of the territory. In his mind, the garrison 
was in a state of emergency, vulnerable to encroaching violence and the spreading radical ideas, 
and it needed to be secured however necessary.8 As Boyd informed the residents, “they are 
inhabitants of a place of war,” and as such they were required to comply with all rules and orders 
that are thought necessary by the Commander in Chief.”9 And as the head of “a garrison, the 
situation of which is eminently critical, as the possession of it is important,” the governor 
believed it was his duty to use his powers to keep it from harm.10 At this time and in this place, 
Boyd believed that the security of the garrison depended on the close policing of all his 
inhabitants.11 
                                                          
7 It is difficult to determine exactly how those in Gibraltar learned about outside events as few letters were kept 
outside of those sent to the governor. While there is mention of clippings from London newspapers in some of the 
officers’ correspondence with their families in Britain, these records have not survived, nor is there anything to 
indicate if or how frequently inhabitants would have received British periodicals. The Gibraltar Chronicle, the local 
newspaper did not begin until 1801, and the Gibraltar Garrison Library was not founded until 1793 with 
construction ending in 1804. However, based on mentions in existing records, it does appear that in general residents 
were fairly knowledgeable about events in Britain. 
8 As Nasser Hussain notes, “Emergency is an elastic category, stretching over political disturbances such as riots, the 
situation of a sovereign war, and even constitutional crises within the sphere of the state.” In such a state, authorities 
often instituted “emergency powers,” which included martial rule, the delegation of legislative powers to the 
executive, and significant interventions in individual liberties. See Hussain, The Jurisprudence of Emergency: 
Colonialism and the Rule of Law (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 17-18. 
9 TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 23 July 1792. 
10 TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 27 September 1792. 
11 As Gilroy argues, in the colonial setting there was often a “distinctive association of governance with military 
power and martial law. Quoted in Renisa Mawani, Colonial Proximities: Crossracial Encounters and Juridical 
Truths in British Columbia, 1871-1921 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009), p. 18. 
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 However, Gibraltar’s inhabitants did not see the situation as such; instead of fearing war, 
many sought to profit from the resulting commercial instability. For the town’s merchants, 
especially the British traders, the unrest in France offered a prime opportunity for their 
commerce to “branch out to all Parts of the World, & be made essentially useful to the British 
Trade, and Manufactures.”12 This was not a possibility unless the merchants were allowed the 
freedom to trade without limits, which under the governor’s current rule was not likely. Boyd’s 
efforts to protect the territory, and in particular to control the civil sphere, posed a significant 
stumbling block to the residents’ commercial dreams. In February 1792, these dissenting views 
lead to a territory-wide conflict between the governor and the merchants. Boyd had issued two 
additional regulations on Gibraltar’s residents, forbidding unauthorized travel at night and 
mounted rides through town, which the merchants found unnecessarily repressive.  While the 
governor maintained that his commands were “prescribed by necessity” to keep the inhabitants 
from harm, British residents disagreed, engaging in their own way with governmentality.13 By 
petitioning the governor to retract these mandates and allow them the liberties provided by 
British rule, the British merchants participated in and offered a critique of Bland’s practices.14 As 
Boyd refused to reconsider his decisions, the British merchants continued to issue petitions of 
complaint to Boyd while encouraging other residents to disobey the governor’s commands. In 
                                                          
12 TNA, CO 91/36, John Turnbull, George War, James Anderson Sr., and James Sutton to Dundas, 29 September 
1792. The leading commercial inhabitants were primarily British as the governor and other administrators 
encouraged British migration by privileging British merchants over foreigners. As a result, most of the civilian 
Britons in Gibraltar were involved in its commercial sphere, typically managing trading companies, some of which 
were outposts of London-based traders. This meant that the British residents often had ties to leading merchants and 
companies in London, giving them a voice to government ministers and the Crown. 
13 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 3 April 1792, and TNA, CO 91/36, 
Chronology by Boyd. 
14 Mehmet Safa Saracoglu, “Letters from Vindin: A Study of Ottoman Governmentality and Politics of Local 
Administration, 1864-1877,” (PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, 2007), pp. 248-249. As he notes, 
referring to Giddens, the merchants experienced a “dialect of control” and they chose to directly intervene in the 
state of affairs of the town. 
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response, the governor vested his troops with the authority to enforce his regulations and sought 
to prosecute the merchants for their accusations and actions. By March the territory was in a state 
of unrest, plagued by physical and rhetorical violence. Although the parties differed on their 
opinions of the situation initially, now both were likely to agree that Gibraltar was indeed 
unstable and in a state of crisis. 
 As the merchants and the governor exhausted their options to resolve the dispute within 
the territory, both parties reached out to their colleagues in Britain for help. Gibraltar’s 
merchants wrote to their trading partners in London, begging them to petition Parliament and 
present the governor’s oppressive restrictions. The British traders accused Boyd of being an 
authoritarian, despotic governor and having jeopardized British laws and liberties. Boyd’s orders, 
they argued, were “entirely calculated to destroy the grand Foundation and Pillar of their happy 
Constitution” by “erect[ing] a Military Tyranny in [its] stead.”15 I argue that the merchants drew 
from a number of British traditions, echoing popular sentiments on the superiority of British law 
and liberty, the problems of a standing army, the fears of soldiers, and the preservation of 
commerce and the civil sphere.16 This language was concentrated in the London petitions by 
focusing on the violence and tyranny that plagued the town. Such depictions, I maintain, aligned 
closely with the descriptions provided by British travelers about life in France under the 
revolutionary government. Drawing on contemporary concerns, the petitioners sought to create a 
convincing argument against Boyd’s regulations.  
                                                          
15 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 8 March 1792. 
16 This discussion of liberty can be traced back beyond the revolutionary period, but it was a rallying cry for the 
American revolutionaries as well as others in colonies against governors whom they believed were abusing their 
rights. See Hussain, Jurisprudence of Emergency; Robert Travers, “Contested Despotism: Problems of Liberty in 
British India,” in Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas 1600-1900, ed. Jack P. Greene (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009); James Epstein, Scandal of Colonial Rule: Power and Subversion in the British 
Atlantic during the Age of Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
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Boyd, on the other hand, wrote directly to the Secretary of State, both to represent his 
position and defend himself against the merchants’ accusations. He also employed the circulating 
rhetoric but in a more explicit manner, denouncing the petitioners as “outrageous Peyneists” who 
sought to “weaken the authority of a Commander in Chief.” Echoing the complaints of many 
counterrevolutionaries, Boyd argued that the merchants had “a violent spirit of opposition to a 
Governors authority” and were willing to topple years of careful rule, compromising the security 
of the garrison, for the sake of their own pursuits of “liberty.”17 Throughout his letters, I contend 
that the governor framed himself as a steadfast British authority eager to support the king against 
any possible rebellion or threat thereof. Boyd maintained that he had established such measures 
in an effort to best protect the garrison; his initial regulations were implemented for the 
inhabitants’ physical safety and his response to their protests was necessary to prevent unrest. As 
Boyd hoped his superiors would understand, Gibraltar had been poised for crisis and he was 
simply doing his duty, employing the full scope of his powers to protect the territory.  
This chapter demonstrates the porousness of revolutionary ideas and rhetoric in late 
eighteenth-century Gibraltar. While other scholars have shown the role of the Revolution in 
places across the globe, including in the British Empire, its effects in Gibraltar have not been 
discussed.18 I demonstrate how in their letters to Britain both Boyd and the merchants drew on 
language from the revolution and its commentators, employing ideas from Burke and Paine, 
among others, and choosing sides in the battle. By embracing contemporary revolutionary 
                                                          
17 TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 23 July 1792. 
18 As presented by Epstein, Governor Picton in Trinidad was in a similar situation as Boyd, surrounding by 
revolutionary states and fearful of threatening peoples and ideas taking hold of his colony. He, like Boyd, was also 
trapped in a scandal with his British settlers, who also claimed deprivation of their liberties under the authoritarian 
governor. See Epstein, Scandal of Colonial Rule, chapters 3 and 4. For discussions of the effects of the Revolution 
abroad, see Armitage & Subrahayam, The Age of Revolutions; Rachel Hope Cleves, “’Jacobins in this Country’: The 
United States, Great Britain, and Trans-Atlantic Anti-Jacobinism,” Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal 8, 2 (Spring 2010): 410-445. 
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rhetoric, Boyd and the merchants demonstrated the spread as well as the pervasiveness of these 
authors, even in the small territory of Gibraltar. The publication of Edmund Burke’s Reflections 
on the Revolutions in France (1790) and subsequently Thomas Paine’s The Rights of Man (1791 
& 1792) had a significant influence on Britain at the time. These two treatises circulated rapidly 
after their initial printing; in the first two months of publication, Burke’s pamphlet had been 
printed ten times, totaling at least 17,500 copies produced in Britain alone and by 1793, there 
were a quarter of a million of Paine’s pamphlets in circulation.19 As David Duff has argued, 
Burke and Paine profoundly shaped individuals’ language, ideas, and experience of this period, 
influencing British culture as a whole. Many Britons divided themselves as either supporters of 
Burke or Paine, embracing the perspective and vocabulary of one writer or the other and creating 
a British binary between two different political views.20  
It appears that both the merchants and Boyd recognized the importance of this debate in 
contemporary Britain as shown through their use of (counter)revolutionary language in their 
communications with the metropole. While the Gibraltarian merchants’ language drew primarily 
on classic British ideology surrounding liberty and law, I argue that Boyd took advantage of the 
government’s stance on radical authors, portraying the merchants as Gibraltarian 
revolutionaries.21 By defining his opponents as supporters of Paine, a man who was currently on 
                                                          
19 I have not be able to find numbers for equivalent numbers for Burke over a longer span of time, but his French 
version was also printed ten times within the first six months. Both Burke’s Reflections and each part of Paine’s 
Rights of Man cost three shillings; in Paine’s case this was due to the efforts of the London Corresponding Society 
and the Society for Constitutional Information that sought to make Paine’s works more accessible for the public. See 
F. P. Lock, Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 132; Jon Mee, 
“Popular Radical Culture,” in The Cambridge Companion to British Literature of the French Revolution in the 
1790s, ed. Pamela Clemit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 118; Kathryn Sutherland, 
‘”Events…have made us a world of readers”: Reader Relations 1780-1830,” in The Penguin History of Literature, 
Vol. V: The Romantic Period (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), p. 19. 
20 David Duff, “Burke and Paine: Contrasts,” in The Cambridge Companion to British Literature of the French 
Revolution in the 1790s, ed. Pamela Clemit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 47-48. 
21 As H. C. Dickinson notes, Britons took pride in their historic liberties and constitution and often contrasted their 
benefits to the political disadvantages of their continental neighbors, especially the French with their absolute 
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the wrong side of the law, the governor established himself as the representative and proponent 
of the British monarchy in the region. The merchants, on the other hand, were easily marked as 
revolutionaries, challenging the governor’s authority through their petitions and physically 
defying his orders. Boyd’s rhetorical defense through his focused language and application of 
contemporary fears was in many ways the most effective justification of his actions. At a time 
when liberties were relegated in favor of securing authority, any possible radical rhetoric, 
regardless of historical appeals to British law, needed to be contained. As Lynn Hunt has argued, 
and eighteenth-century British leaders agreed, “ideas are never just ideas; they are cultural 
constructs that call forth actions.”22 In this time of emergency, as revolts sparked across the 
globe, no British authority wanted to provoke the “first spark” that would ignite a “blaze” in their 
territories.23 Any and all potentially radical bodies needed to be controlled and contained at all 
costs. As a result, I contend, authoritarian governors, the policing of inhabitants, and the 
restriction of liberties were deemed less harmful, especially in the colonial settings, than the 
freedoms of peoples who could possibly undermine British security.24 
 
                                                          
monarchy. Jack P. Greene echoes this sentiment, noting that “Britons, in the far peripheries as well as at the centre 
of the British Empire, still regarded liberty as the essence of Britishness.” See H. T. Dickinson, “Introduction: 
Impact on Britain,” in Britain and the French Revolution 1789-1815, ed. H. C. Dickinson (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1989), p. 10; Jack P. Greene, “Empire and Identity from the Glorious Revolution to the American 
Revolution,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume II: The Eighteenth Century, ed. P. J. Marshall, 
Alaine Low, and William Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 228. See also H. T. Dickinson, 
“Popular Conservatism and Militant Loyalism,” in Britain and the French Revolution 1789-1815, ed. H. T. 
Dickinson (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989); P. J. Marshall, “Britain without America,” in The Oxford History 
of the British Empire: Volume II: The Eighteenth Century, ed. P. J. Marshall, Alaine Low, and William Roger Louis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); H. T. Dickinson, Liberty and Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth-
Century Britain (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977). 
22 Lynn Hunt, “The French Revolution in Global Context,” in The Age of Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-
1840, ed. by David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 31. 
23 Epstein, Scandal of Colonial Rule, 225. See also Hussein, The Jurisprudence of Emergency. 
24 See Hussain, Jurisprudence of Emergency, 76-78. See also Robert Travers, “Contested Despotism.” 
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Mobilizing for War: Boyd in Gibraltar, 1791 
As states across the region mobilized for war and tried to fend off revolutionary fervor, 
upon his return to the garrison in 1791 Governor Robert Boyd sought to secure Gibraltar against 
all internal and external threats.25 The situation in France posed a great concern to the governor 
who was called to the post for a second time in order to replace the previous commander, Major 
General Charles O’Hara who had returned to active duty to prepare British forces against a 
possible French threat. By 1791 it seemed likely that war was in Europe’s future. In June 1791 
Louis XVI tried to flee Paris and escape to Varennes; however, his efforts were unsuccessful and 
he was forced to return to the capital. His failed flight marked the a shift in French radical 
interest towards a republic, as opposed to the planned constitutional monarchy, as well as a shift 
in perceptions among the European powers towards the revolution. At this point the other 
monarchs recognized the king was essentially powerless, yet French émigrés urged their new 
home states to act against the revolutionary government.  As a result, in August the kings of 
Austria and Prussia signed a pact that they would declare war against France so long as the other 
European states joined their efforts. This Declaration of Pillnitz signaled the potential for war 
among the European powers against the new French state and also marked an increase in French 
emigration, especially among the nobles and officer classes.26 
                                                          
25 This was Governor Boyd’s second service as governor of Gibraltar. He had been appointed lieutenant governor in 
1768 and governor in 1773. He left that position in 1777, but returned to defend the garrison as a major general 
during the Great Siege in 1779 to 1782. His second term as governor was from January 1791 until his death in the 
garrison in May 1794. Stuart Handley, “Boyd, Sir Robert,” in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, ed. H. C. 
G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
26 See Sylvia Neely, A Concise History of the French Revolution (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2008), pp. 129-131. 
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Meanwhile, the internal strife in North Africa also posed problems for the garrison, 
disrupting trade and limiting Gibraltar’s provisions.27 As a result, the governor had to reach out 
to his Spanish neighbors to meet the garrison’s needs for food and supplies. However, tensions 
were high between Britain and Spain due to disputes in the Pacific Northwest territories. In 
addition, Spain had recently placed ships sailing from Gibraltar under perpetual quarantine, 
despite the absence of disease.28 There had been a number of complaints about smugglers 
traveling across the border from Gibraltar, carrying tobacco and alcohol for reduced prices.29 
Smuggling had long been an issue between the two territories, and in light of the larger Anglo-
Spanish hostilities, Governor Boyd was concerned about Spanish retribution. In response to these 
threats, Boyd mobilized his troops and sought to strengthen the garrison’s works, especially 
along the border with Spain. He requested additional funds from the government in London to 
build a new bastion and improve the crumbling fortifications, many of which had not been 
repaired after the Great Siege a decade prior.30 Having participated in Gibraltar’s most recent 
siege, Boyd recognized the importance of a strong garrison to counter Spanish and French 
threats. As hostilities grew abroad, the governor readied his defenses to secure the territory 
against the pressing danger of war and revolution. 
                                                          
27 Morocco’s wars fill many of Gibraltar’s colonial files as a primary concern, even more than events on the 
continent in many cases. See TNA, CO 91/36 and 91/37 for details of this particular instability. 
28 See chapter three for a greater explanation of quarantine and its use in political and diplomatic disputes. 
29 One such incident surrounding the importation of tobacco to Gibraltar occurred in 1791 and reappeared in October 
1792, involving many of the same merchants implicated in the petition dispute discussed below. See TNA, CO 
91/36, Turnbull to Boyd, 31 March 1789, 24 September 1792, 25 September 1792, 26 September 1792, Boyd to 
Dundas, 8 October 1792. 
30 There are several letters and mentions of the need for funds to repair the works throughout the volume covering 
this time period. For instance, see TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 11 October 1792 and Dundas to Boyd, 21 
November 1792. 
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 Alongside his military efforts, Boyd also sought to secure the town and its residents in 
the face of conflict. The republican ideas espoused in France posed a threat to neighboring 
leaders whose authority was not based on the “rights of man” but on ancient laws and traditions 
or the support of an unelected monarch. With the growth of French revolutionary fervor in the 
years following 1789, the surrounding states feared the incursion of such “contagious” ideas, 
seeking the means to prevent their spread. Some states, such as Spain, established a cordon 
sanitaire in an effort to restrain French ideological influence, whereas others, like Sweden and 
Russia, employed elaborate censorship and policing efforts to restrict any escalation in radical 
movements.31  
Like these governments, Boyd was also eager to prevent the spread of revolutionary 
fervor from affecting Gibraltar. One of the best ways to do so was limit the number of non-
British immigrants to the territory. In states throughout the region, French émigrés were regarded 
with suspicion and treated with caution, if they were even permitted residence. Many states 
placed limits on the number of émigrés allowed, and upon their arrival they were closely 
monitored to ensure they would not propagate revolutionary ideas.32 In Gibraltar, where the 
civilian population had reached approximately 3,000 inhabitants, the majority of whom were 
foreigners, it was especially important for the governor to limit the influx of additional residents. 
The current population was already rather large for the military fortress in which space and 
housing were limited and likely to become even more scarce as Boyd expected a greater influx of 
soldiers. Additionally, the governor’s responsibilities were considerable, especially in light of his 
                                                          
31 See Colin Jones, The Longman Companion to the French Revolution (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 15; 
William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 172. 
32 Maya Jasanoff, “Revolutionary Exiles: The American Loyalist and French Émigré Diasporas,” in The Age of 
Revolutions in Global Context, c. 1760-1840, edited by David Armitage & Sanjay Subrahmanyam (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 48. 
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work in the garrison, and he had little time to attend to his existing civil responsibilities. Extra 
hassles, such as troublesome residents, needed to be avoided at all costs.33 
In an effort to halt the flood of foreigners and manage the civil sphere, the governor 
issued the Alien Act of 1791.34 This order declared that that “no person can possess a right to 
enter and reside in Gibraltar, even though a natural born subject of the Crown without permission 
of the Governor of the Fortress.”35 Not only did this act enable Boyd to reject new immigrants, 
but it also allowed him to expel all current residents who could pose a threat to the territory or 
were a point of concern for the governor. This included the many troublesome, clandestine 
“house breakers & other Vagrants” residing in the territory who participated in various illegal 
activities.36 Surprisingly British citizens were not exempt from the governor’s decree, despite 
their other privileges in the territory.37 Under the Alien Act, Boyd was able to better control the 
inhabitants and direct the growth of the civil sphere in the territory. In essence, this order was a 
civil equivalent of the governor’s military efforts: it provided a barrier from unsavory characters, 
it insulated Gibraltar from outside forces and peoples, and it secured the town and garrison from 
threats. The act also served to reassert Boyd’s power over the territory and its inhabitants, 
                                                          
33 Governors often blamed the inhabitants for the soldiers’ misdeeds, either by providing them with illegal or 
excessive liquor or for paying the troops to work for them instead of doing their military duties. See CO 91/62, “An 
Account of General Bland’s Conduct,” fo. 81-82. 
34 These efforts were only successful until France declared war on Britain, at which point a number of French 
émigrés fled to British territories with the support of the British government. Throughout many of the war years, 
especially after the Siege of Toulon from September to December 1793, French émigrés flooded Gibraltar, creating 
many problems for the governors. See TNA, CO 91/37-40. For more information on alien acts, see chapter 2. 
35 GGA, The Alien Question. A History of the Permit System, 1704-1871. Draft Report May, 1871, “Memorandum 
on the Right of Residence in Gibraltar,” fo. 1. 
36 TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 27 September 1792. Smuggling was a significant problem during this period 
and it soured diplomatic relations between Gibraltar and Spain, leading several governors to implement measures to 
combat this illegal trade. 
37 Only British inhabitants were technically allowed to purchase and sell homes; they were given preference in 
trading contracts and supplying the garrison; and they were the only residents granted the privilege of serving 
alongside the Judge Advocate in civil disputes brought to the Civil Court. 
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reminding them of his authority and ability to control all aspects of Gibraltar. It stressed to the 
residents that he was willing to do whatever necessary to “secure the garrison,” even if it meant 
putting several limitations on the civil sphere and its development. An state of emergency 
justified such restrictions, he believed, if it prevented the spread of radical bodies and their 
beliefs into and within the territory. 
 
The 1792 Controversy in Gibraltar: Trade versus Security 
With the dawn of 1792, the situation abroad worsened, revolutionary fervor gained 
strength, and it seemed increasingly likely that war was on the horizon. After learning of the 
1791 Declaration of Pillnitz, which the French government interpreted as a threat, many French 
radicals called for war against Austria.38 Military action would strengthen their personal and 
political influence at home and demonstrate their newfound power abroad, countering the 
critiques of surrounding states. By February, war seemed to be a likelihood in the near future. As 
the possibility of war loomed, the Revolution became even more radical as the revolutionaries 
sought to pursue their enemies and ferret out any traitors within the government. In addition, the 
situation in France worsened as the year began with significant inflation, resulting in food riots 
across the state. This, alongside the disagreements and competition within the parties present in 
the collapsing Legislative Assembly, resulted in great unrest and instability throughout the state. 
As tensions rose in France, and subsequently in Britain and the neighboring states, Boyd 
strove to tighten his grasp on the territory in an effort to keep Gibraltar safe from the surrounding 
turbulence. To him, and other leaders, it appeared that Gibraltar could be on the brink of an 
                                                          
38 The Girondins believed that a large conspiracy threatened France, leading the Assembly to demand that Louis 
XVI confront King Leopold and force him to promise that he would not interfere in French affairs. France 
eventually declared war on Austria, and by default Prussia who had allied itself with Austria in the declaration, on 
April 20, 1792. See Neely, Concise History, pp. 144-145. 
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emergency and it was necessary to do whatever possible to privilege security over all else. As 
part of this effort, Boyd sought to ensure that existing regulations were enforced and that any 
existing holes in the control of the town were plugged. On February 10 Boyd published an order 
that required all residents to obtain a permit before riding mounted “anywhere within the Gates 
of this Fortress” (Figure 5.1). These restrictions were necessary, Boyd maintained, because “the 
practice is grown remarkably common” that people would ride throughout the town despite the 
dangers posed by the unpaved streets and close quarters. Accidents were not uncommon: a 
soldier had recently broken his leg when a servant rode too closely next to him.39 If residents did 
not obey the order, Boyd mandated that they would be forced to dismount and the animal would 
be seized and sent to the pound, released only with the governor’s permission and under the 
Town Major’s authority.40 Soldiers were also forbidden to ride through the garrison or suffer 
similar consequences, and officers were recommended to either ride careful or lead their horses 
outside of the gates before mounting. Boyd requested the aid of the garrison’s officers to help 
him and other administrators enforce this edict to ensure the safety of the residents.41 
Two weeks later on February 27 the governor issued an additional declaration, forbidding 
all unauthorized inhabitants and soldiers from traveling on the streets between tattoo and reveille 
(8 PM to 6 AM) (Figure 5.2).42 This order, he claimed, merely reiterated the garrison’s standing 
orders, which forbade all civilians from passing without a light or permit after certain hours. 
These restrictions would help to prevent any unsavory activities by the inhabitants, and possibly 
                                                          
39 GGA, Orders, 1749-1793 Placarts, 1793-1802, Orders 1st July 1749-22nd Feb 1793, 10th February 1792, fo. 331. 
40 TNA, CO 91/36, Correspondence from London merchants to Dundas, 17 May 1792; GGA, Orders, 1749-1793 
Placarts, 1793-1802, Orders 1st July 1749-22nd Feb 1793, fo. 331-332. 
41 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, and TNA, CO 91/36, Chronology by Boyd. 
42 Tattoo was the signal for the men to secure the post in preparation for bed; it also typically marked the end of 
drinking for the night. Reveille was typically the morning call for the troops, which marked the raising of the flag, 
the firing of the gun, and the assembly of men for roll call. 
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even thwart any secret meetings that could happen in the night. Because “Housebreakings and 
Thefts by night” had “grown remarkably frequent for some time past,” Boyd felt it necessary to 
remind inhabitants and reinforce this policy.43 The governor directed the nighttime patrols of 
soldiers to take up any offenders and lodge them in the Main Guard overnight; offenders would 
not be released until their names were sent to the governor. Boyd did allow certain exceptions to 
the rule, allowing people who were ill or facing some sort of emergency to carry a light and 
simply inform the patrols of their reasons for traveling without a permit. In addition, he also 
forbade the patrols from stopping anyone within the first half an hour after the firing of the 
evening gun. Commanding officers, and those who accompanied them, were exempt from both 
orders.44  
In Boyd’s mind, these orders would allow him to keep the civil sphere well managed, 
granting him more time and attention to focus on more pressing military and diplomatic matters. 
With the nightly curfew, the inhabitants would require less monitoring and his soldiers would be 
better able to police any offenders. His goal, he argued, was simply to protect the residents and 
promote order in the town. As he later informed the Secretary of State, the governor was merely 
acting for “the King’s Service, & the protection of the community.”45 However, Gibraltar’s 
British merchants did not view these new orders in such a light. In their opinion, Boyd’s orders 
were a threat both to their personal well-being and their professional livelihood. As the 
petitioners noted, they chose to settle in Gibraltar because of the Crown’s encouragement and 
promise to protect the “security of British Trading Subjects.” This “Royal Promise” had 
                                                          
43 GGA, Orders, 1749-1793 Placarts, 1793-1802, Orders 1st July 1749-22nd Feb 1793, 27th February 1792, fo. 332-
333. 
44 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 8 March 1792. 
45 GGA, Miscellaneous Papers, 1791-1794, 1792 Papers, Memorialists to Boyd, 3 April 1792, and TNA, CO 91/36, 
Chronology by Boyd; TNA, CO 91/36, Boyd to Dundas, 27 September 1792. 
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sustained them through the struggles that life in Gibraltar posed: the many quarantine 
restrictions, the particularities of international relations in the region, and life in a garrison 
community under a military governor that was often at war.46 While they had borne the many 
restrictions placed on the garrison trade and weathered the losses of the Great Siege, the 
merchants were not willing to labor under unnecessary or overbearing regulations.47 In their 
minds, the new regulations, particularly the one restricting nighttime activities, were tantamount 
to an unnecessary and unjust imposition of martial law. 
Gibraltar’s leading British merchants expressed their dissatisfaction in a written petition 
to the governor dated March 8, 1792. At the time petitions were widely regarded as a respected 
and peaceable means for British subjects to communicate their concerns, introduce their 
proposals, and voice their opinions.48 By responding in the form of a petition, these Britons 
sought to inform the governor of their unease by engaging directly with his practice of 
governmentality.49 Embracing their rights as Britons, the merchants sought to challenge the 
governor’s overbearing policing of the inhabitants and their every movement. In their opinion, 
Boyd’s micropolitical approach to government was overly excessive, especially in light of the 
current situation of the town.  
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As the authors noted, the garrison was currently in a “time of profound peace;” there was 
even “nothing hostile [that] can be apprehended from the Court of Spain.”50 Yet the February 
orders were more reminiscent of a time of war. During wartime it was excusable for a governor 
to pass such regulations because he required complete control over the territory and its 
inhabitants. However, during times of peace, they believed there was no justifiable reason for the 
governor to deprive inhabitants of their “free liberty and license” as he had done. To these men, 
Gibraltar was not in a state of emergency and its people should not be treated as if they were. 
Under these orders even the most “respectable” citizens were prohibited from “the enjoyment of 
an Evenings Walk, or the Convivial intercourse of a Friend” without threat of seizure and 
imprisonment. Such restrictions, they argued, were “cruel in the extreme, and contrary to all 
Justice and Equity.”51 Boyd’s orders also posed significant complications to the merchants’ 
commercial ventures, making it difficult for them to move about the town, transport their goods, 
or carry out business after 6 PM. Under these regulations, the petitioners argued, “No Trade can 
be carried on there, with any degree of Satisfaction or Sincerity.”52 
Such restrictions seemed especially unreasonable in light of the merchants’ positive 
relationship with the previous governor, Major General Charles O’Hara. O’Hara, who served 
from 1788 to 1790, was so beloved by the commercial community that after his departure they 
sent him a letter of commendation and “Piece of Plate” in thanks for his beneficence. Unlike 
previous governors, who had placed stringent regulations on the merchants, O’Hara “shew[ed] us 
that in a Garrison Town Situated in an Enemy’s Country (as the Conduct of the Spaniards to 
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Gibraltar has always proved them to be) the rigid & necessary Exactness of Military Discipline, 
Could be maintain’d without encroaching on the Liberty of the Subject, or restraining the 
Freedom of Trade.”53 Recognizing the complications that plagued the governor, the merchants 
applauded his efforts to work with them rather than limiting their trading opportunities like past 
commanders.54 Although trade actually declined during this period, Gibraltar’s merchants did not 
appear to have blamed this occurrence on the governor; instead they emphasized his kindness 
and attention to the Gibraltar’s civil sphere, celebrating his efforts to foster growth in the town 
and its trades.55 If O’Hara could manage to secure Gibraltar against continuous Spanish threats 
while facilitating the growth of the civil sphere, it seemed that any governor should be able to do 
so, especially if not under the direct threat of war. To the merchants, the garrison’s situation had 
not changed in the time between the two governors’ tenures, and they refused to be treated as if it 
had. 
The only explanation the merchants could consider was that unlike O’Hara, Boyd was not 
interested in preserving and promoting Gibraltar’s civil sphere. Instead, the merchants argued, he 
showed a “glaring Partiality” for members of the military. This was his greatest fault and formed 
the basis of the merchants’ complaints. Among Britons it was often avowed that “Trade was 
never known [to] flourish under a Military Power;” this was especially true, the merchants 
demonstrated, under Boyd’s administration.56 As a result, the authors focused most of their ire on 
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the soldiers, condemning Boyd’s use of the military.  With these new regulations Boyd had 
“vest[ed] the Military Officers, and even privates” with the authority to act as “Judge, Evidence, 
and avenger.” Officers were permitted to stop passing inhabitants, question them about the 
purpose of their travels, determine if the person was violating garrison orders, and if so, punish 
them accordingly.57 In essence, the petitioners suggested, the garrison soldiers now resembled a 
standing army, employed as an enforcing body during a time of peace. As they argued, Boyd’s 
“Placart makes a peace Officer of a Soldier.” 58 Such bodies of soldiers were an anathema to 
many Britons, who decried them as a “dangerous instrument” and a “Hydra among mankind.”59 
Long associated with martial law in Britain, standing armies were believed to be incompatible 
with the proper administration of justice.60 The Gibraltar petitioners echoed such sentiments, 
arguing that although they were promised to be “perfectly free from every Species of Tyranny & 
Military law,” they were now “intirely at the Mercy of the Military.” This administrative 
approach, they contended, was contrary to British law and good government and illegal in times 
of peace. 
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Focusing their attention on the soldiers, the petitioners also argued that Boyd’s new 
orders contradicted his efforts to secure the town. Instead of protecting the residents, his 
commands would actually effect more violence and crime. Because soldiers were “obliged to 
admit of no Arguments but the sword and the Musket,” it was likely that they would turn to force 
when challenged by an inhabitant. They had been “furnished and provided with the very proper 
Weapons” and “authorized… to avail of those body means which are placed in their Hands.” In 
that light, the merchants suggested Gibraltar’s inhabitants would be in greater danger from “the 
uncontrouled power vested in the Officer or Soldier” rather than “the Kick of an unruly Animal.” 
They feared that the soldiers’ recourse to violence would result in “the most dreadfull 
circumstances,” even including the murder of an innocent inhabitant. If that were to happen, they 
argued, it would create even greater problems for the governor, who could be charged as an 
accessory by virtue of issuing the orders.61 By vesting the soldiers with the authority to enforce 
orders and providing them with weapons to do so, Governor Boyd was treading a fine line 
between peaceful control and violent disorder. 
The petitioners also suggested that Boyd’s orders would encourage greater thefts and 
other crimes. Some soldiers had already been charged with robbery, the very crime that inspired 
the February 27th order; now that so many of them were exempt from this regulation, there was 
nothing to stop them from perpetrating greater crimes. As the merchants noted, the soldiers were 
“none of the most rigid observers of honesty,” a stereotype that pervaded contemporary British 
portrayals of the military.62 Soldiers were thought to “always be uncommonly depraved,” known 
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for their general debauchery and drinking habits, use of foul language, visits to public houses and 
prostitutes, and fathering illegitimate children.63 Many Britons, including those settled in 
Gibraltar, believed themselves to be safer when the military was engaged abroad rather than 
sitting at home. Even King George III was reportedly concerned that there would be an increase 
in highway robberies and property crimes with the return of the soldiers following the American 
Revolutionary War.64 In the current atmosphere in Gibraltar, the petitioners worried that many 
soldiers, when “enforcing” Boyd’s orders, would force the inhabitants to pay for their freedom or 
rob them of the personal possessions they carried at the time of their arrest. In light of the 
soldiers’ newfound powers, the memorialists feared that these orders were “the most likely way 
in the World to make [crime] more frequent.”65 Appealing to Boyd’s fears of unrest in the 
garrison, the merchants sought to convince him to retract his commands, allowing them to better 
pursue their trades. 
Despite the memorialists’ “sober” reflections on Boyd’s orders, the governor refused to 
redact his commands. Rather than denying his use of military power in the town’s 
administration, Boyd defended his orders and his actions. He replied that “in this Garrison, ‘the 
free liberty and licence… to go and come in, by day or by night, either with or without a light, 
without the necessity of any permit from a military Officer, and without he control of any 
military power,’ cannot be allowed.”66 Such practices were contrary to the standing orders of the 
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garrison, and Boyd was unwilling to budge on those regulations, which he claimed were “no 
innovation of mine.”67 It was not difficult to obtain a permit and, as Boyd later noted, many 
“peaceable Inhabitants” had applied for and been granted one. Only questionable residents would 
be bothered by these restrictions, and those peoples were the very ones that the governor sought 
to monitor. In light of these protests, Boyd was even more concerned for the safety of the 
garrison and the threat that the petitioners posed to the territory’s peace. Their challenge to his 
authority encouraged the governor to hold his ground, especially because he believed that his 
orders posed no real threat to inhabitant’s rights. In a garrison community like Gibraltar, he 
argued, it was essential for civilians to follow the commander’s orders for the sake of the 
territory and their own safety. Such a micropolitical approach to governance, he suggested, was 
necessary for the security of the town. Boyd decreed that his February orders would remain in 
force. 
Even before the governor refused to relent with his orders, tensions rose between some of 
Gibraltar’s inhabitants and the garrison soldiers on patrol. It appears that the inhabitants did not 
heed Boyd’s orders, choosing instead to disobey them and travel without a permit or a light. As 
one report detailed, in the beginning of March a British inhabitant stayed out after hours and 
chose to travel home, despite not having an authorized pass. On his way home he encountered a 
patrol of soldiers and fled, at which point the soldiers pursued him. Reportedly a member of the 
patrol fired a shot at the young man, which luckily hit a wall, and the resident escaped.68 Such 
incidents were apparently not uncommon as Boyd was driven to issue a subsequent order in 
March, reinforcing the terms of his two February declaration. As a punishment for disobeying his 
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mandates, Boyd commanded that “any Inhabitant taken up hereafter by the Patrols, for breach of 
Garrison orders, shall be confined in Jail a Week.”69 Such a strict punishment was necessary, he 
believed, to deter offenders and remind them of the importance of observing the governor’s 
regulations. 70 Now that the petitioners were not only authoring seditious petitions but also 
disrupting the peace of the garrison and flouting direct orders, the governor felt that he had to 
take a stand against this outright threat.  
These confrontations between the inhabitants and the soldiers became even more frequent 
in the following months. As Boyd later reported, many of the petitioners did not respond well to 
the governor’s most recent order, choosing to disregard his commands and cause disruptions in 
the town.  The numbers of inhabitants arrested for “gross abuse, & meances to an Officer” grew 
and those who were arrested were supported during their confinement with ample funds and 
provisions provided by other dissatisfied residents. One of the merchants was even accused of 
taking other residents’ permits, which they had legally obtained from Governor Boyd, and 
disposing of them in front of the Officer of the Main Guard.71 Meanwhile, inhabitants reported 
that they had been “seized in the Streets” or “forcibly taken from their doors by the Patroles,” 
arrested for no reason and with no opportunity to protest their innocence.72 One gentleman 
claimed that he had been forced by the soldiers to open his door, which had been shut as he was 
inside preparing for bed. When he was slow to respond to the soldiers’ demands, the sergeant 
had threatened to break down the door, “took a firelock from one of his own guard, - cocked and 
presented it to the Man in his own house, and swore he would immediately shoot him” if he did 
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not accompany the officer to the Main Guard. The gentleman acquiesced in order to protect 
himself from injury, and he was subsequently confined in the guard overnight and imprisoned in 
jail for the following week.73 Half a dozen other men reported similar experiences with the 
patrols and they too were “committed to the New Jail without any Trial or Conviction.”74 During 
this time it seemed to some residents that “the very Name of an Inhabitant, or rather the Sight of 
a coloured Coat carries with it, in the eye of the meanest Soldier, Degradation, and disrespect.”75 
By the beginning of April, the relationship between all parties in the territory were strained and 
fractious.  
On April 3, the March memorialists submitted another petition to Governor Boyd, yet 
this one did not employ as charitable language as their previous memorial. Rather than 
concentrating on the inherent problems with the governor’s orders and working towards an 
agreeable solution, this petition served as a verbal attack on the governor, detailing his failures as 
a British administrator. The merchants claimed that Boyd had “struck at the Root of sacred 
unalienable Rights of Liberty and Property” and had done “irreparable damage… to the Majesty 
of Justice whose Insignia you bear.” Boyd robbed them of their right to fair trial, he had 
“deprived them” of their liberties, and he had “subverted” and “defied… all Laws.” As they 
portrayed it, the governor’s oppressive orders appeared to be “an Extract from some gloomy 
Relic of despotism,” not “the sober, dispassionate sentiment of an English Governor and Chief 
Magistrate.” Rather than honoring the “known Laws of England” that he “was bound to,” Boyd 
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had instead “aimed at establish[ing] a Military Tyranny,” establishing exacting edicts that 
curtailed the rights of his inhabitants, limited their voices, and privileged the soldiers.76 
In Boyd’s eyes, the petitioners argued, “Gibraltar is only to be considered in the nature of 
a Garrison.” This was evident through his many restrictions and regulations upon trade, which 
demonstrated his “extreme aversion to the designs of Commerce,” as well as his complete 
disregard to the civil sphere in Gibraltar. As they maintained, because the governor appeared to 
believe that “there was no Town,” he also seemed to have adopted the attitude that “there was no 
formal establishment for the Government and protection of its Inhabitants.” Rather than 
attending to “the people committed to your charge,” Boyd’s “determined predilection” for the 
military “blinded you to the high and honorable relation in which you stand to the Inhabitants of 
this Town.” The governor, they argued, ignored his duty of governing, choosing instead to 
“enslave the people committed to your charge.” His “arbitrary and oppressive” regulations had 
been so restrictive and detrimental to this community that the petitioners claimed that the town of 
Gibraltar had never suffered so greatly under a governor’s leadership. While other governors had 
enforced stringent restrictions, only Boyd, they argued, had sought to “humiliate and distress the 
Inhabitants, to render their lives uncomfortable, and their Trade unprofitable” with “almost every 
order or placard which has been issued.”77 According to the authors, martial law had become the 
norm under Boyd’s rule as governor, and now they were unwilling to tolerate such treatment. 
Tired of the governor’s constant policing of all aspects of their life and his technologies of 
governance, the merchants chose to take a stand and appeal to a higher law. 
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Because Boyd had refused to consider their memorial, it was their duty, the petitioners 
contended, to inform “that most August Assemblage” in London of Boyd’s defiance of his 
charge as governor. As such, they concluded their memorial by informing the governor that they 
would “with chearfullness refer their Cause” to Parliament, seeking restitution for Boyd’s 
intolerance and repression.78 The merchants reiterated that Boyd’s orders, and his administration 
of the territory, were “arbitrary and oppressive” and entirely contrary to the British constitution 
and the desires of the British crown and Parliament. Following through with their promise, the 
merchants contacted their commercial colleagues in London, forwarding their two petitions as 
well as several affidavits reporting on the conditions under which Gibraltar’s inhabitants 
suffered. As the authors affirmed, the situation in the town “becomes more irksome… daily, and 
hourly” and they worried that it “will not stop.” They urged their associates in the metropole to 
contact members of Parliament and present their concerns so as “to obtain us redress from our 
present disagreeable state.”79 If Gibraltar’s merchants could not trade freely, this would in turn 
affect their commercial relations in Britain, who had a much stronger voice and influence to 
present to Parliament and the king.80 It was necessary, they argued, and their associates agreed, 
to resolve the situation in the territory in order to allow trade to flourish and enable Gibraltar’s 
merchants to take advantage of the new Mediterranean trading opportunities. 
In response to the merchants’ second petition, Governor Boyd sought the assistance of 
the acting Judge Advocate in ferreting out the offensive authors and control the situation on the 
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ground. He informed the judge that the merchants had “depreciated” his character in “the vilest 
terms” and “encouraged a non compliance with Garrison orders.” As he noted, these inhabitants 
were seditious on a number of fronts and should be prosecuted. In particular, he denounced the 
actions of George Davies, who he believed was responsible for the petitions and for taking 
residents’ permits. Boyd contended that Davies “does not only encourage sedition, but has 
proceeded to an overact of presumption and opposition to the Garrison Rules and orders.”81 
Therefore, he asked the judge to please summon Davies and question him about his actions. 
Unfortunately for Boyd, Judge Morrison was not as helpful as the governor had hoped. The 
judge did summon Davies, but he “could not legally enforce” the merchant to respond to his 
questions or divulge his role in the petitions and acts of civil disobedience.82As a result, Boyd 
was left without answers regarding Davies’ involvement or the future directions of the 
petitioners.  
Without the help of the Judge Advocate, the governor was unable to pursue the matter 
further within the garrison and was left without the support of his fellow British administrator. 
Having already published an additional order and sought the help of his fellow administrator, 
Boyd had largely exhausted his options for managing the crisis within the garrison. While he did 
still have the ultimate authority in the territory, he had no means beyond those already employed 
to control the petitioners further. With the petitioners’ submission of their complaints to those in 
London, the governor recognized that he would have to defend his name to his superiors abroad 
should the memorial catch their attention. It appeared that this local conflict, which had emerged 
out of Boyd’s efforts to manage the territory and proactively prevent other crises, would now 
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become a larger imperial issue subject to the opinions of Parliament and the king. These higher 
powers would have to decide if Boyd had indeed employed such orders to protect the territory 
and its people or if he had overstepped his bounds as governor and impeded on the rights of the 
inhabitants. Gibraltar, both parties could now agree, was indeed in a state of crisis, caused by the 
other, and needed a resolution from the metropole in order to bring peace back to the territory. 
 
Crisis Moves to the Metropole 
In May 1792 a party of London merchants presented a memorial to members of 
Parliament on behalf of their partners in Gibraltar, including the Gibraltarians’ petitions, 
depositions, and letters in their missive. This memorial condensed several of the themes 
expressed by Gibraltar’s merchants, emphasizing Boyd’s tyrannical nature and his invasion of 
their rights and liberties as British citizens in such a way that it employed similar rhetoric as 
many of the revolutionary writers. Rather than simply being a poor administrator, Governor 
Boyd was now depicted as a tyrannical, absolutist ruler and his disregard for their rights was not 
just because of his military predilections but because he sought to destroy the British 
constitution. As suggested by both the Gibraltar and London merchants, Governor Boyd 
appeared to embody all the evils of the “MONSTER” French government.83 
According to many British onlookers, the French revolutionary government appeared to 
be “the bloodiest and most detestable tyranny that has blotted the annals of modern Europe.”84 
As observers of the Revolution noted, the situation in France had rendered everyone’s liberties, 
                                                          
83 Arthur Young, The Example of France, A Warning to Britain (Dublin, 1793), pp. 11-15, 27. While this section 
draws on quotations primarily from the London merchants’ memorial, their language was based largely on that used 
by the Gibraltar merchants. Although the previous section of this chapter did not focus specifically on this rhetoric, 
it is present in their two memorials, affidavits, and letters, although in a more diffuse form as it is scattered 
throughout the documents. 
84 Somerville, The Effects of the French Revolution, p. 38. 
209 
 
freedoms, and property insecure, placing even their lives in jeopardy.85 This, British authors like 
Thomas Somerville asserted, was the epitome of tyranny: “If the invasion of private property, if 
intolerance of religious and political opinion, if false accusations, if the imputation of guilt 
without the shadow of evidence, if merciless severity of punishment, if these are characteristics 
and ingredients of tyranny, then assuredly we cannot hesitate a moment to pronounce, that the 
French Convention has reached the summit of tyranny.”86 Such a description, the petitioning 
merchants suggested, was not only fitting for the French revolutionaries but also for Boyd’s 
administration. They argued that Boyd’s governorship was “Tyranny really bordering upon 
Madness” with his residents suffering “under the Scourge of such an undue Exercise of 
Power.”87 Like the French government, depicted as “vicious, arbitrary, and incompatible with the 
just rights of the people,” Boyd too issued a number of “strange [and] arbitrary Orders” that 
“debase[d] & humiliate[d] the Civil People.”88 Due to his “Caprice & Tyranny,” the merchants 
argued, the inhabitants “suffer[ed] every hardship.” Employing a similar rhetoric as those 
protesting the revolution, the merchants demonstrated shocking parallels between their British 
governor and the French despots.89 
Like the French revolutionaries, who sought to “destroy all vestiges of the antient 
country, in religion, in polity, in laws, and in manners,” the petitioners accused Governor Boyd 
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of violating the sanctity of the British constitution. As historians have noted, during this period 
there was “an almost hysterical regard for the constitution.”90 The constitution, as many 
proponents attested, was emblematic of the glory of Britain and its superior system of strong 
government and liberty.91 Burke exclaimed, “it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to 
claim and assert our liberties.”92 The London petitioners echoed this sentiment, noting that the 
constitution was “formed by the Wisdom of Ages, to secure to Individuals the greatest possible 
degree of Liberty, consistent with the general Welfare & Security.”93 Liberty was seen as the key 
component of the constitution because it empowered Britons to follow their interests, talents and 
goals so long as they did not injure the property or liberty of others.94 It was through their 
liberties, many Britons believed, that they were able to accumulate property, wealth, and 
happiness under the guidance of the British state.95 As some historians have argued, liberty was 
“the single most important ingredient” of British identity at that time and often used to 
distinguish the superior political doctrine of Britain from their tyrannical neighbors.96Although 
the governor was “far from ignorant of the Laws of his Country, of the Priviledges of English 
Subjects, & of the legal Extent of his own Power,” the merchants claimed that he had violated 
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the principles established by the constitution, having “deprived [the residents] of every Shadow 
of Personal Liberty.”97  
Life in the town of Gibraltar, as the petitioners’ portrayed it, in many ways mirrored the 
perils experienced by French citizens.98 According to Arthur Young, who had traveled in France 
during the early years of the Revolution, the “indigent poor possessed of power” under the 
revolutionary government had committed “horrors” across the state, “plundering” and 
“oppressing” the people.99 The National Assembly had arrested more than five hundred people, 
imprisoned them without cause, tried them illegally and denied any appeals.100 Meanwhile, free 
citizens were subject to the whims of the “widely destructive” and “dangerously incontrollable” 
French radicals who favored “the most violent propositions.”101 The merchants’ depicted a 
similar scenario in Gibraltar, writing of the numerous illegal arrests and the imprisonment of 
even Gibraltar’s leading residents in the common jail, “which is a wretched Place,” and their 
week-long confinement “without trial, or the Imputation of any Crime, but that of having been 
visible, contrary to the Governor’s Orders.” Those residents who remained in the town feared the 
“full & unlimited Power” of the patrolling soldiers, who often turned to violence or theft with 
their newfound authority. The soldiers, much like the French radicals, the petitioners’ claimed, 
posed an “imminent danger to the Lives & Libertys of Numbers [of inhabitants].”102 
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The tales of Gibraltar’s residents depicted a life of insecurity, violence, destruction, and 
tyranny that seemed surprisingly similar to the stories told by anti-revolutionary Britons coming 
from France. Echoing these authors’ themes, the petitioners employed this rhetoric to support 
their cause in freeing Gibraltar’s merchants (and other residents) from Boyd’s restrictions. Such 
an approach was necessary in order to strengthen their argument against the governor and better 
represent the merchants’ case. Parliament had rarely paid much attention to the territory, and in 
light of the greater threats of revolution abroad and at home, it was unlikely that the merchants’ 
complaints of a petty trading dispute would register. As a result, the merchants took advantage of 
current fears and tailored their critique to the surrounding revolutionary discourse. Recognizing 
the importance of these conversations to their contemporaries, especially those in the 
government, the petitioners sought to convince their audience of the severity of the problem by 
using a common frame of reference. When placed together, the petitioners’ scattered critiques 
offered a cogent argument against Boyd and his efforts “to destroy the grand Foundation and 
Pillar of their happy Constitution.”103 
The petitioners’ tactics were successful enough to generate a response from Henry 
Dundas, Secretary of State for the Home Department.104 He wrote to Governor Boyd in July, 
informing him of the merchants’ complaints about his “rigid observance of the regulations.” 
While Dundas did not insist that Boyd halt his current practices, seeking an explanation from the 
governor first, he did advise that the governor “relax gradually” “the exercise of your Military 
authority over the civil Inhabitants.” As his letter suggested, Boyd’s approach to governance was 
too micropolitical and employed an excessive use of power. It was the governor’s duty, Dundas 
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maintained, to “grant [the inhabitants] every degree of indulgence which can be afforded to them 
consistently with a due attention to the security of that important Garrison.” As his missive 
intimated, it did not appear that Boyd was currently governing with this in mind, instead 
imposing “a very improper and unnecessary restraint upon the peaceable Inhabitants.”105 
As Dundas’ letter traveled to Gibraltar, the governor was composing his initial attack on 
the petitioning merchants for the Secretary of State. Having learned of the merchants’ missive to 
his superiors in Parliament, Boyd felt the need to inform the Secretary of the “two infamous 
libels,” denouncing the traders for “so gross an insult.” Boyd likely recognized that their 
memorial to Parliament would denigrate his good name and administrative effort. As a result, he 
took a similar approach by vilifying the merchants and condemning their recent actions. 
According to Boyd, the “outrageous Peyneists,” also known as merchants, had “made some 
attempts tending to weaken the authority of a Commander in Chief.” These “high and mighty 
Demagogues” had bullied the Judge Advocate into inaction, leaving the governor 
“unsupported… in my civil capacity” and “grossly insulted by the lowest of mankind.” The 
inhabitants had been told repeatedly, he argued, that “they are Inhabitants of a place of war” and 
thus “must comply with all the rules and orders that are thought necessary by the Commander in 
Chief.”106 
Boyd’s language in his July letter, despite not knowing the exact content of the 
merchants’ May petition, invoked similar themes as his opponents in employing a rhetoric 
reminiscent of British anti-revolutionary writers. Whereas the petitioners identified the governor 
as a tyrant, Boyd presented the merchants as similar to the French radicals, seeking to overthrow 
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a well-established government. At a moment when authoritarian rule was less of a concern than 
radicalism, the governor’s accusation was grave. In labeling the merchants as “outrageous 
Peyneists,” the governor intimated that they subscribed to the beliefs of Thomas Paine, who was 
a pariah among the British government for his publication of the Rights of Man. Paine was 
known across Britain as exemplifying the revolutionary ideas that had created the current 
troubles in France. As Young noted in his treatise on the effects of the revolution, “we see the 
living and effective consequences of Paine’s doctrine.”107 At the time of Boyd’s writing, Paine’s 
trial for seditious libel had been postponed, but the British government had issued a proclamation 
against the proliferation of seditious writings, urging Britons to avoid such publications or 
gatherings that could produce unrest.108 By characterizing Gibraltar’s merchants as such, Boyd 
portrayed them as revolutionary leaders who disregarded the governor’s reasoning and instead 
appealed to the emotions of the other inhabitants in order to subvert his administration.109 
Boyd echoed and expanded upon this imagery in a September letter to Secretary Dundas 
in which he offered a full defense of his position. The petitioners, he contended, may have 
presented themselves as “peaceable,” but in actuality they were “ringleaders of the licentious 
populace.”110 Their protests were not simply kindly written complaints but rather seditious 
writings followed by physical violence and disruption. As he argued, these seemingly respectable 
men were not what they appeared to be, much like the “modest reformers” of the French 
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revolution who in actuality posed the greatest danger to the prevailing order.111 Instead of simply 
applying for a permit, the merchants refused to so, preferring to “encourage the lower class of 
inhabitants to the willfull breach of orders.” Boyd reminded Dundas that Gibraltar’s residents 
were not entirely upright citizens; rather, they were the “dregs of a motely people, expatriated 
from all parts of the Universe.” Such people of “suspicious character,” Boyd argued, could not 
be trusted and certainly should not be “encouraged and rewarded… for defying all observance of 
regulations.”112 By supporting such disobedience, Boyd suggested, the petitioners revealed their 
potential for treachery both against the governor but also the basis of his power: the British 
sovereign himself.113  
Such insinuations on Boyd’s part were not innocent; by September 1792 the Revolution 
had become a bloody one. The Girondin ministers were dismissed in June and the king was 
removed from power in August with the violent uprising at the Tuileries Palace. Following the 
overthrow of the monarchy, the French populace feared a large-scale counterrevolutionary plot 
was imminent, supported by the state’s many political prisoners. These fears grew until the 
beginning of September when news arrived in Paris that the Prussian army had invaded France, 
had captured Verdun and was advancing toward the capital. On that day an armed band attacked 
a group of prisoners that was being transferred, ushering in the beginning of the five-day 
September massacres that killed approximately 1,200 prisoners. For many outsiders, especially 
those in Britain, the massacres represented the disorder and violence of the French revolution.  
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In light of these developments abroad, Boyd seemed to suggest that Gibraltar’s 
petitioners posed a true risk to the security of the garrison and Britain itself. The “gentlemen” 
had “claim[ed] as a right the total abolition of all regulations, Civil and Military,” despite the 
consequences that would ensue. If he were “to prefer the convenience, or rather caprice, of each 
private individual” as the petitioners wished, the governor feared he would not be able to fulfill 
his responsibilities as commander.114 By giving into their demands, Boyd argued, he would 
sacrifice the security of the garrison and set a dangerous precedent for other Britons that might 
be inclined to rebel against authority. This was a real fear for many Britons who believed that 
“Popular tyranny is a catching phrenzy; that will surely spread, if effective measures be not taken 
in time to prevent it.”115 Rewarding or giving into such disobedience was one such way to 
promote the spread of rebellion. Boyd suggested that he was merely trying to prevent such chaos 
from erupting, while performing his duties as the head of the garrison and the town. Rather than 
policing the inhabitants unnecessarily, Boyd argued, he was merely exerting his authority on 
radical bodies as needed. As evidence of such, he argued, Gibraltar’s inhabitants had been 
granted “every indulgence” “in their civil rights, as [well as] the protection of their persons, 
estates, and merchandize.”116 Yet, he contended, they continued to contest his authority with “a 
violent spirit of opposition” and “the darkest malice & untruth.”117 
This verbal dispute continued in both Gibraltar and London as the year progressed. In 
September the London merchants issued a second petition to Parliament on their Gibraltar 
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colleagues’ behalf. This memorial employed the same language as the first and made similar 
claims about the governor’s tyrannical actions and assault on his peoples’ liberties.118 
Meanwhile, Governor Boyd continued to search for the “libelous” petitioners in Gibraltar. Again 
in September he sought the aid of the Judge Advocate in summoning one of the merchants who 
he believed was responsible for authoring the missive sent to London.119 While the merchant 
willingly admitted that he did write a letter to the head of the London petition, this investigation 
could be taken no further.120 The Judge Advocate refused to question the man if he was not 
charged with a crime or if it would incriminate him against future charges, and because the 
merchant did not offer up any grievances against the governor, there was nothing to consider in 
that regard.121 Once again Boyd was left without recourse against the rebellious merchants in the 
garrison. Although it appears that the physical hostilities had subsided, the animosity between 
the merchants and the governor remained, sparking up in other commercial disputes.122 Until 
administrators in London reached an official decision on the matter, the pressure in Gibraltar 
continued to simmer, even as tensions in the neighboring state worsened. 
 
Conclusion 
At the end of January 1793 Secretary Dundas wrote to Governor Boyd, endorsing his 
actions as commander over the past year. As he reassured the governor, “you may readily 
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suppose that His Majesty is always inclined to give countenance and protection to His Officers, 
in the proper and regular discharge of their respective duties; and I flatter myself that no 
dissatisfaction will be given to you, by any determination which may take place on the subject of 
these complaints.”123 The secretary’s support of Boyd and his efforts to secure the garrison sent a 
message not only to the governor but also to both parties of merchants: they too implicitly agreed 
that Gibraltar was in a state of emergency and the governor was justified in behaving as such. 
Boyd was not to be condemned or punished for overreacting to the situation, but rather 
applauded for acting appropriately as he had been commanded. His actions, as the secretary 
noted, had been deemed “proper and regular,” thus legitimating his efforts at securing the 
territory and controlling the civil sphere. Dundas’ response suggested that at this time, security 
and protection were far more important to the government than debates over “liberties.” By 
supporting Boyd’s micropolitical tactics of governance, including the policing of British 
subjects, the secretary indicated that he believed such a focused approach was necessary for the 
security of the British territory. 
By January, Louis XVI had been tried, found guilty, and executed by the French 
republican government. His death offered an even stronger argument against revolutionary ideas 
and their supporters, especially among states with a monarchy, like Britain. Meanwhile the 
French Convention pledged to pursue efforts to spread republicanism across the continent and 
throughout Europe, suggesting an expansion of their current war with Austria and Prussia.124 
This declaration, along with the execution of the king, encouraged Pitt to request funds from 
Parliament to fight a war against the murderous French government, despite past promises to 
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remain at peace. Louis’ execution proved to be the final straw not only for the British parliament 
but also its people who had become disenchanted by the violence in France.125 On February 1, 
France declared war on Britain.  
In light of these developments, the British government was more likely to support an 
“authoritarian” governor seeking to impose order and suppress proposed “reforms” instead of a 
“rebellious” populace challenging authority.126 Whereas in the past, Parliament often actively 
considered the complaints of Gibraltar’s merchants, at this time the discussion appeared to be 
largely muted.127 There were more pressing matters to concern the members than insulted 
residents and an upset governor in a distant territory, and few in the government would have 
been eager to support a group of dissenters. Even if their efforts were indeed innocent, the 
merchants’ appeals may have appeared more radical because of current events. Ideas during this 
period were not simply innocent musings but could be spurs to action, posing a threat to British 
authority as a whole.128 In order to preserve British law and liberties that the merchants and 
others praised, it was necessary, leaders believed, to place limits on these expressions of freedom 
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to ensure its continuation beyond this era. Liberty was best protected, the government suggested, 
by ensuring that British powers were unchallenged.129 
As this episode shows, Gibraltar was not untouched by the era of revolutions; rather, it 
too was drawn into the conflicts and discourse that plagued Europe and beyond. Boyd’s response 
was in many ways similar to other colonial governors threatened by rebellion and unrest.130 For 
many leaders, including Boyd, the events abroad posed a true emergency for places governed by 
monarchical authority. Because of the crisis situation, it was allowable for commanders to 
implement whatever means necessary to control possible threats, implementing a jurisprudence 
of emergency.131 Under this form of law, governors like Boyd could employ often unrestricted 
power and a lack of restraint in their dealings with inhabitants in their efforts to control the 
radical body. What was key, however, was to convince the metropole that such measures were 
necessary; during the revolutionary period, especially in the 1790s, the British government, also 
driven by fear of revolt, was likely to agree with its commanders. By embracing 
counterrevolutionary language and adopting the rhetorical nuances of supporters of the monarch, 
Boyd and other leaders were able to use these outside events to their advantage, strengthening 
their control over their territories and peoples with the permission of the British government. 
This strategic use of revolutionary rhetoric enabled Boyd, and possibly others, to escape the 
blame of the very problems that they caused through excessive control and “crisis” management. 
Boyd’s technologies of governmentality had at last become legitimate according to the British 
crown and Parliament. 
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Figure 5.1: Governor Boyd’s 10 February 1792 Proclamation  
(GGA, Orders, 1749-1793 Placarts, 1793-1802, Orders 1st July 1749-22nd Feb 1793, 10th February 1792, 
fo. 331) 
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Figure 5.2: Governor Boyd’s 27 February 1792 Proclamation 
(GGA, Orders, 1749-1793 Placarts, 1793-1802, Orders 1st July 1749-22nd Feb 1793, 27th February 1792, 
fo. 332) 
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Conclusion 
 For many Britons in the eighteenth century, and today, Gibraltar represented the “ideal” 
British territory, one that has remained a British possession despite dozens of attacks and threats 
over the past three centuries. This dedication to the small Mediterranean territory developed 
early in Gibraltar’s history as British pamphleteers defended Britain’s right to and need for 
Gibraltar despite Spanish attacks during the War of the Quadruple Alliance (1718-1720).1 
Gibraltar, in the authors’ portrayal, was “a Place of the greatest Concern to the Trading Part of 
this Kingdom” and also for diplomacy, making Britain “Masters of the Entrance into the 
Mediterranean.”2 As one pamphleteer claimed, those states “that once seemed to vie with Us for 
the Mastery of the Sea… will hardly ever be able to do again if we keep Gibraltar.”3 While 
Spain continued to vie for the return of Gibraltar, its image in the British imagination 
strengthened, leaving many to see the Rock as “a Jewel in the Crown of England… with respect 
to our Safety, Trade, and Power.”4 This sentiment was renewed and reinforced with each 
subsequent Anglo-Spanish contest, especially during the War of the American Revolution. With 
the loss of the American colonies but Britain’s continued hold on Gibraltar, British writers held 
up the Rock as the image of Britain’s fighting spirit and glory. As one author penned, “Lo! On 
these Rocks, whose blood-disputed right, Contending nations long engaged in fight, Victorious 
Britain sits enshrined in stone; Herself a rock, and not to be o’erthrown.”5 In the minds of 
Britons, Gibraltar represented the strength and might of the British empire. 
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 As a symbol of Britain and its imperial power, the image of Gibraltar held a powerful 
sway in the British imagination. In many ways, Gibraltar was not only a physical territory, but 
also an imagined colony, one which embodied the ideals of the empire. The imaginary Gibraltar 
was staunchly British: a strong, unconquerable rock that promoted maritime expansion and 
commercial growth. Yet this vision of the territory could only be sustained at a distance. For 
those in Gibraltar, it was clear that it had little use as a British stronghold, often causing more 
problems than its worth. It was not used as a means to propagate British ideals, support British 
trade, or promote British naval and diplomatic power, but rather it served as a site of cultural 
contact and exchange, a port with lackluster British trade, and a source of constant contention in 
European politics. The reality of Gibraltar was much more grim – and much less British – than 
the imaginary vision of the territory that held sway at home in Britain. 
 It was this reality of Gibraltar as a Mediterranean meeting ground of peoples, ideas, and 
goods that the governors encountered during their time in the garrison. For these commanders, 
the situation in Gibraltar created a sense of distress, largely because of the significant difference 
between it and the imagination of the territory that circulated in Britain. Hoping to find a 
securely British Rock to finish out their decades of military service, instead the governors 
discovered an embattled territory replete with a vast majority of foreign inhabitants speaking 
foreign languages, holding foreign beliefs, and practicing foreign religions. This, in conjunction 
with the tense geopolitical state of the eighteenth century which often involved Gibraltar, 
invoked a feeling of constant crisis for the territory’s governors. The garrison’s internal affairs 
plus the external tensions left many of the commanders dreaming of easier postings and seeking 
to gain a sense of control over the unruly territory and its problematic populous. 
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 With little control over the larger-scale diplomatic events that plagued Europe, the 
commanders turned their attention to the administration of Gibraltar and its people. Unable to 
appeal to their shared ideologies and beliefs, the governors sought to manage the inhabitants 
through more explicit means of governance. Embracing a variety of technologies, such as 
surveillance, the production of knowledge, and the creation of an archive, Gibraltar’s 
commanders endeavored to better “see” and “know” their population, giving themselves a sense 
of power in and over the territory. This form of management, they believed, was necessary to 
properly govern the territory and keep it securely in British hands. The driving force behind the 
governors’ policies was a fear of the foreign, a fear that was largely unwarranted in light of the 
many efforts these inhabitants made to support the garrison. The greatest troublemakers, as 
chapter five demonstrated, were the British inhabitants who felt that the restrictions placed by the 
governor were not befitting for a “free” British territory that should exemplify the British ideals 
of “liberty.” In this sense, the governors were not the only ones who felt the disconnect between 
the imaginary and real British Gibraltar. 
 While the current narrative of the eighteenth-century British empire has rarely included 
Gibraltar, this dissertation argues that Gibraltar was indeed an important part of the empire: in 
the minds of many contemporary Britons, in the lives of its governors and inhabitants, in the 
creation of an imperial ideology and narrative, and in the development of various administrative 
strategies and technologies. It is my aim to bring the story of Gibraltar into the eighteenth 
century narrative and provide a sense of these larger imperial developments and trends through 
the lens of this small Mediterranean holding. Gibraltar, I feel, offers a key perspective on this 
period that has often been ignored, one with a vision that is not bound by Europe or the 
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Americas, by land or by sea, or by “early modern” or “modern” periodization.6 Rather than 
focusing on the binaries of empire, Gibraltar encourages a view that accounts for the nuances, 
the varieties, and the multiplicities of the eighteenth century and its imperial world.
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